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1. SUMMARY: These consolidated petitions raise five issues for 
review: (1) whether thev'Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 
~ u.s.c. §§ 1251-1376, and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444, create implied private rights of 
action independent of the rights explicitly created by the citizen suit 
provisions of those Acts; (2) whether a private plaintiff may maintain a 
suit under the federal common law of nuisance recognized in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee; (3) whether the federal coIIu~on law of nuisance recognized in 
Illinois v. Milwaukee has been preempted by FWPCA and MPRSA; (4) whether 
plaintiffs' failure to give notice under the New Jersey tort claims act 
bars suit against state agencies in federal court on federal statutory or 
common law claims; and (5) whether the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery 
from state agencies for alleged violations of federal law. 
2. FACTS: Resps brought a class action suit on behalf of all those 
who earn their livelihood harvesting fish and shellfish from Atlantic 
Ocean seabeds near New Jersey and New York. According to resps, various 
state and federal agencies named as defendants in their complaint either 
discharged or permitted the discharge of sewerage into the Atlantic 
Ocean. In 1976 these discharges allegedly caused a massive growth of 
algae from Long Island to Cape May extending from a few miles to 20 miles 
~ 
off shore. When this algal mass bloomed and died it settled on the 
ocean's floor and created an oxygen deficiency which resulted in the 
death of marine life. Resps sued for injunctive relief and damages -------------
- -
- 3 -ce under FWPCA, MPRSA, federal common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. 
~-
3. DECISIONS BELOW: The6 Meanor) dismissed resps' claims under 
FWPCA and MPRSA. Resps had failed to comply with the provisions in FWPCA 
and MPRSA authorizing citizen suits only after notice to the EPA, the 
state, and the alleged violator. The statutory scheme allowed the EPA 
and the state 60 days within which to bring a suit of their own, 
foreclosing any private suit. The DC rejected resps' argument that the 
savings clause of FWPCA, and its counterpart in MPRSA, created an 
alternative basis for relief. The FWPCA savings clause reads "Nothing in 
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of 
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of 
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a state agency)." Petrs 
argued on the basis of this clause that FWPCA created an implied right of 
action for private parties to enforce its provisions unfettered by the 
notice requirements in the explicit citizen suit section. Relying on the 
interpretation of the similar citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air 
Act in City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976), the DC reasoned that Congress intended 
citizen participation in the enforcement of FWPCA and MPRSA standards to 
be specifically limited in such a manner that would not clog the already 
overburdened federal courts and which would permit governmental agencies 
to take appropriate action prior to citizen suit. These concerns would 
be ill served if private plaintiffs could circumvent the notice 
requirements of FWPCA and MPRSA via an unrestricted implied right of 
- action. The DC ruled that private parties could not bring an action 
under the federal common law of nuisance, reasoning that this Court's 
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), turned on the 
- -
- 4 -
• status of the plaintiff as a sovereign state. The DC also ruled that 
even if resps' complaint were read to allege a separate maritime tort of 
tortious damage to fishing by pollution, cognizable under the admiralty 
jurisdiction, resps' failure to comply with the Federal Tort Claims Act 




The 'cA reversed. It reasoned that the explic i t citizen suit 
provisions in PWPCA and MPRSA were intended to provide for enforcement by 
non-injured parties, so-called private attorneys general. Injured 
parties, such as resps herein, could sue under an implied private cause 
preserved by the savings clause, which did not 
require compliance with any notice provisions. The court discerned the 
implied cause of action by applying Cort v. Ash, recognizing, however, 
this Court's more recent pronouncements to the effect that the critical 
inquiry is one of legislative intent. The CA further ruled that resps 
could sue under the federal common law of nuisance. The CA stressed 
language in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n. 6, that "it is not 
only the character of the parties that requires us to apply fed e ral law,~ 
and reasoned that the question of interstate pollution required 
application of a uniform federal standard regardless of whether the 
plaintiff were a sovereign body. The CA further ruled that resps had 
stated a separate claim in maritime tort. Although the failure to comply 
with the FTCA barred any monetary recovery from the federal defendants, 
resps' failure to comply with the state tort claim provision only 
affected claims under that act, not any federal statutory or common law 
causes of action. 
4. CONTENTIONS: (1) All four petrs argue that the CA erred in 
permitting resps to pursue FWPCA and MPRSA c1aims despite their failure 





suits. Congress carefully limited the role of citizen suits in FWPCA and 
MPRSA, and the CA's finding of an implied cause -of action unfettered by 
any of the limiting provisions subverts the congressional purpose. In 
light of the explicit citizen suit provisions, courts should be chary of 
reading other remedies into the Act. In any event, the Cort v. Ash 
factors do not support implication, since the acts were passed for the 
benefit of the general public and not a particular class: and the 
unfettered private suits would interfere with the legislative scheme 
according primary responsibility to federal and state agencies. The CA 
decision is in direct conflict with City of Evansville v. Kentuckv Liquid 
Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979), which held that there was 
no implied right of action for damages under FWPCA. 
Resps adopt the reasoning of the CA, specifically that the notice 
- provisions only apply to suits by non-injured parties while injured 
parties may avail themselves of an implied cause of action. Resps also 
argue that the 60-day notice provision could be satisfied in substance 
simply by delaying any action after the filing of the complaint for 60 
days. Resps further contend that notice would have been futile in this 
case, since the damage of which they complain had already been incurred 
prior to the commencement of litigation. Notice would not, therefore, 
have permitted any agencies to rectify the conditions of which resps 
complain. 
-
(2) Petrs in 79-1711, 79-1754, and 79-1760 contend that a private 
plaintiff may not pursue a claim based on the federal common law of 
nuisance recognized in Illinois v. Milwaukee. These petrs disagree with 
the CA's reading of footnote 6 in Illinois v. Milwaukee, agreeing instead 
with the court in Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls 




on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976), that the footnote 
indicated "that there were other federal interests which in addition to 
the character of the parties required the application of federal law 
although those other interests in themselves would not have been 
sufficient." The United States argues that alt~ough there is no conflict 
in the circuits on the question review might be appropriate at this 
time. The position of the United States is that the CA correctly decided 
_the issue, and that a hard and fast rule should not be established 
preventing private parties from ever invoking the federal common law of 
nuisance. Resps agree with the United States, arguing that it was not 
the character of the parties in Illinois v. Milwaukee, but the character 
of dispute, interstate pollution of a navigable waterway, that 
__ necessitated the development of federal common law. 
(3) Petrs in 79-1711 and 79-1760 contend that even if private 
parties can sue under federal common law of nuisance, that common law has 
been preempted by the enactment of FWPCA amendments and the MPRSA. In 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Court stated "It may happen that new federal 
laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field of federal 
common law of nuisance." 406 U.S. at 107. When Illinois v. Milwaukee 
was decided, the 1972 amendments of FWPCA had not yet come into effect 
nor had Congress enacted MPRSA. Petrs argue that these new enactments 
establish a comprehensive regulatory system covering discharges into 
navigable waters. The United States and resps argue that there has been 
no preemption. The legislative history and the language of the statutes 
themselves, particularly the savings clauses, which refer to rights 
,e "under any statute or common law," indicate that Congress did not intend 
to preempt the federal common law of nuisance. Resps and the United 






this same issue, Illinois v. Milwaukee, cert. granted, No. 79-408 (March 
17, 1980), and that therefore review of the instant case is unnecessary. 
(4) Petrs in 79-1711 and 79-1754 contend that the federal causes of 
action are barred by resps' failure to comply with the New Jersey tort 
claims act. Whether characterized as federal common law nuisance, 
maritime tort, or implied federal claims predicated upon FWPCA or MPRSA, 
resps' claims are basically tort claims and therefore barred, since resps 
did not give notice to the public entity within 90 days of accrual of the 
cause of action. The United States and resps argue that state tort 
limitations do not apply to actions brought under federal law. Beyond 
limited immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment, a state may erect 
no additional barriers to suits under federal law. 
(5) Petrs in 79-1711 contend that resps' lawsuit is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment, arguing that the sewerage authorities being sued 
should partake of state immunity as "an arm of the state". The United 
States and resps answer that the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to 
counties or municipal corporations such as those involved in this case. 
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planninq Agency, 440 U.S. 
391, 400-01 (1979). Furthermore, New Jersey law itself establishes that 
the agencies involved here are not "an arm of the state". New Jersey 
statutes provide that the term "state" "shall not include any such entity 
which is statutorily authorized to sue or be sued". Among the powers 
specifically granted sewerage authorities is the right "to sue and be 
sued." 
5. DISCUSSION: There is a square conflict among the circuits on the 
FWPCA and MPRSA question, and the Court should grant cert to determine if 
there are implied rights of action under these acts independent of the 
explicitly authorized citizen suits. The CA's reasoning seems strained 
- -
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• and ignores the definition of "citizen" in the FWPCA as "a person or 




explicit citizen suit provisions thus do not seem to apply only to 
non-injured private attorneys general. Further, there is little support 
-----------'=::. 
in the statute or gislative history for the implication of a private 
right of action, see City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 
Inc., 604 F.2d at 1014-16, and this Court's recent pronouncements in the 
area have generally required strong indications of legislative intent. 
Finally, the framework of the citizen suit provisions of FWPCA and MPRSA 
are quite similar to those found in a large number of environmental 
statutes, such as the Deepwater Port Act, 33 u.s.c. § 1515, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8, the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4911, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 u.s.c. § 6972, and 
the Clean Air Act, 42 u.s.c. § 7604. Decision of the question in this 
case will provide guidance to lower courts confronted with similar 
questions under this broad range of statutes. 
There is no sharp conflict on the question whether private parties - --- --.. 
may bring federal common law nuisance actions. The question whether the 
federal common law of nuisance has been preempted by PWPCA and MPRSA is 
already before the Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee, cert. granted, No. 
"---- ---79-408 {March 17, 1980), and if the Court determines that there has been 
preemption this determination would moot · the question of private party 
suits. 
Petrs' claim of sovereign immunity does not appear meritorious in 
light of decisions such as Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Dovle, 
9 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Neither petrs nor resps cite any relevant 
'- authority on the question whether the New Jersey tort claims act can bar 







state notice of claims provisions are not necessarily hostile to the 
assertion of federal rights, this argument has been rejected in the 
context of civil rights suits. See, e.g., Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 
602 (7 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 {1974); Gipson v. Township 
of Bass River, 82 F.R.D. 122, 126 {D. N.J. 1979). 
There is a common response to all four petitions. 
8/18/80 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 79-1711; 79-1754; 79-1760; 80-1 2 - Middlesex 
Co., et al. v. Nat 'l Sea Clammers Assn. 
After receiving a very helpful summary from the Legal 
Officer, I propose that we grant certiorari in these cases 
to consider the following questions : 
1. Whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act , 33 
U.S.C. (& Supp . I) §§ 1251 et seq ., and the Marine 
Protection, Research & Sanctuaries Act of 1972 , 33 
U.S.C . (& Supp . I) §§ 1401 et seq., i mply a private 
right of action independent of the rights explicitly 
created by the citizens suit provisions of those Acts , 
33 u.s .c. § 1415 (g). 
2. Whether a private citizen has standing to maintain 
a federal common law nuisance action for alleged 
damages sustained resulting from ocean pollution as a 
general federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
3. Whe th e r any federal common law nuisance action for 
alleged damages sustained resulting from ocean 
pollution, if available to a private citizen, is not 
preempted by the present regulatory scheme governing 
ocean pollution established by the Federal Wate r 
Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, 
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(3) In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
Sea Clammers Assoc . (and companion cases ), Nos .' 
1754 , 1760 and 80-12 , the question is whether the~ dertr.l 
Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Prote ction , 
Research and Sanctuaries ct create private rights of action 
independent of the rights explicitly cr e ated by the citize n 
suit provisions of those Acts . The CA 3 r e v e rsed the DC 
which had held that there was no private right of action 
under these Acts. The appellate court r e a s oned that the 
citi ze n suit provisions of the Acts we re intended to provide 
enforceme nt by private attorneys general , not injured 
parti e s . Providing an i mplied cause of action for injured 
per s ons would be con s istent with the overall scope of the 
Act and would not violate the strictures of Cort 
andTr a nsamerica . The l e gislative int e nt s upported the 
implication of a private right of action . The circuits are 
in conflict on wh e ther a private right of action can b e 
implTecrunder these Acts. ~ , City of Ev a nsville v. 
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Mr. Justice Powell ~ 
From: Paul Smith 
Nos. 79-1711, -1754, -1760, 80-12 (Sea Clammers) 
Questions Presented 
(1) Whether resps can sue petrs as polluters under 
an implied right of action derived from the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and the Marine Protection, 
Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA). (2) Whether a private 
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by the present regulatory scheme. 
Background 
Petitioners are the City of New York, various New 
Jersey sewerage authorities, and EPA. They were sued by 
resps--the National Sea Clammers Association and one of its 
members--after a 1976 event in which a large growth of algae 
in the Atlantic died, killing various shellfish. Resps 
alleged that this algal growth occurred because of dumping of 
treated sewage "sludge" from New York and New Jersey. The 
~
complaint alleged violations of NEPA, FWPCA, MPRSA, the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899, the federal common law of nuisance, 
and the federal and state constitutions. It sought 
prospective, equitable relief and $500 million in damages. 
The EPA was included because the dumping here was authorized 
by licenses issued by the EPA. 
The district court dismissed all claims with A!J- C 
prejudice, except for pendent state claims, which 




FWPCA and MPRSA for failure to comply with the 60-day notice 
requirement of the citizen-suit provisions in those acts. 33 
U.S.C. § 1365; id., § 1415(g). It rejected an implied action -under these acts. It also held that private parties cannot 
bring a federal common-law nuisance suits under Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The other claims were 







The CA3 reversed 




as to the claims under FWPCA, MPRSA -------------It agreed with the district court 
that resp could not proceed under the specific jurisdictional 
grant of the citizen-suit provisions, because those are 
conditioned on 60-day notice to the defendants, and no such 
notice took place here. However <'f/ held that there are 
implied rights of action under these acts, relying on the 
savings clauses in each act, as well as the four factors of 
Cort. With respect to the FWPCA, the court held that the 
citizen-suit provision, 33 u.s.c § 1365(a), does not provide 
the exclusive method of private enforcement. Instead, it was 
intended to open up the courts to suits by any "citizen" who 
could show any adverse effect and was seeking to impose civil 
penal ties or injunctive relief on polluters. Congress then 
sought to retain other private remedies for those who are 
directly injured. It did so by adding§ 1365(e), which states 
that "[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or 
limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief 
against the Administrator or a State agency)." Similar 
reasoning was applied to the parallel provisions of the MPRSA. 
t:?/l ~ 
/ With respect to the feder~ mmon l ~w claim derived ~ 
from Illinois v. Milwaukee, the CA3 held that such a claim can ~ 
b b h b . h b . . . b c:..k~ -c.~-4..:> -~ e roug t y a pr 1vate party w o has een 1nJured directly y -~ "'"-
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descriptions in the Restatement concerning who is a proper 
plaintiff in a nuisance suit, and on cases from other 
jurisdictions alowing such suits by the federal government, 
municipalities and private individuals (cited on page 26a of 
the pet. for cert. in No. 79-1711). The court did not address 
the preemption argument presented here as well as in No. 79-
408, Milwaukee v. Illinois. 
In this Court, New York City and the New Jersey 
petitioners, along with the federal petitioner, argue that 
there is no implied right of action under FWPCA or MPRSA. 





5G--- has ~ common-law cause of action here (1) because this claim 
been totally preempted since the 1972 decision in Illinois v. 
 
a.-,_"t:e 
Milwaukee, (2) because the cause of action extends only to ~ •-~ 
states, and (3) because there are no grounds for awarding ~ 
damages under a federal common-law theory. The SG points out ~ 44~~-
that the United States has little direct concern with t h1'=-
nuisance theory, since the regulatory efforts of EPA cannot be ~ t:1..-/s 
considered acts creating a nuisance and since sovereign 
immunity bars an award of damages against the United States 
SG-
under common law theory. But he opines that private parties ~6-
 
sh~ d be able to bring common-law suits and that the savings ~a-
clauses in FWPCA and MPRSA bar the conclusion that this cause ~-~ 
of action has been preempted. 
Discussion 
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In my view, the argument that there is an implied 
right to sue for damages under FWPCA and MPRSA is specious. 
The CA3 acknowledged that the key criterion is legislative 
intent and then embarked on an unconvincing explanation of how 
Congress intended to imply a cause of action for damages even 
though it provided explicitly for "citizens suits" seeking 
injunctive relief and imposition of penalties on polluters. 
Obviously, the existence of these explicit private-suit 
provisions is the major hurdle for resps, since they suggest 
the absence of congressional intent to create other private 
rights of action. See Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 
571-74 (1979). 
The argument made by the CA3 is that §1365 (a) of 
FWPCA and the parallel provision of MPRSA were intended to 
broaden federal jurisdiction to include suits by "private 
attorneys general" who only had to demonstrate that they had 
an "interest which is or may be adversely affected," 33 u.s.c 
§ 1365(g). This broadening of the parties able to bring suits 
to . abate nuisances, it is argued, is irrelevant to the 
question of the right those more directly affected to seek 
recourse in damages .1 The savings clause in § 1365 (e) was 
1The CA3 went so far as to distinguish suits by "non-
injured" plaintiffs under § 1365(a) from suits by injured 
plaintiffs under an implied right of action. Pet. for cert. 
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meant to ensure that they could sue under the act itself for 
damages, since it preserves any "right which any person ••. 
may have under any statute or common law." 
The fundamental flaw with the argument is that the 
----- -express, citizen-suit provisions of § 1365 (a) and § 1415 do 
not apply solely to some class of "private attorneys general" 
- ' 
with only nebulous injuries from pollution. Instead, Congress 
sought to include anyone in the class of plaintiffs who was ~ 
sufficie~tly i ~ jure~ to be (?O~~d "adversely affected." ~ 
This ciass includes those, like resps, who allege economic ~ 
damage. Since these provisions apply to resps, it is ~ 
difficult to believe that Congress also intended a damage 
remedy. Nor do resps find convincing support in the savings 
clauses. Whatever the effect of §§ 1365(e) and 1415(g) (5) in 
preserving the separate federal common-law cause of action 
(Cf. Justice Rehnquist' s opinion in Milwaukee v. Illinois), 
they can hardly be read as "preserving" an implied remedy in 
the very same statute. That is not the natural import of the 
language used. 2 
2Moreover, even if these savings clauses were applicable to 
the statutes in which they are contained, they would not 
constitute affirmative indications of congressional intent to 
create an implied right of action. At most, they preserve 
such a right of action if it exists. If Congress intended to 
include a possible implied action in the scope of the savings 
clauses, its action manifests only an affirmative and 
conscious decision to relegate (or delegate) the question of 
an implied remedy to the courts. It would be worthwhile to 
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Finally, there is no other indication of 
cong r essional intent to create an implied remedy. The CA3 
applied Cort, concluding that the acts were passed for the 
"especial benefit" of per sons in resps' class, and that a 
private remedy would be "helpful." But it produced no real 
evidence of intent. 
In sum, I agree with petrs (including the SG) that -
there is no implied right of action under these acts. 
11.A) 
~ 
II. The Federal Common Law 
~~~ 
~~ 
There are two separate arguments concerning a 
possible federal common law claim in this case. The first is 
that all such claims have been preempted since the 1972 
decis i on in Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91. Since that 
time, federal regulation of water pollution has become 





identical ----Illinois, to the one presented in No. 79-408, Milwuakee v. { ~I will not discuss it here. I understand from Paul~ 
Cane that you are as yet undecided about joining Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion, which 
claims are now preempted. 
concludes that federal common 
9~tti't_ 
law 
The more specific argument is that the federal 
common law cannot be invoked in this case--either because the 
plaintiff is not a State, or because the relief sought is 
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damages. 3 New York and the New Jersey petitioners of fer a 
narrow reading of the Illinois v. Milwaukee decision, 
emphasizing the fact that the plaintiff was a state. As the 
~ 
SG and resps argue, however, there is no apparent reason to 
adopt such a limited view. Although the Court in the 
Milwaukee decision did discuss the fact that the states have 
sovereign interests that require intervention of federal law 
in this kind of case, the decision also emphasized the fact 
that federal law .must step in when there are interstate 
disputes, regardless of the parties involved. Moreover, if a -
body of federal common law of nuisance exists for purposes of 
suits by states, it makes no real sense to deny private -plaintiffs access to that same body of law. 
Fairly clear support for this view may be derived 
from a footnote in the decision: 
Thus, it is not only the character of the 
parties that requires us to apply federal law. 
[citations omitted]. As Mr. Justice Harlan 
indicated for the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-427, where there is an 
overriding federal interest in the need for a 
uniform rule of decision or where the controversy 
touches basic interests of federalism, we have 
fashioned federal common law. 
31t appears that the only relief sought by resps under 
federal common law is damages. Any equitable relief sought 
would probably be moot by now, since dumping of sludge is 
scheduled to stop this year under regulations promulgated 





- C ~ - 9. ~tJ-.~~., -0 a:.-
fad..:..._~~~ 4,-
d<-~ } u-~~  
L4.--~£.e---j,i--~~ 
406 U.S., at 105 n.6. And, as the SG points out, Brief at 31, Met c.A..., 
there may be an even greater "federal interest" in offshore ~ 1'tJ 
waters that belong to no state than there is in an interstate ~a.. 
lake or river. Finally, in at least one case, this Court has ~ 
applied federal common law to an interstate dispute involving 
apportionment of a river brought by a private party. 
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 
U.S. 92, 110-11 (1938). 
Assuming that resps can invoke federal common law at 
all, there remains the question whether they can seek damages, 
rather than an abatement of the nuisance, as in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee. Although there appears to be no reason in 
principle why damages should not be available under a federal 
common law theory of nuisance, it may be that the Court should 
hold that federal common law has been preempted to the limited 
extent of precluding a claim for damages. Damages are 
traditionally available to redress a nuisance, but arguably in 
, 
this context the prospect of damages will interfere more ~
greatly with the statutory scheme than an occasiona order to ~ 
ab~ nce. Businesses would have incentives to channel~ 
their clean-up efforts into areas where there are potential ~ tAA.U. 
/1...~ 
pr iv ate plaintiffs who can claim to have suffered econom ~ 
injury. This might skew the priorities set by EPA, which is ~ 
also concerned with "noneconomic" harm to the environment. ~ ~ 
Such a holding would allow the Court to stave off a series o~ 
~ 
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v. Milwaukee. 
Summary and Recommendation 
1. I would reverse as to the implied right of action under 
FWPCA and MPRSA. Congress created specific remedies for 
anyone suffering any injury from pollution illegal under these 
acts. These remedies do not include suits for damages. The 
fact that Congress left this out is persuasive evidence of its 
intent, and the savings clauses do not change mattters 
because, fai r ly read, they do not apply to rights of action 




respect to federal common law, the outcome is 
to a large extent by your view in Milwaukee v. 
Assuming you conclude that the nuisance cause of 
action has not been totally preempted by additions to federal 
regulation since 1972, you might still want to limit the cause 
of action to states or to suits for abatement rather than - ~ -- - -damages. The former limitation would be difficult to justify, 
r 
especially in light of the language of Illinois v. Milwaukee 
emphasizing that federal common law applies wherever there is 
an inherently interstate dispute. On the othe r hand, it may 
be that damages go too far in interfering with the priorities 




- 79-1711 MIDDLESEX COUNTY v. NAT'L SEA CLAMMERS Argued 2/24/81 
-
-
-~ ~ ~ & -;f-->:?('J 
~ nt-7 ~~s ~~ 
( ~ ,,.,,,,.,,.., -n-,..,,.., ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ,-,-6 /1  ...,.,,, 
~~ ~ ; )I fl,? it') 
.. ~7'7-h~>P--j-?~~·M 
~~~ ~-pt 
-~ ~ ~~ 
~ ~~~~' 
-
 76 ~--,,,,,, 1P'-t . , ~ -,,.,p • 
~~~~1M~ 





~/71~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -I~ f. cl 
,,~.S:~9 -r;r_s) · m~ 
~ ~ ~~ O?Z . ~~ 
~ ~ ~ -r>µ -r-7vv,,, ../7:'~ -n-v fy 
~~ ~'l?f~ '.>.'(/ 
L { ~_.,,.,..,.,~ ~ 
r~~,~~-'6/~ 
. ,tP~  ~ ---r-tl ~) ~/ 
. ..P'.,.-:7' ~ £ °l6 ~ _, ~-v 
~~ ~,..~ ~ ~ 5 
-~ ~ ---1?~ l#rp ~ i·~ 
--.rn-~~~~~-&/ 
~ ~ ~~ 
~ ~ >~ -ry_j_ 
'(2.L .b I -,r"tf '71:;P--' ~6 /I ~0 ._ ~  
~) .. -~"71' rm ~ -P!? on/ 
~~ -CL~ I~ ~ 
~ ~~~,-· p-;r/ ~ / ~ 
~  ----v ~?: 
~~>'~~I/ '7' >t~ 




.. ~~~~ ~ ~ 




~ ~) ~ ~/Z-tLM-pZ? ~ 
--zz2:,1~ ~h-~~~ ~ 
~~-rr~~$~s 
r~~ ~;,._~  '/ 
,, . ~~~ 
-




- /u,v. '7 "'7-
(a·· 
--'-__ 79-1711 Middlesex County v. Natl. Sea Clammers 
The Chief Ju~ :;;:e~ 
Conf. 2/27/81 
 Al « ~ ,,,,._, ~ ~-•.,. c.~ . 
/1. ~~ ~ u1 ><-~ L.,c.,4•4-""' 
,-2..~· , ~ -
WH/1,~~ 2 . ... '?. 
~ -L•••Ll«&e ~.f~I>{~ 
~ -
Mr. Justice -
~ ~ r1-h---l!LA 
-,.✓-1 
'i\f;~. Just{ce Stewart ~ 





~ ~ ~ '-'L.J a-~·- --( 
~~,fr-v--a:<fv'l-c,4,.c.~~ • ,,.(J ~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~"1 
/.e.~. 4<A/ ~ 
~~ ~' 
J___,_~ ~ a~ <.. 1.4>-t'r--J,t:-1~  
~ ~ A- ~_...,,, -e::-. ~~ 
,.1--~-....... ~r-----·- . . ti) JI-JP;. rl'· l'I•• • o/' ~ ~ 
~ ~UA.1•c~ m ~_.'t..,~ Ja,,,a1k 4 £.. 
• • 
Mr. ·.Justice White ~ 
~~ ~(J-~. 
M.l'.' v Justice Marsh-aII ~ 
~ ... ...._ '--"I-~ &f/llC""--c..c..._ ~ 
4--c-~ . ~ ~ ~~ 
Mr. Justice Black.mun Z2jf 9-- / ~.....,.,.. 
w,__,u_ s G- ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~~ o-f M4..C4 _.,,_,,,-< 
~ ~~~ 
s. 6/? ~ ~ ... 4-r; 
-~ 
~ J,.,_-~,y h-,,TP~,tfl/ ~ V 
~ SU8/\...34S '3"J"J4Snf "1W 
~ 4s1nbuqa~ a-=>14snr ·.:iw 
-11)~"? ,.,,,..,,, ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ ~-P'? l~..A,/ ~-,,. J..,fJ 
~~~ ~. H 
~,,_,_..., .... ~,"Jo?~ ~t:/ l 
• 1J" ,y;, ,HJ?~ ~ 
(~'Y"rv~~fH"-/J -~ 
 __,.,,_~ 'II""' ~ ~ ~ ,..,...,r 
~~_;y-~~~·"f-o 
.Sf,(,-IJ/'rl ·l->g•·~·,.,,..,~.,, ~~ ·~ ~ I 
--:-'1-( ~ -9 s;! ~ 
~ /• ~,;rp '4 ~ ~a--zt_ 
' 
! ( 




TO: Paul Smith DATE: April 1, 1981 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
79-1711 Middlesex v. National Sea Clammers 
Thank you for bringing to my attention the opinion 
of CA8 in 80-1391 First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis. 
The Eighth Circuit's reading of Thiboutot is quite 
helpful. Whether there are five votes to construe Thiboutot 
in this sensible way remains to be seen. I think Sea 
Clammers is a stronger case in which to distinguish 
Thiboutot than First National Bank of omaha. But we can 
gain some support from it. 
I still plan to vote to deny, and hope that this 
case will not be granted. ✓ It could possibly afford a reason 
to carry Sea Clammers over for reargument next fall. Of 
course, I suppose we could hold First National Bank of omaha 
for Sea Clammers, but I think the cases are sufficiently 
different for this not to be desirable. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
- - / 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~upumt <!f!turl ttf tltt ~b ~tateg --a,g~ ~. <!f. 2!1.;i~~ 
April 23, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1711, etc., Middlesex County Sewer Authority v. Sea 
Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 
I was very much surprised that your op1n1on addressed the question 
hether these statutes can be said to create 11 rights, privileges and 
immunities 11 on which section 1983 suits can be premised. That is an im-
portant question, the decision of which is certainly not necessary to 
resolve this case. If I may say so, it ought not be addressed without 
full briefing and oral argument by the parties. You'll remember that 
we have granted cert in the second Kassel case to consider the question 
whether violations of the Commerce Clause, which result in injury to 
persons, constitute deprivation ro"f rights, pri vHeges and ,immun i t:res 11 
within the meaning of 1983. Bill Rehnquist's dissent from denial of 
cert in Kassel, which finally led to four votes to grant, states "This 
Court has never held, and it would require a careful scrutiny of the 
statute books to hold with any degree of confidence, that Sec. 1983 
applies to every provision of the federal Constitution and all federal 
laws. 11 
Not only is there no briefing of this question in any of the many 
briefs filed in this case, (you yourself said 11 it was not suggested by 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -
.hµ:rtntt (!tltlttt cf tlft ~h ~hdtg 
~aslp:ngfott, ~. (!t. 2.0ffe'!, 
April 23, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1711, etc., Middlesex 
Cti. Sewer Auth. v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis, 





Justice Powell / 
Copies to the Conference 
- -,ju.prttttt <qllltrl llf i4t ~tb ,jtaftg 
-aslpnghm, ~. <q. 2llffe~~ 
CHAM BER S O F 
.JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
April 30, 1981 
Re: Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760 & 80-12 Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clarnmers 
Association 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Mr. Justice Powell 




May 7, 1981 
79-1711 Sea Clammers 
Dear Potter and Bill: 
As this case seems to be on •dead center", I am 
inclined to respond to Bill Brennan's letter of April 23 
along the lines of the enclosed draft. 
As you are my only constituents, I would welcome 
your views as to whether this is desirable, and has your 
approval. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
.. ~ . 
1 









- -~upuntt <!J 1l1lrl cf flrr ~h- .® htlt s 
~rur fybtgum ~. QJ. 21lffe'1-.;t 
CH A MBERS OF 
~ 
May 7, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1711, Sea Cl ammers 
Dear Lewis, 
I think the basic thrust of your proposed letter 
to Bill Brenn an is fine, but I wo uld not go so far in 
the f our th and si xth paragrap hs. In the fou rth para-
graph, I would be inclined to say something like the 
following: 
If it would meet the concerns of you or other 
Justices, I might be willing to consider 
limiting the § 1983 discussion .. . 
The second clause of the final sentence of that para-
graph would then read: 
we would thus leave 
The final paragraph would begin "In sum, I would 
consider limiting the § 1983 discussion 11 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copy to Justice Rehnquist 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
,juprtutt (!}ltltrl itf tlf t ~~ _itattg 
Jhudfi:n~ ~. Qf. 2llffe'l-;l 
May 7, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1711, Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis, 
-
I think the basic thrust of your proposed letter 
to Bill Brennan is fine, but I would not go so far in 
the fourth and sixth paragraphs. In the fourth para-
graph, I would be inclined to say something like the 
following: 
If it would meet the concerns of you or other 
Justices, I might be willing to consider 
limiting the § 1983 discussion ... 
The second clause of the final sentence of that para-
graph would then read: 
we would thus leave .... 
The final paragraph would begin 11 In sum, I would 




'>· \ . 
/ 
Copy to Justice Rehnquist 
- -j5u:p-rrntt C!fllltrl of tlrt ~tb j5taug 
~a\Tfringtlltt, ~. (!I. 2.tlffe~.1 ¼ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. fh-~f-
~~ 
Dear Bill: 
as to the 
this case. 
May 7, 1981 1/.o ~ 
79-1711 Sea Clammers~4/ 
-L~ ✓,~ 
This refers to your letter expres: 7ng reservations 
appropriateness of addressing the §1983 issue in 
It seems appropriate to me for several reasons. 
The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Thiboutot 
at the time it decided this case. The central question 
before us is whether a private r i ght of action exists 
independently of the rights e xplicitly created by the 
statutes in question. If we belie ved that s uch a right now 
exists under §1983, I would not have thought we would decide 
this case against respondents. They preva i led below on a 
different theory, and even though they have not advanced the 
§1983 arg ument, t he ques t i on is implicit in the case. 
Mo reo ve r, in l i gh t of Thiboutot, I e xpect that 
federal courts are now facing wi th i ncreased frequency the 
question of Thiboutot's scope. 
If it would be he lpful t o you or other J us tices, I 
would be g lad to l imit th e §1983 d i s c us sion to the effect o f 
the compr ehens i vene s s of the statuto r y remedi e s a vai l able 
under both Acts. Al tho ugh I think t here are two re a sons f or 
t he i napplicability of §1983 h e r e, I would be content to 
leave the " rights, privileges, and immunities " question f or 
another day . 
We ha ve here t wo Act s tha t pr o vide unusua lly 
de ta i l e d provisions with respect t o reme d ies, particularly 
those available f or "citizens ". Where thi s degr e e of 
statutory specificity exists, it would not be reasonable -
as I view it - to think that the extreme ly genera l 
provisions of §1983 nevertheless apply . Nor do I think tha t 
. -
- -
any briefing or reargument of this issue would be 
enlightening. 
2. 
In sum, I would be happy to limit the §1983 
discussion to the statutory effect of the existing remedies 
issue if four other Justices prefer this. I feel rather 
strongly, however, that we should not ignore §1983 in a case 
where the crucial issue is whether a private right of action 
exists. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
" '. •.-~ . ... 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
Dear Bill: 
-
.:§uµrttm QJonrt o-f tqt 'Jllnitth .:§htltil 
~asJringfott, l9. <!}. 21Jffe)!.~ 
May 8, 1981 
79-1711 Sea Clammers 
This refers to your letter expressing reservations 
as to the appropriateness of addressing the §1983 issue in 
this case. 
It seems appropriate to me for several reasons. 
The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Thiboutot 
at the time it decided this case. The central question 
before us is whether a private right of action exists 
independently of the rights explicitly created by the 
statutes in question. If we believed that such a right now 
exists under §1983, I would not have thought we would decide 
this case against respondents. They prevailed below on a 
different theory, and even though they have not advanced the 
§1983 argument, the question is implicit in the case. 
Moreover, in light of Thiboutot, I expect that 
federal courts are now facing with increased frequency the 
question of Thiboutot's scope. 
If it would meet your concerns or those of other 
Justices, I might be willing to consider limiting the §1983 
discussion to the effect of the comprehensiveness of the 
statutory remedies available under both Acts. Although I 
think there are two reasons for the inapplicability of §1983 
here, we would thus leave the "rights, privileges, and 
immunities" question for another day. 
We have here t wo Acts that provide unusually 
detailed provisions with respect to remedies, particularly 
those available for "citizens". Where this degree of 
statutory specificity exists, it would not be reasonable -
as I view it - to think that the extremely general 
..,. ~ ,.._ ... - - 2. 
provisions of §1983 nevertheless apply. Nor do I think that 
any briefing or reargument of this issue would be 
enlightening. 
In sum, I would consider limiting the §1983 
discussion to the statutory effect of the existing remedies 
issue if four other Justices prefer this. I feel rather 
strongly, however, that we should not ignore §1983 in a case 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
~~ - -
May 8, 1981 
79-1711 Sea Clammers 
Dear Bill: 
This refers to your letter expressing reservations 
as to the appropriateness of addressing the §1983 issue in 
this case. 
It seems appropriate to me for several reasons. 
The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of Thiboutot 
at the time it decided this case. The central question 
before us is whether a private right of action exists 
independently of the rights explicitly created by the 
statutes in question. If we believed that such a right now 
exists under §1983, I would not have thought we would decide 
this case against respondents. They prevailed below on a 
different theory, and even though they have not advanced the 
§1983 argument, the question is implicit in the case. 
Moreover, in light of Thiboutot, I expect that 
federal courts are now facing with increased frequency the 
question of Thiboutot's scope. 
If it would meet your concerns or those of other 
Justices, I might be willing to consider limiting the §1983 
discussion to the effect of the comprehensiveness of the 
statutory remedies available under both Acts. Although I 
think there are two reasons for the inapplicability of §1983 
here, we would thus leave the "rights, privileges, and 
immunities" question for another day. 
we have here two Acts that provide unusually 
detailed provisions with respect to remedies, particularly 
those available for "citizens". Where this degree of 
statutory specificity exists, it would not be reasonable -
as I view it - to think that the extremely general 
'a, I - -- " .. 
- - 2. 
provisions of §1983 nevertheless apply. Nor do I think that 
any briefing or reargument of this issue would be 
enlightening. 
In sum, I would consider limiting the §1983 
discussion to the statutory effect of the existing remedies 
issue if four other Justices prefer this. I feel rather 
strongly, however, that we should not ignore §1983 in a case 
where the crucial issue is whether a private right of action 
exists. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis: 
- -~u:puntt QJ aurl of fltt ~b ~taf.e_g 
'Jlfrurlfht-sLm. J. QJ. 20btJ!.J 
May 11, 1981 d9 
79-1711 Sea Clarrmers 
I appreciate your willingness to "consider limiting the 
Section 1983 discussion to the effect of the canprehensiveness 
of the statutory rerredies under both Acts." Although I prefer 
not to decide the Section 1983 issue at all, I could go along 
with the limited discussion you now propose. But should not 
the word be "preclude" rather than "pre-empt" on page 12? As 
in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, "pre-empt" seems inappropriate 
here. 
And is not your discussion in Part II B sCID:.'What inconsistent 
with the Court's recent treabrent of Cort v. Ash in the opinions 
in california v. Sierra Club and Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu? 
In particular, your discussion of the Cort factors both anits the 
first of the four factors and, in addition , treats the first, 
third, and fourth factors equally, as "less llt'lfOrtant indicia 
of legislative intent." But Sierra Club stated that "the initial 
consideration is whether the plaintiff is a member of a class 
for 'whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.'" (Emphasis 
in original). Accordingly, I hope you will see fit to include a 
short analysis of the first Cort factor and re-write the 
carryover sentence on page 20 so that I will be able to join 
your opinion. 
Mr. Justice P0v-1ell 
cc: The Conference 
Sin/~~J 
-
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear lewis: 
-
.Suprtntt Q}ourt of f!rt ~b ~tau.s 
,ra,g~ ,. Q}. 2llffe'!$ 
May 11, 1981 
79-1711 Sea Clarmers 
I appreciate your willingness to "consider limiting the 
Section 1983 discussion to the effect of the carprehensiveness 
of the statutory remedies under both Acts." Although I prefer 
not to decide the Section 1983 issue at all, I could go along 
with the limited discussion you now propose. But should not 
the \\Ord be "preclude" rather than "pre-empt" on page 12? As 
in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, "pre-empt" seems inappropriate 
here. 
And is not your discussion in Part II B sanewhat inconsistent 
with the Court's recent treatirent of Cort v. Ash in the opinions 
in california v. Sierra Club and Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu? 
In particular, your discussion of the Cort factors both anits the 
first of the four factors and, in addition, treats the first, 
third, and fourth factors equally, as "less important indicia 
of legislative intent." But Sierra Club stated that "the initial 
consideration is whether the plaintiff is a rne:nber of a class 
for 'whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.'" (Fmphasis 
in original). Accordingly, I hope you will see fit to include a I 
short analysis of the first Cort factor and re-write the 
carryover sentence on page 20 so that I will be able to join 
your opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 








Date: May 15, 1981 
No. 79-1711 Sea Clammers 
::/,it 
As I read through your "markup" for a third draft, 
I dictate comments as they occur to me. 
1. I approve of your rearrangement, and think it 
is considerably better. 
2. I would omit entirely the first paragraph 
(only two sentences) on page 15. The preceding paragraph 
concludes by saying what we are going to examine. It would 
be better to defer stating our conclusion until we have made 
the examination. 
3. On page 19, I think WJB would like for us to 
commence the second full paragraph with the capital letter 
"A" - as I have indicated. 
4. On page 20, I would substitute "made clear" 
for "decided" in the sixth line. 
5. In note 29, I suggest revising it as follows: 
The purpose of the Cort v. Ash analysis is to 
determine the intent of Congress. (Paul, if there are other 
cases to this effect in addition to Touche Ross, cite them. 
Didn't Cort itself say so?) We note, however, that none of 
the other Cort factors, see 42 U.S., at 78, lends support to 
- -
respondents' argument. Both FWPCA and MPRSA impose duties 
with respect to water pollution for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole, and not for particular individuals or 
groups. The fishing industry has an obvious interest, but 
concern for this was only one element of the larger 
Congressional purpose to maintain water quality for the 
benefit of all citizens. Cf. WPCA § 101, 33 u.s.c. §1251: 
2. 
MPRSA § 2, 33 u.s.c. § 1401. Nor would an implied remedy be 
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme." 422 U.S., at 78. Congress clearly intended to 
control pollution through administrative channels, 
authorizing explicit litigation remedies only to correct 
administrative abuses prospectively. Seen. 27, supra. An 
implied remedy would not be a "cause of action. 
traditionally relegated to state law," 422 U.S., at 78, but 
in view of the pervasive federal regulation of water 
pollution problems, this single factor is essentially 
irrelevant in this case. 
6. The concluding sentence at the end of Part II 
(on old page 12) might be reframed along the following 
lines: 
We therefore conclude that the existence of these 
express remedies not only evidences a Congressional intent 
,, - - 3. 
to foreclose the implication of additional private remedies 
under these Acts, but also precludes suits based on§ 1983. 
7. I am inclined to eliminate the note now 
renumbered 30 at the bottom of page 20. I agree with it, 
but my guess that WJB on a second reading will object to it. 
It is not necessary to the force of our opinion. 
8. On page 10, add Sierra Club to the string of 
citations - also to please BRW as well as WJB. I don't like 
Sierra Club and think a majority of the Court dealt less 
than fairly with Touche Ross. But it is now on the books. 
9. In describing the statutory scheme in these 
two Acts, we use two adjectives: elaborate and 
comprehensive. Normally, it is well to use identical 
language if it involved important words. I am inclined here 
to use both interchangeably. 
* * * 
I think your surgery on our opinion has been quite 
skillful. I am not sure that it will satisfy WJB, who often 
advances his demands sequentially. I do think the new draft 




In view of the substantial nature of the changes, 
I suggest that you ask Lou Cornio to give you only a half a 
dozen copies of a tentative 3rd Draft for you, Peter and me 
to take a final look at before we circulate. I might also 
ask PS whether our changes worry him. 
L.F.P., Jr. 






Date: May 15, 1981 
No. 79-1711 Sea Clammers 
As I read through your "markup" for a third draft, 
I dictate comments as they occur to me. 
1. I approve of your rearrangement, and think it 
is considerably better. 
2. I would omit entirely the first paragraph 
(only two sentences) on page 15. The preced i ng paragraph 
concludes by saying what we are going to examine. It would 
be better to defer stating our conclus ion until we have made 
the examination. 
3. On page 19, I think WJB would like fo r us to 
JQ~ commence the second full paragraph with the capital letter 
"A" - as I have indicated. 
4. On page 20, I would substitute "made clear" 
for "decided" in the sixth line. 
5. In note 29, I suggest revising it as follows: 
The purpose of the Cort v. ~ analysis is to 
determine the intent of Congress. (Paul, if there are other 
cases to this effect in addition to Touche Ross, cite them. 
Didn't Cort itself say so?) We note, however, that none of 
the other Cort factors, see 42 U.S., at 78, lends support to 
r - - 2. 
respondents' argument. Both FWPCA and MPRSA impose duties 
with respect to water pollution for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole, and not for particular individuals or 
groups. The fishing industry has an obvious interest, but 
concern for this was only one element of the larger 
Congressional purpose to maintain water quality for the 
benefit of all citizens. Cf. WPCA § 101, 33 u.s.c. Sl2517 
MPRSA § 2, 33 u.s.c. S 1401. Nor would an implied remedy be 
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme." 422 U.S., at 78. Congress clearly intended to 
control pollution through administrative channels, 
authorizing explicit litigation remedies only to correct 
administrative abuses prospectively. Seen. 27, supra. An 
implied remedy would not be a "cause of action ••• 
traditionally relegated to state law," 422 U.S., at 78, but 
in view of the pervasive federal regulation of water 
pollution problems, this single factor is essentially 
irrelevant in this case. 
6. The concluding sentence at the end of Part II 
(on old page 12) might be reframed along the following 
lines: 
We therefore conclude that the existence of these · 
express remedies not only evidences a Congressional intent 
r - - 3. 
to foreclose the implication of additional private remedies 
under these Acts, but also, precludes suits based on S 1983. 
7. I a~ inclined to eliminate the note now 
renumbered 30 at the bottom of page 20. I agree with it, 
but my guess that WJB on a second reading will object to it. 
It is not necessary to the force of our opinion. 
8. On page 10, add Sierra Club to the string of 
citations - also to please BRW as well as WJB. I don't like 
Sierra Club and think a majority of the Court dealt less 
than fairly with Touche Ross. But it is now on the books. 
9. In describing the statutory scheme in these 
two Acts, we use two adjectives: elaborate and 
comprehensive. Normally, it is well to use identical 
language if it involved important words. I am inclined here 
to use both interchangeably. 
* * * 
I think your surgery on our opinion has been quite 
skillful. I am not sure that it will satisfy WJB, who often 
advances his demands sequentially. I do think the new draft 




In view of the substantial nature of the changes, 
I suggest that you ask Lou Cornio to give you only a half a 
dozen copies of a tentative 3rd Draft for you, Peter and me 
to take a final look at before we circulate. I might also 
ask PS whether our changes worry him. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
- -
May 18, 1981 
No. 79-1711, Sea Clammers 
To the Conference: 
As I suggested in my last letter to the 
conference, I have modified the enclosed draft by 
eliminating any reliance on the argument that the Acts did 
not create "rights" within the meaning of§ 1983. Because 
of this change, it seemed more appropriate to place the§ 
1983 discussion after the section on implied rights of 
action under the Acts themselves. 
I also have broadened the discussion of the Cort 
v. Ash test. 
Sincerely, 
-~p~~-~.-~ ~~~~r-~~""2 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The changes in this circulation were prompted 
by my exchange of letters with Bill Brennan (my 
him of May 8 and his reply of May 11). 
I have limited the §1983 discussion to the effect 
of the comprehensiveness of the statutory remedies available 
under both Acts. In view of this change, it seemed more 
appropriate to place the truncated §1983 discussion after 
the section on implied rights of action under the Acts 
themselves. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -
~mu Qiou:rt cf tq~ ~b ~hdts 
'J[a-s fringhtn. ~. ~ 2llffe~ ~ 
May 19, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1711, etc., Middlesex City 
Sewer. Auth. v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis, 





Copies to the Conference 
/ 
- -~u.p:rtutt <!J.llltrl llf t4t ~th ~fai.tg 
'j'rur!fhtghm, ~. QJ. 2llffe)l,~ 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE W I LLIAM H . REHNQUIST / 
May 20, 1981 
Re: Nos. 79-1711, etc. Middlesex County v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely ~ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
-
~mtt QJ.tturi .ttf tlft ~h ,jtau_g 
'Jfa,gltingt.ttn. J. QJ. 2llffe'1~ 
May 21, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1711, 1754, 1760 & 80-12 Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. Thanks again for your consider-




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE B YR O N R . WHIT E 
- -
;§npumt QJ011rl it£ tlrt ~ ~taf:t.tl' 
Jkudrm¼lhtn. ~. QJ. 21lffe~;l 
Re: Nos 79-1711, etc., 
Middlesex County 
v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 






.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-
j;u.prtmt (4ou.rt of tqt ~b j;taftg 
'Basfrington. ~. (4. 20.;,J!.' 
May 27, 1981 
✓ 
Re: Nos. 79-1711, 1754, 1760, and 80-12 -
Middlesex County v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
-
C HAMBERS OF 
J USTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
,i;u:pum~ <!tllttd qf Ur~ 'J!tniult ,i;taftg 
:.Mlritt¼lron. ~. <lt• 2nffe'!.;l 
May 28, 1981 
Re: 79-1711, 1754, 1760, and 80-12 -
Middlesex County v. Sea Clammers 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
As I should have indicated in writing some 
time ago, I am working on a brief opinion con-








j,uµrmtt <!tom! ttf tit~ Jlttiub ~taus 
,raslpttgtou:. ~. <lt• 2llffe~.;l 
May 28, 1981 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 79-1711) Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Association 
No. 79-1754) Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties 
v. National Sea Clammers Association 
No. 79-1760) New York v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n 
No. 80-12) EPA v. National Sea Clammers Association 
Dear Lewis: 
I am waiting to see what John has to say. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
- -
~ttprttttt (!}ttllrl cf tqt ~~ ~btftg 
~ulringhm.. ,. <!I. 2.llffe~~ 
.'.rune 3, 1981 
✓ 
79-1711, etc., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 




,I ,,,.- 2 
6/i/~~ 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
June 17, 1981 
No. 79-1711, Middlesex _COlll:ltX v. 
I propose adding a new footnote to my opinion for 
the Court in this case, in response to some of the arguments 
raised by John's dissent. This footnote would appear on 
attached to the second full sentence on that page: fj 
~~ ,v.; 
31JUSTICE STEVENS in dissent finds 
contrary indications of congressional intent 
in the savings clauses--§ 505(e) of the 
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) and S 105(g) (5) of 
the MPRSA, 33 u.s.c. S 1415(9) (5). The 
language of these clauses, see nn. 10, 11, 
s _llE~~, does not, however, support the view 
tlia't"""Congress expressly preserved S 1983 
remedies for violations of these statutes. 
As noted, supra, at 13, there is little 
reason to 6eiieve that Congress intended to 
do this when it made reference in S 505(e) to 
"any right which any person ••• may have 
under any statute or common law or to seek 
any other relief." The legislative history 
makes clear Congress' intent to allow further 
enforcement of anti-pollution standards 
arising under other statutes or state common 
law. Seen. 26, su!Ia. A suit for damages 
asserting a substan ve violation of the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA is far different, even if 
the remedy asserted is based on the separate 
right-oE-action created in S 1983. We are 
convinced that the savings clauses do not 
refer at all to a suit for redress of a 
violation of these statutes--regardless of 
the source of the right-of-action asserted. 
Even if this were not the correct 
interpretation of the savings clauses, we 
recently held that the savings clause in 




accompanying citizen-suit provision. 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, U.S. , 
(!§BI) (tfie section •means only tfiat tfie 
provision of [a citizen] suit does not revoke 
other remediesw). The parallel provision of 
the MPRSA is equally limited. 33 U.S.C. S 
1415 (g) (5) (wThe injunctive relief provided 
bf th is su_bsection sfia1I not restrict any 
r1gnt which any person ••• may have under any 
statute or common law") (emphasis added). We 
therefore are not persuaded that the savings 
clauses limit the effect of the overall 
remedial schemes provided expressly in the 
Acts. In sum, we think it clear that those 
express remedies preclude suits for damages 
under S 1983, and that the savings clauses do 
not require a contrary conclusion. 
In so holding, we also note that, 
contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' argument, post, 
at , n. 11, we do not suggest that tne"' 
burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate a 








;- • ~tnU {!IMttt cf tlf~ ~b ~mug 
..-ae-lfittgbtt4 ~- (!I. 2llffe'!, 
CHAMBERS 0,. June 18, 1981 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 79 - 1711) Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clamrners Association 
No. 79 - 1754) Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties . 
v. National Sea Clamrners Association 
No. 79-1760) New York v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n 
No. 80-12) EPA v. National Sea Clammers Association 
Dear John: 
For me, your opinion concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part is most persuasive. Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Heretofore Held for No. 79-1711, Middlesex Co. Sewera e 
Au • v. Nat1ona ea C ammers 
It: yr,:·~ "'-r/;"9:_; ~~~-
No. 80-126, Outboard Marine Corp. v. Illinois. 
This case was held for No. 7§-408, Mirwau~ee v. I!!lnofs, as 
well as for Sea Clammers. It involves tfie efforts of 
Illinois to take 1ega! action against a polluter of a river 
tributary of Lake Michigan. An initial suit under federal 
common law and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was 
dismissed by the District Court. The State then sought to 
intervene in a similar suit that had been brought by the 
federal government, but leave to intervene was denied. The 
CA7 reversed both rulings, holding that the federal common 
law of nuisance was not preempted by the FWPCA and that it 
applied to this intrastate navigable waterway. The court 
also held that the state had a right to intervene in the ; 
federal suit under § 1365 (b) (1) (B). r,'if, 
.. t...~r~at. 
I will vote to GVR on Milwaukee v. Illinois. In 
light of our holding that the FW~CA preempted the feaeral 
common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution, the 
decision below must be reconsidered. Sea Clammers seems to 
have little bearing on this case, and tfie intervention issue 
,, , , ,; , is not independently certworthy • 
... ~ 1'i. ... 
~-.\g 
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
j;u:;rrttnt <!fonrl of flrt 'J!inihh jitaftg 
~asfringfon, ;rJ. <1t• 2IJ.;iJl.~ 
June 22, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENC ~ 
Heretofore Held for No. 79 - 1711, Middlesex Co. Sewerage 
Auth. v. National Sea Clammer s 
No. 80-126, Outboa rd L:i rine Corp. v. Il linois . 
This case was held for No. 79- 4CJ , Milwaukee v . I llinois, as 
well as for Sea Clammers. It involves the effort s of 
Illinois to take legal action agu ins t a polluter o f a river 
tributary of Lake Michigan. An in itial suit under federal 
common law and the Federal Water Pollution Control Ac t was 
dismissed by the District Court. The State then sought to 
intervene in a similar suit that had been brought by the 
federal government, but leave t o intervene was denied. The 
CA7 reversed both rulings, holding that the federal common 
law of nuisance was not preempted by the FWPCA and that it 
applied to this intrastate navigable waterway. The court 
also held that the state had a right to intervene in the 
federal suit under § 1365 (b ) (1) (B) . 
I will vote to GVR on :~i lwaukee v. Illinois. In 
light of our holding that t he F~PCA preempted the f ederal 
common law of nuisance in t he a~ea of water pollu tion , the 
decision below must be reconsidered. Sea Clammers seems to 
have little bearing on this cas e , and the intervention issue 





L. r .P ., Jr. 
' 
J.:tp/SS 0/L.'+/OJ. ,,-J./J.J. ~uaaJ.esex vouncy ~ewage aucnoricy 
v. National Sea Clarrnners Association 
r ~-~ ::;_::;. 
~~ -,,,,. ]oth of the cases that ~~nounce/involve 
--hJ omplex statutes or regulations, IAwill erely identify the 
5' 
issues and state our judgment. The reasons are set forth 
I\ 
fully in the opinions filed today with the clerk. 
The first of these,/the National Sea Clammers 
Association case, / is here from the Third Circuit. It 
involves claims for damages/. n~eral Water 
LJ.J "' Pollution Control Act, the Marine Protection, Research and 
'\ 
Sanctuaries Act a. aRa t.Rie e01tattc11 MW 
The principal question is whether these 
- flc.L "tis ~~~--J ;_ 
respondents-'\have an implied right 1/ apart from the elaborate 
remedies provided by the Acts/ to bring this private damage 
suit. The Court of Appeals answered this question in the 
affirmative. 
For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, we 
think no ~ r right of actiof may be implied. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
Justice f~led an opinion concurring in the 




No. 79-1711, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1754, Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties v. 
National Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1760, City of New York v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn. 
No. 80-12, EPA v. National Sea Clammers Assn. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to 
fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of 
5 
10 
sewage and other waste, we are faced with questions 15 
concerning the availabli ty of a damages remedy, 
basef n federal common law or ~ on the provisions of 
two Acts--the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 
as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 20 
33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members 
harvest fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and 
~
New Jersey, as well as one member of that organization. 25 
A 
In 1977, they brought suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey against petitioners--
various governmental entities and officials from New 
2. 
York, 1 New Jersey2 and the federal government. 3 Their 
complaint alleged that sewage, sewage "sludge," and other 30 
waste materials were being discharged into New York Harbor 
and the Hudson River by some of the respondents. In 
addition it complained of the dumping of such materials 
directly into the ocean from maritime vessels. The 
complaint alleged that, as a result of these activities, 35 
the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, and made 
/ special reference to a massive growth of algae said to 
have appeared offshore in 1976. 4 It then stated that this 
1The New York defendants were the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the 
City of New York; Abraham Beame, Mayor of New York; the 
West Long Branch Sewer District; the County of 
Westchester; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen 
Cove. 
2The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection; David J. Bardin, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the 
Bergen County Sewer Authority; the Joint Meeting of Essex 
and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; 
the Linden-Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown 
Sewerage Authority. 
3The federal defendants were the Environmental 
Protection Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as 
EPA Administrator; the Army Corps of Engineers; and Martin 
R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary of the Army. 
4The complaint alleged that this growth of 
algae was caused by the discharges of sewage and "covered 
an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging from approximately 
the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to a point 
approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and 
extending from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles 
out to sea," Complaint, 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief 
in this Court states that when 
3. 
pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, 
clamming and lobster industries which operate in the 40 
waters of the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 
respondents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 
million in compensatory damages, and $250 million in 
~)Ute. 
punitive damages. _Jfefen~ nts moved to dismiss the 
,tj_::_ 'Jq-{ complaint, ::J;i the District Court treated this as a motion 
for summary judgment because it relied on affidavits. The 
court granted the motion with respect to all counts of the 
complaint, 7 although its rejection of the pendent state-
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals 
settled on the ocean floor, creating a condition 
of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about 
the water near the ocean's floor. This 
condition resulted in the death and destruction 
of an enormous amount of marine life, 
particularly with respect to the shellfish and 
other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief 
for Respondents 4. 
5complaint ,1 39, App. 26a. 
6Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the 
MPRSA; federal common law; §13 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 33 u.s.c. §407; the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361; New York and 
New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Cons ti tut ion; 
the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 
42 u.s.c. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. 
§§1346(b}, 2671; and state tort law. 
7The court had previously dismissed claims 
against the New York and New Jersey environmental 
protection agencies and their directors. These defendants 
45 
4. 
law claims was without prejudice. 50 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court 
dismissed the respondents' nuisance claim under federal 
common law, see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), 
on the ground that such · a cause of action is not available 
to private parties. With respect to the claims based on 55 
alleged violations of the FWPCA, the court noted that 










are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 rhis section gives the federal courts • 
QI jurisdiction to enforce effluent standards and limitations 
/ 
...2._,; and orders relating theret'o,"" as well as to impose 
SQ.Q l--.., ~~ appropriate y vil penalties under. 33 U.S.C. §1319 (d) • 
. { /, ) l¥d., § 136s-(a). It doe~ not autl)or1zed awards ·of damages 
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~c;J~_l.,',~',q that the notice requirement is inapplicable because of 
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7 \JI. \ I ~1 ( "Nothing in this section shall 
bl vet;~ restrict any right which any person (or class of O persons) may have under any statute or common 
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5. 
court applied the same analysis to respondents' claims 
under the MPRSA, which 
and notice provisions. 
contains ~ 
33 u.s.c. § 
similar citizen-suit 
1415(g).lO Finally, 
the court rejected a possible claim of maritime tort, both 
because respondents had failed to plead such claim 
explicitly and because they had failed to comply with the 
65 
procedural requirements or the federal and state tort 70 
claims acts.ll 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the 
MPRSA, the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime 
State agency)." 33 u.s.c. § 1365(e). 
lOLike the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings 
clause," which states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by 
this subsection shall not restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have 
under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against 
the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State 
agency)." 33 u.s.c~ § 1415(g) (5). 
11see 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; N.Y. 
Gen. Mun. Law§§ 50-e, 50-i; N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. The 
District Court noted that respondents had given timely 
notice to one defendant--New York City. --
The petitions for certiorari in this Court 
raised questions concerning the applicability of state 
tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment to tort suits 
in federal court. These questions are not, however, 
within the scope of the questions on which review was 
granted. 
6. 
tort. 616 F.2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, 75 
the court held that failure to comply with the 60-day 
notice provision in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33 u.s.c. 
§1365 (b) (1) (A), does not preclude suits under the Act in 
addition to the specific "citizen suits" authorized in§ 
505. It based this conclusion on the savings clause in§ 80 
3:, ()._, ~ • C -S ) 3~ ~ ( e) J 
~ (e), preserving "any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or 
to seek any other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1227. See 
n. 9, supra. The Court of Appeals then went on to apply 85 
our precedents in the area of implied statutory rights of 
action, 12 and concluded that "Congress intended to permit 
the federal courts to entertain a private cause of action 
implied from the terms of the [FWPCA], preserved by the 
savings clause of the Act, on behalf of individuals or 90 
groups of individuals who have. be E¥1 or will be injured by 
_ u l<o f_ ;;_J. -
pollution in violation of its terms." 
12Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66 (1975). 
7 • 
The court then applied this same analysis to the 
MPRSA, concluding again that the District Court had erred 
in dismissing respondents' claims under this Act. 95 
Although the court was not explicit on this question, it 
appears that it intended to authorize suits for damages, 
as well as for injunctive relief, under the FWPCA and the 
MPRSA.13 
With respect to the federal common-law nuisance 100 
claims, the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's 
conclusion that private parties may not . bring such claims. 
It also held, applying common-law principles, that 
respondents "alleged sufficient individual damage to 
13After holding that there is an implied right 
of action under the FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal 
government defendants' sovereign immunity 
argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 
of title 28 make clear that sovereign immunity 
has been waived in all suits by plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief against federal 
agencies or officers. Whether damages can be 
recovered from the federal government is a 
separate question to which the Federal Tort 
Claims Act speaks." 616 F.2d, at 1231. 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court 
had concluded that the statutory rights of action it was 
creating included damages relief. An additional 
indication is that by the time of the Court of Appeals 
decision, any relief other than damages was probably 
unnecessary. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was 
not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 u.s.c. § 
1412a(a), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping of 
sewage sludge by December 31, 1981. 
8. 
permit them to recover damages for this essentially public 105 
nuisance." 616 F.2d, at 1234. It thus went considerably 
beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, which involved purely 
prospective relief sought by State plaintiff. 14 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a 
vareity of arguments were filed in this Court by a group 110 
of New Jersey sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties in New Jersey 
(No. 79-1754), by the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-
1760), and by all of the federal defendants named in this 
suit (No. 80-12) •15 we granted these petitions to review 115 
to three questions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a 
private right of action independent of their citizen-suit 
provisions, (2) whether a private citizen has standing to 
14The court also held that respondents had 
offered allegations sufficient to make out a claim of 
maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. 
It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
with its various procedural requirements, 28 u.s.c. §§ 
1346 (b), 2671 et. seq., applies to any of respondents' 
federal-law claims against federal defendants, although it 
did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage recovery 
against federal agencies based on state law." 616 F.2d, 
at 1236. 
15see n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 
79-1754, and 80-12 also named the remaining petitioners as 
respondents, based on cross-claims filed in the District 
Court. 
9. 
sue for damages under the federal common law of nuisance, 
and ( 3) whether all federal common-law nuisances act ions 120 
concerning ocean pollution are now preempted by the 
legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA. 
We hold that there is no implied right of action under 
these statutes and that the federal common law of nuisance 
has been fully preempted in the area of ocean pollution.16 
7~ 
' 125 ~ 
II 
ck,~ 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was 
first enacted in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 
1155. It emphasized state enforcement of water quality 
standards. When this legislation proved ineffective, 130 
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 33 u.s.c. § 1251 
et seq. The Amendments shifted the emphasis to "direct 
restrictions on discharges," EPA v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it 135 
"unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without 
16we therefore need not discuss the question 
whether the federal common law of nuisance could ever be 
the basis of a suit for damages by a private party. 
10. 
obtaining a permit and complying with its terms," id., at 
205. 17 While still allowing for state administration and 
enforcement under federally approved state p~ans, § 
402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c), the Amendments 140 
created various federal minimum effluent standards, id., 
§§ 301-307, 33 u.s.c. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 93-532, 86 Stat. 1052 et seq., 
sought to create comprehensive federal regulation of the 145 
dumping of materials into ocean waters near the United 
States coastline. Section 101 of the Act requires a 
permit for any dumping into ocean waters, when the 
material is transported from the United States or on an 
American vessel or aircraft. 33 U.S.C. § 14ll(a) . 18 In 
addition, it requires a permit for the dumping of material 
1 7The Act applies to discharges of pollutants 
from any source into navigable waters, including the 
"territorial seas," 33 u.s.c. § 1362(7), (12), and applies 
as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel or 
other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the 
high seas, id., § 1362 (9), (10), (12). See s. Rep. No. 





18These permits are issued by the Administrator 
Environmental Protection Agency, 33 u.s.c. § 1412, 
in the case of dredged materials, which may be 





transported from outside the United States into the 
territorial seas or in a zone extending twelve mile from 
the coastline, where "it may affect the territorial sea or 
the territory of the United States." Id.,§ 14ll{b). 155 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under 
these two Acts is ~ clear, but the claims appear to 
fall into two categories. 
T~ 
main contention is that 
the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have permitted the 
New Jersey and New York defendants to discharge and dump 160 
pollutants in amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. 
Complaint ,1,1 26, 28, 31, 55, 59, 75. In addition, they 
seem to allege that th* New York and New Jersey 
defendants have violated the terms of their permits. Id., 
,, 7 5. The question ~~ '::::'tf. ce'r(obere is whether 
respondents may raise either of these claims in a private 
suit for injunctive and monetary relief, where such a suit 
is not expressly authorized by either of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at r length the 
165 
principles set out in -a Au_t°r or recent deci s_ion~ 170 
~~~-~t . ht rl~t· ~ 
G0~!:@-f:--R-:~ a-L-t,.tL.e.--acv-a:'tt:a-l:m f:-:t4tw---.o.f..:6 a pt l v~ t e right Of a C 10n 
under a federal 
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/4.~ ~~ff;~~ 
intent of the legislature. California v. Sierra Club,_ 
U.S. (1981); Universities Research Association v. 
Coutu, , 
Advisors!_ 
has provided explicitly for a private damages remedy, our 
inquiry is at an end. Where, however, Congress has nc\> v 
provided for such a remedy explicitly, we must underta'-1-
an examination of the statutory provisions, th 180 
egislative history and other traditional tools of 
tatutory construction in determining whether 
equisite congressional intent existed. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific 185 
statutory provision authorizing a private suit for damages 
under either the FWPCA or the MPRSA. 19 We .the ref~ 
I\ 
19The Court of Appeals did state that the 
savings clause in § 505(e) of the FWPCA "provides an 
independent remedy for injured parties unburdened by the 
notice requirements of section 505(b) ." 616 F.2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings 
clause is itself an express authorization of private 
damages suits. Instead, it held that the savings clause 
acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in§ 505(b). 
The court went on to apply an implied-right-of-action 
analysis before concluding that a private suit for damages 
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~C! ~;!i;!1;~~sible '~lied!! 
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· ' ~ ~ possible alternative r -ights 0i5 .aet10R:;, were I\ 
source of express congressional authorization, not 190 
suggested by the parties. That possible altcrflati~e is 42 
u.s.c. § 1983t ~~~~tfer 
41
k o ~rt 
.....0i deaisi-0-f'l in Maine v. Thiboutot, U.S. (1980), 
IP 
/\ autho.rizes suits to redress violations ~ tc~ ~~ 
of r 1ghts created by federal statutes. l10rc, arguab-l~ 195 
~ /\ 
I\ respondents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards 
among the petitioners 20 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by 
CL.,, ~ 
virtue of ~Ac cx'fa; ss right of action j,,n § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the 
applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, 200 
J-
despite the failure of respondents to raise~ ~Ai • arqwnent 
here or below, bQcause 1°his case began 1=- before that 
decision, .....,~ = ::lcium~l.~viate 
k!J ~ ~ ~ ~~J 
the need ,\ f-Gr: sarut i..Q~ of toe.. ineeRt ss wii;h 
1-t:; ~~ ~ ~  
r-e.peat to enforcement of these particular federal 205 
7.-:::::--~ W..e~J~~~,~~~~ 
2 0mbl:("'e .,.. petitioners appear ~ fall within the A..;11/ 
category of municipal governmental entities suable as ....-~ 
"persons" under ou:r eeeisign HJ. Monell v. Department of 0,,.. J,-hx. 11"-' 
Social Services, 416 U.S. 658 (1978). ~~~ 
I 7k -~ t>f ~ 'f,n,./,_, , tv ~ ~ 
\ ~ f~ ~~ . ~-
14. 
statutes. 
~ ~ ~ 
The claim brought here a~ o1 fall with 1the 
A A 11 
scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit by 
a private party claiming that a federal statute has been 
violated under color of state law, causing an injury,, ~ 
~ - The _Court [f;,, however, a lready A recognized 
~~-~ 
210 
two exceptions to ~ application of§ 1983 to statutory 
" 
violations. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, U.S. (1981), we remanded certain claims 
for a determination whether (i) the statute at issue there 
was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under § 215 
1983, and (ii) whether Congress had ~ private 
~- ~~ 
enforcement of fnat statute in the sta tYt e itself. Id., 
at . Each of these exceptions may be applicable to the 
present case. 
~ 
The second one--possible congressionl\ rejection 220 
~ vt--~~&-c--t'-' 
of§ 1983 under this Act--may apply -i f --BtleA a f e ,; e ee-ion 
'\ 
oan_J)Je--eia-si=-e-~ :)ft"~ :-n-E!'--f-l!t-et that 
\(a,l._~~~hensive enforcement scheme. 
~ 
Congress /\ provided a 
As discussed infra, at 
, the FWPCA and MPRSA do provide comprehensive 
enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, Justice Stewart, who 




Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 
600, 673, n. 2 (1979) (dissenting opinion), that when "a 
state official is alleged to have violated a federal 
statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement 230 
scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may 
not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under§ 1983. 11 21 
This analysis would seem to apply here. See Chesapeake 
Bay Foundation v. Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 
F. Supp. 821 (ED Va 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action 235 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the 
federalism concerns raised). 
We need not, however, decide whether Congress 
can be said to have rejected§ 1983 remedies in this case, 240 
~~ 1/ ,--r\;_~ ~~ (', 
21see also Meyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-
715, slip op. at (D. Ariz February 12, 1981) ("[T]he 
~ 
,.; 
--;:> I t:}.,1.A.,/ -
. 
~ 
remedial provision of§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent 
. the remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act." )_:_Ji t 
v'might be argued, however, that § 1983 remedies only are 
rendered inapplicable where Congress expressly states that !} 4L,/ "J-t--C 
other remedies are exclusive. The FWPCA and MPRSA can be 
contrasted with the statute at issue in Adickes v. Kress & 
<Co., 398 O.S. 144, 150, n. 5 (1970), cited in Maine v. Thiboutot, U.S. , , n. 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)-.-There, the Court said it was highly doubtful 





~L..vl--I 2000a, could provide the basis for a § 1983 action since that act provided for an injunction remedy, id.,§ 206, 42 '7'~ 
I u.s.c. § 2000a-5, and provided further that this remedy .~ 
\ wa~ th~ 11 ex
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~l~sive means of enforcing the rights based o ry · 
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since we hold that such remedies are unavailable under the 
other exception suggested in Pennhurst. Section 1983 
authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under color of 
state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 245 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to work out the 
meaning of the phrase "rights, privileges, or immunities," 
as it applies to claims based on violations of federal 
statutes. A fair reading of Maine v. Thiboutot suggests 250 
that the Court did not mean to authorize suits for damages 
under § 1983 in all cases in which a citizen has been 





Rather, it makes sense to distinguish two 
~\::~}••?;,~ violations by state 
(\ 
First, where a federal law creates an 
~
entitlement to benefits administered by state officials, 
/I 
or imposes a duty on the State to respect the rights of a 
particular class of citizens, the statute can be said to 
255 
create "rights privileges, or immunities" on which§ 1983 260 
suits may be premised. Where, on the other hand, federal 
17. 
law simply regulates the conduct of the States or their 
officials without creating entitlements for particular 
individuals or promoting the interests of a specific class 
of citizens, it cannot be said that statutory violations 265 
infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" of 
individual persons,,(~~~ b-/ ~ I J'7 I~ 
While this line may some 
contexts, it is necessary to place some limits on the 
right of action created in § 1983 in order to "liY:e ll=E 270 
~tf . to the ,f intent o Congress 1n 
_fh_ ..v& ..,_,~~k, ~ 
enacting that provision. ~ eongress intended to protect ~ 
1 individual rights, not to authorize private suits by any 
~ 
citizen affected by r ~ violation of ~ federal 
regulatory , ~ ~ '1 E-UOt.u"f'-€ under color 
(U.A.-
present case is a (109a example of 
I\ 
" 
of state law. The 
the need for some 
7 limiting ~ he FWPCA and the MPRSA impose duties on 
the states and municipalities in the water pollution area 
in order to benefit the Nation as a whole. 22 While it is 
275 
~....J..f.o ~~ 
~ ~ ~ 
~ 22 ~ Congress e l ii1 111&0 ,t concern ut the 
f ishin' industry > in..., J:-hese Asts, but only as .....-~""- of -a-_,,,,- 11:;_, 
larger effere to maintai rt.,.*ater quality for the enefit of 
all ci izens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 125; MPRSA § J~_,/ 
2, 33 U.S.C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did t -me-a-fl~ l---tv~ 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does n statutes 
18. 
true that respondents as fishermen and clammers have a 280 
significant economic stake in proper enforcement of these 
acts, their interest is ~~~~at of a Social 
~ 
Security recipient f epr ivee o f authorized benefits by an 
act of a State administrator. Such a recipient is 
deprived of a federal statutory "right." Respondents, by 285 
contrast, merely allege an injury resulting from a 
violation of an essentially regulatory statutory scheme. 23 
that select out particular classes of citizens for 
specific benefits. 
23The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same 
distinction. In First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F.2d 195 (1980), cert. 
denied, U.S. (1981), involving a claimed violation 
of federal bankingstatutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain 
rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the 
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act. • •. 
The Supreme Court in Thiboutot makes clear that 
section 1983 does protect rights established by 
statutes enacted pursuant to authority other 
than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory 
rights protected by section 1983. Thiboutot 
involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights 
•.• represent important personal rights akin to 
fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights 
incidental to the National Bank Act are 
qualitatively different and not within the 
contemplation of section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op. at __ ("In 
order to have an action under§ 1983, it is not enough to 
establish the violation of a federal statute. Rather, the 
statute violated must be one that confers a federal right 
upon the plaintiff."). 
, 
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Dy Because § 1983 does not provide a right of 
action to respondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, we 290 
~ turn to the ~ f the'\ ~~~re is 
. 1· d . h f . d' 1 d h ~ f J an imp 1e rig to action 1rect y un er t ese statutes. 
~'---'~ 
We ~e a tue e-s go A-Gt o~~ide sufficient 
indication,! of legislative intent 
action ~ r ~ h~ rd~ such 
I\ 
to create rights of 
rights exist. This 
? 
295 
/ ~ ~ 
conclusion is supported by the structure of the Acts and 1 
4 -
t i,.e.4..c legislative history. 
Although these statutes neither authorize nor 
~~ 
expressly rule out private suits for damages, thi a fa.ct 
ffiic a.te , tl).a l. Co,R9 .r-ess f.e i l ed t e- cons i de-r 
q1w ~t_ i t, ii nf ~ Pnfn~ 
~~~ 
• The FWPCA, for example, 
authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to violations 
of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 
33 u.s.c. § 1319. 24 He may seek a civil penalty of up to 
300 
$10,000 per day, id.,§ 309(d), 33 u.s.c. § 1319(d), and 305 
24The Administrator is authorized to give 
States an opportunity to take action before doing 




criminal penalties Larefalso7...available, id., § 309(c}, 33 
u.s.c. § 1319(c}. States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials 
possess adequate authority to abate violations through 
civil or criminal penalties or other means of enforcement. 310 
Id., § 402, 33 u.s.c. § 1342 (b} (7). In addition, if "any 
interested person" believes that the standards being 
applied by the EPA are themselves violative of the Act, 
under 33 u.s.c. § 1369(b} he may seek judicial review in a 
United States Court of Appeals of various particular 315 
actions by the Administrator, including establishment of 
effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge 
of pollutants. Where review could have been obtained 
under this provision, the action at issue may not be 
challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding 320 
for enforcement. Id., § 1369 (b} (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have 
their counterparts under the MPRSA, 25 are supplemented by 
25The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil 
penalties by the Administrator, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a}, 
criminal penalties, id, § 1415(b}, suits for injunctive 
relief by the AttorneyGeneral, id.,§ 1415(c}, and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id.,-§-1415(f}. 
21. 
the express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the 
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and§ 105(g) of the MPRSA, 33 325 
u.s.c. § 1415(g). These citizen-suit provisions require 
sixty days' prior notice to potential defendants and 
provide only prospective relief.26 
~ 
The ~inference to be drawn from the existence of 
these various enforcement ~,' especially the 330 
citizen-suit provisions, is that Congress did not intend 
to authorize impliedly other judicial remedies for private 
citizens. As we stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, 
supra, "it is an elemental canon of statutory construction 
that where a statute expressly provides a particular 335 
remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading 
others into it." 444 U.S., at 19. See also Touche Ross & 
Co. v. Redington, 
7~~ 
442 U.S. 560, 571-574 (1979). In the 
absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional 
intent, we are compelled to conclude in this kind of 340 





26under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to 
the government, may also be ordered by the court. § 
505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
22. 
~~~ w-anted , 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided 
this inference. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the 
existence of a citizen-suit provision in § 1365 (a) does 345 
not rule out implied forms of private enforcement of the 
Act. It arrived at this conclusion by asserting that 
Congress intended in§ 1365(a) to create a limited cause 
of action for "private attorneys general"--"non-injured 
members of the public" suing to promote the general 350 
welfare rather than to redress an injury to their own 
welfare. 616 F.2d, at 1227. It went on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged 
violation, as these plaintiffs allege they were, 
has an alternate basis for suit under section 
505 (e), 33 u.s.c. § 1365 (e), and the general 
federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Code. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1976). Section 505(e) 
is a savings clause that preserves all rights to 
enforce the Act or seek relief against the 
Administrator. Coupled with the general federal 
question jurisdiction it permits this suit to be 
brought by these parties." 616 F.2d, at 
1227. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are, however, at least two problems with 
this reasoning. First, the language of the savings clause 
on which the Court of Appeals relied is quite ambiguous 




under the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in 370 
23. 
the citizen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which 
any person ••• may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or 
to seek any other relief." It is at least unclear whether 
the phrase "any statute" includes the statute in which 375 
this statement was contained.27 
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of 
Appeals relied is flawed because it draws 
~ ~-;-
a fa l se 
distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs entitled to 
~ ~-o d~ c.t iu~.I_ 
bring a citizen suit and [ injured" plaintiffs)\en-t:4 ed to 
sue under the general provisions of the Act. "Citizen" 
for purposes of § 1365 means "a person or persons having 
27 In fact the Senate Report the FWPCA Amendment 
of 1972 stated with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the sect ion 
would specifically preserve any rights or 
remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain 
available. Compliance with requirements under 
this Act would not be a defense to a common law 
action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-
414, p. 81 (1971) (emphasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on 
the MPRSA) (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict 
or supersede "any other right to legal action which is 
afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or 
the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent 
standard or limitation" in § 505(e) necessarily is a 
reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are 
unpersuaded that Cf ng re~ ~ sarily intended this 
meaning. The phrase coul als ~ fer to state statutory 
limitations, or to 'effluent limitations" imposed as a 







an interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 
u.s.c. § 1365(f). This phrase was intended by Congress to 
allow suits by all persons possessing standing under the 385 
terms of this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727 (1972). S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 
(1972). This category of potential plaintiffs necessarily 
includes not only those suffering "non-economic" harms 
from pollution, but also persons like respondents who 390 
allege direct economic harms. Thus it cannot be inferred 
that Congress preserve a separate private remedy for 
direct economic injuries. 
altw ct;;__ 




to the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that 395 
Congress evidenced an intent not to imply private remedies 
when it expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant 
provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost 
identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 u.s.c. § 1415(g). 
Although they do not expressly limit - citizen suits to 400 
those who have suffered some injury from a violation of 
the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that 
Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of 
25. 
a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin 405 
violations. 




legislative intent is the legislative 
r ne of the four relevant factors iden 
\.in ~t v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) 11 
ich wa~ 
this Court' c:; U ified by 
J 
This history does 410 
~ - --
not lead to a contrary conclusion with respect to implied 
under either Acts. Indeed, the reports and 
debates provide affirmative support for the view that 
Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits 
to apply to all private suits under these acts. 28 Since 415 
28The citizen-suit provision of the FWPCA was 
expressly modeled on the parallel provision of the Clear 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 79 
(1971). The legislative history of the latter act 
~Nu~ . ·rJ;ontains")plea~ indications that private enforcement suits 
-e,,r~·. were intended to be limited to the injunctive relief 
expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for example, 
stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that 
conferring additional rights on the citizen may 
burden the courts unduly. I would argue that 
the citizen suit provision of s. 4358 has been 
carefully drafted to prevent this consequnece 
from arising. First of all, it should be noted 
that the bill makes no provision for damages to 
the individual. It therefore provides no 
incentives to suit other than to protect the 
health and welfare of those suing and others 
similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather 
than the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with 
no hope of financial gain and the very real 
prospect of financial loss, will initiate court 






the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 
both point toward an absence of intent to create an 
implied remedy, 29 we need not look further to less 
important indicia of legislative intent, such as the 
remaining three Cort factors. See Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, supra, 442 U.S., at 576. Where Congress has 
) ~4L~••·-~~ ~~ 
at-f:i.rmatively decided that a separate private remedy is J 
I\. 
unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are not authorized 
to ~ this legislative judgment. 3 0 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, 
Senator Muskie, in response to concerns expressed by other 
Senators, contrasted the citizen-suit provision with the 
terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and 
a remedy for recovery of fines and restitution, 
and other monetary damages. The pending bill is 
limited to seek [sic] abatement of violation of 
standards established administratively under the 
act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 
116 Cong. Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that 
the availability of damages "would encourage frivolous or 
harassing suits against industries and government 
agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland Park 
v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
29see generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky 
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (CA7 1979)_,_cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 





A t-a-ee the question whether to provide such a remedy, this 
question remains essentially legislative, and our 
decisions have made clear that ..w~--will.,.(fiof sufpl::emeR C tn~ 
a ei?iberations ef ~ witb ..pol--k:¥ j1adgments of 01a r own 
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27. 
III 425 
The remaining two issues on which we granted 
certiorari relate to respondents federal claims based on 
the federal common law of nuisance. The principal 
'< 1) precedent on which r ~,._ 5 "'· 10 this claim was" based is Illinois v. 
I\ 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), where the Court found that 430 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the 
federal common law issues raised by a suit for injunctive 
relief by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin 
~ 
municipalities and sewerage commissions, involving the 
" 
discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In this case, we 435 
need not decide whether a cause of action may be brought 
under federal common by a private plaintiff, seeking 
damages. We have recently held that the federal common 
law of nuisance, in the area of water pollution, is 
entirely preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the 440 
FWPCA, which was completely revised soon after the 
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, U.S. (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' 
federal common law claims, since there is no reason to 445 
28. 
suppose that the preemptive ef feet of the FWPCA is any 
less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue. To the 
extent that this case involves ocean waters not covered by 
the FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRSA, we see no reason 
to suppose that federal common law should be applicable. 450 
The regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no less 
comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than are 
analogous provisions of the FWPCA.31 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law 
claims because their underlying legal basis is now 455 
completely undermined. As discussed above, we also 
dismiss the claims under the MPRSA and the FWPCA because 
respondents lack a right of action under those statutes. 
We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
31 rndeed, as noted supra, at n. 13, the ocean 
dumping of sewage sludge must end altogether by December 
31, 1981. To the extent that Congress allowed some 
continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this 
represents a considered judgment that it made sense to 




No. 79-1711, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1754, Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties v. 
National Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1760, City of New York v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn. 
No. 80-12, EPA v. National Sea Clammers Assn. 
In this case, involving a lleged damage to 
fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of 
5 
10 
sewage and other waste, we are faced with questions 15 
concerning the availablity of a damages remedy, based 
either on federal common law or on the provisions of two 
Acts--the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as 
amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 20 
33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members 
harvest fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and 
New Jersey, -a-s=-~ individual member of that 25 ,._ 
organization. In 1977, they brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
against petitioners--various governmental entities and 
2. 
officials from New York, 1 New Jersey 2 and the federal 
government. 3 Their complaint alleged that sewage, sewage 30 
"sludge," and other waste materials were being discharged 
into New York Harbor and the Hudson River by some of the 
respondents. In addition it complained of the dumping of 
such materials directly into the ocean from maritime 
vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a result of these 35 
activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, and 
made special reference to a massive growth of algae said 
to have appeared offshore in 1976. 4 It then stated that 
1The New York defendants were the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the 
City of New York; Abraham Beame, Mayor of New York; the 
West Long Branch Sewer District; the County of 
Westchester; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen 
Cove. 
2The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection; David J. Bardin, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the 
Bergen County Sewer Authority; the Joint Meeting of Essex 
and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; 
the Linden-Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown 
Sewerage Authority. 
3The federal defendants were the Environmental 
Protection Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as 
EPA Administrator; the Army Corps of Engineers; and Martin 
R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary of the Army. 
4The complaint alleged that this growth of 
algae was caused by the discharges of sewage and "covered 
an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging from approximately 
the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to a point 
approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and 
extending from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles 
out to sea," Complaint t 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief 





this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, 
clamming and lobster industries which operate in the · 40 
waters of the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories, 6 
respondents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 
million in compensatory damages, and $250 million in 
punitive damages. ».efe-ndants '1Uove-<l to di smis.s -~the_ 
c-0mpl-a~nt,-=bu~ the District Court tFcacee ~A'.t"D as a--mG-t-i-G::R-
for .summary judgment be-eausac rel-ie 
,I i / 
on af f i-davi.t:s.. Tbe 
21 
~ T .,'> { _,., p lv ·- ~ d"1, J 
r-eottt--t granted tRe mot ion '.w-i-t!~t t.e- all counts of the 
complain~ .tlt-!lo~r ej eet-ion of Jl.e-pe ode n t~ s..ta.te= 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals 
settled on the ocean floor, creating a condition 
of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about 
the water near the ocean's floor. This 
condition resulted in the death and destruction 
of an enormous amount of marine life, 
particularly with respect to the shellfish and 
other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief 
for Respondents 4. 
5complaint ,1 39, App. 26a. 
6Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the 
MPRSA; federal common law; §13 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §407; the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 u.s.c. §§4321-4361; New York and 
New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Cons ti tut ion; 
the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 
42 u.s.c. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. 
§§1346(b), 2671; and state tort law. 
7The court ~ rev~sly l dismissed claims 
against the New YorK and New Jersey environmental 
protection agencies and their directors. These defendants 
7lJ O (\ :> lJ> + CJ~ 
.) ~':. 





1 aw cla-i-im;: =was=wi-tho11t _ px:ceiudice 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court 
crz 5J., ~ sed the respondents' nuisance claim under federal 
common law, see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), 
on the ground that such a cause of action is not available 
50 
to private parties. With respect to the claims based on 55 
alleged violations of the FWPCA, the court noted that 
respondents had failed to comply with the 60-day notice 
,,.. 
f 
requirement of the "citizen suit" provision in§ 505 of 
'--
R •""f 
the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365(b) (1) (A). This provision allows 








first give notice to the EPA, the 
I 
alleged violator. Id 8 . Because 
respondents did not give the requisite notice, the court 
ref used to allow them to proceed with a claim under the 
60 
Ac tf-1independent of the citizen-suit provision and based 65 
on the general jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. §1331. 9 
are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8see n. 28, infra 
emphasizing the limited forms of 
the Act). 
(legislative history 
relief available under 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the 
original FWPCA, added in the 1972 Amendments, with 
parallel ci~s to the United States Code. 








The court applied the same analysis to respondents' claims 
under the MPRSA, which contains similar citizen-suit and 
notice provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(9) .lO Finally, the 
court rejected a possible claim of maritime tort, both 70 
because respondents had failed to plead such claim 
explicitly and because they had failed to comply with the 
procedural requirements of the federal and state tort 
claims acts. 1 1 
9 rn so holding the court rejected an argument 
that the notice requirement is inapplicable because of the 
"savings clause" in§ 505(e), which states: 
"Nothing in this section shall 
restrict any right which any person (or class of 
persons) may have under any statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard 
or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a 
State agency)." 33 u.s.c. § 1365 (e). 
lOLike the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings 
clause," which states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by 
this subsection shall not restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have 
under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against 
the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State 
agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1415(9) (5). 
11see 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; N.Y. 
Gen. Mun. Law§§ 50-e, 50-i; N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. The 
District Court noted that respondents had given timely 
notice to one defendant--New York City. --
The petitions for certiorari in this Court 
raised questions concerning the applicability of state 
tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment to tort suits 
in federal court. These questions are not, however, 
within the scope of the questions on which review was 
granted. 
6. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 75 
Circuit reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the 
MPRSA, the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime 
tort. 616 F.2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, 
the court held that failure to comply with the 60-day 
notice provision in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33 u.s.c. 80 
§1365 (b) (1) (A) , does not preclude suits under the Act in 
addition to the specific "citizen suits" authorized in§ 
505. It based this conclusion on the savings clause in§ 
505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), preserving "any right which 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any 85 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent 
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." 616 
_.,I 
F.2d, at 1226-1227 ~ __.9-'ee n. 9, supra. The Court of 
Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in the area 
of implied statutory rights of action, 12 and concluded 90 
that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts to 
entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
12Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66 (1975). 
t>J¥'f' 
7. 
of the [FWPCA] , preserved by the savings clause of the 
Act, on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who 
have been or will be injured by pollution in violation of 95 
its terms." 616 F.2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the 
MPRSA, concluding again that the District Court had erred 
in dismissing respondents' claims under this Act. 
Although the court was not explicit on this question, it 100 
C, ,J 
t t 
-appears that it intended to antborii!ie suits for damages, 
: ~ (.r-rt.t.•p,a r'.t' ) 
as well as for injunctive relief, under the FWPCA and the 
I. 
MPRSA.13 
With respect to the federal common-law nuisance 
l3After holding that there is an implied right 
of action under the FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal 
government defendants' sovereign immunity 
argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 
of title 28 make clear that sovereign immunity 
has been waived in all suits by plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief against federal 
agencies or officers. Whether damages can be 
recovered from the federal government is a 
separate question to which the Federal Tort 
Claims Act speaks." 616 F.2d, at 1231. 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court 
had concluded that the statutory rights of action it was 
creating included damages relief. An additional 
indication is that by the time of the Court of Appeals 
decision, any relief other than damages was probably 
unnecessary. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was 
not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 u.s.c. § 
1412a(a), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping of 
sewage sludge by December 31, 1981. 
"). 
8. 
claims, the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's 105 
conclusion that private parties may not bring such claims. 
It also held, applying common-law principles, that 
respondents "alleged sufficient individual damage to 
permit them to recover damages for this essentially public 
nuisance." 616 F.2d, at 1234. It thus went considerably 110 
beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, which involved purely 
prospective relief sought by State plaintiff. 14 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a 
vareity of arguments were filed in this Court by a group 
of New Jersey sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the 115 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties in New Jersey 
(No. 79-1754), by the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-
1760), and by all of the federal defendants named in this 
~ 
suit (No. 80-12). 15 we granted these petitions to review 
~ 
~ 
14The court also held that respondents had 
offered allegations sufficient to make out a claim of 
maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. 
It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
with its various procedural requirements, 28 u.s.c. §§ 
1346 (b), 267~ seq., applies to any of respondents' 
federal-law claim against federal defendants, although it 
did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage recovery 
against federal agencies based on state law." 616 F.2d, 
at 1236. 
15see n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 
79-1754, and 80-12 also named the remaining petitioners as 
respondents, based on cross-claims filed in the District 
9. 
\ ot) 
6 three quest ions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a 120 
I-. 
private right of action independent of their citizen-suit 
provisions, whether a private citizen has standing to 
sue for damages under the federal common law of nuisance~ ) 
""" 
(i ) whether all federal common-law 
, 
pollution I are 
.,. 
concerning ocean now preempted by the 125 ,, 
()., legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRS Ai ~J ~ ~ 
We hold that there is no implied right of act ion under 
these statutes and that the federal common law of nuisance 
has been fully preempted in the area of ocean pollution. 16 
II 130 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was 
first enacted in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 
1155. It emphasized state enforcement of water quality 
standards. When this legislation proved ineffective, 
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 135 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 
et seq. The Amendments shifted the emphasis to "direct 
Court. 
16we therefore need not discuss the question 
whether the federal common law of nuisance could ever be 
the basis of a suit for damages by a private party. 
10. 
restrictions on discharges," EPA v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it 
"unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without 140 
obtaining a permit and complying with its . terms," id., at 
205. 17 While still allowing for state administration and 
enforcement under federally approved state plans, § 
402 (b), (c), 33 u.s.c. § 1342 (b), (c), the Amendments 
created various federal minimum effluent standards, id., 145 
§§ 301-307, 33 u.s.c. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 93-532, 86 Stat. 1052 et seq., 
-
sought to create comprehensive federal regulation of the 
dumping of materials into ocean waters near the United 
States coastline. Section 101 of the Act requires a 
permit for any dumping into ocean waters, when the 
material is transported from the United States or on an 
American vessel or aircraft. 33 U.S.C. § 14ll(a) • 18 In 
17The Act applies to discharges of pollutants 
from any source into navigable waters, including the 
"territorial seas," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12), and applies 
as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel or 
other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the 
high seas, id., § 1362 (9), (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 
92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
Footnote(s) 18 appear on following page(s). 
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11. 
addition, it requires a permit for the dumping of material 155 
transported from outside the United States into the 
~ '( 
territorial seas or in A zone extending twelve mile~ from 
the coastline, where "it may affect the territorial sea or 
the territory of the United States." Id.,§ 14ll(b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under 160 
these two Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall 
into two categories. The main contention is that the EPA 
and the Army Corps of Engineers have permitted the New 
Jersey and New York defendants to discharge and dump 
pollutants in amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. 165 
Complaint ,1,1 26, 28, 31, 55, 59, 75. In addition, they 
seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey defendants 
have violated the terms of their permits. Id., ,1 75. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and 17 0 
monetary relief, where such a suit is not expressly 





18These permits are issued by the Administrator 
Environmental Protection Agency, 33 u.s.c. § 1412, 
in the case of dredged materials, which may be 
under a permit issued by the Secretary of the Army, 
1413. 
12. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the 
principles set out in recent decisions concerning the 
recurring question whether Congress meant to create a 175 
private right of action under a federal statute without 
saying so explicitly. The key to the inquiry is the 
intent of the legislature. ,;;;:California v. Sierra Cln0.r-=:: _ 
-::£I.-S::;=-- E::l981) ;-- Universities Research Association v. 
Coutu, U.S. (1981); Transamerica Mortgage 
" ) p...._,., 
Advisors, Inc., J 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. 
~ 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of 
course, to the sttatutory language, particularly to tftJ 
provisions made therein for enforcement and relief. Then 
180 
we review the legislative history and other traditional 185 
aids of statutory interpretation to determine 
congressional intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific 
statutory provision authorizing a private suit for damages 190 
under either the FWPCA or the MPRSA. 19 We therefore 
19 The Court of Appeals did state that the 
savings clause in § 505(e) of the FWPCA "provides an 
independent remedy for injured parties unburdened by the 
13. 
normally would proceed directly to the question whether an 
implied private cause of action nevertheless may be 
inferred. Arguably, however, there is here an alternative 
h 
source of express congressional au not 195 
suggested by the parties. Last Term, in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, U.S. (1980), the Court construed 42 
U.S. C. § 198 3 as authorizing suits to redress 
violations by state officials of rights created by federal 
statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that 200 
respondents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards 
among the petitioners 20 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by 
virtue of a right of action created by§ 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the 
applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, 205 
notice requirements of section 505(b) ." 616 F.2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings 
clause is itself an express authorization of private 
damages suits. Instead, it held that the savings clause 
acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in§ 505(b). 
The court went on to apply an implied-right-of-action 
analysis before concluding that a private suit for damages 
is among the preexisting remedies preserved by the savings 
clause. 
20These petitioners appear to fall within the 
category of municipal governmental entities suable as 
"persons" under our decision in Monell v. Department of 





despite the failure of respondents to raise it here or 
below. This case began long before that decision. 
Moreover, if controlling, this argument would obviate the 
need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize 
private suits to enforce these particular federal 210 
statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls within 
the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit 
by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 215 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, U.S. 
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
whether ( i) the statute at issue there was the kind that 
created enforceable "rights" under § 1983, and (ii) 220 
whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself. Id., at Each 





The second one--possible congressional~~~~-
,, J tr ' ~ this Act--may apply where it is clear that 
Congress has provided a comprehensive enforcement scheme. 
225 
15. 
As discussed infra, at , the FWPCA and MPRSA do provide 
relatively comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. 
Moreover, Justice Stewart, who later joined the majority 
in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Houston 230 
Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opini~n), that when "a state official 
is alleged to have violated a federal statute which 
provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the 
requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be 235 
bypassed by bringing suit directly under§ 1983. 1121 This 
analysis would seem to apply here. See Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation v. Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. 
Supp. 821 (ED Va 1980) (rejecting a§ 1983 action against 
the Chairman of a State Water Board, based on the 240 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the 
federalism concerns raised). 
We need not, however, decide whether Congress 
21see also Maine v. Thiboutot, __ U.S. __ , /:) 
__ , n. 11 (1980) (Powell, J., d1ssent1ng); Meyerson v. 1 Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op. at __ ® Ariz A ~ _ Q _ 
February 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of § 1983 
cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of 
the Revenue Sharing Act."). 
16. 
can be said to have rejected§ 1983 remedies in this case, 
since we hold that such remedies are unavailable under the 245 
other exception suggested in Pennhurst. Section 1983 
authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under color of · 
state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Cons ti tut ion and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 250 
J l, . c 
It remains, however, for this Court to work out the 
meaninq of the phrase "rights, privileges, or immunities," 
as it applies to claims based on violations of federal 
statutes. A fair reading of Maine v. Thiboutot suggests 
that the Court did not mean to authorize suits for damages 255 
under § 1983 in all cases in which a citizen has been 
injured by federal statutory violation under color of 
state law. Rather, it makes sense to distinguish two 
distinct examples of statutory violations by state 
officials. where a federal law creates an 
---p-t.' 4' 0 )..I!/} ; ,t 
2 6 0 ,L _)',.,._;J 
entitlement to individual benefits administered by state 
officials, or imposes a duty on the State to respect the 
I rights of a particular class of citizens, the statute can 
be said to create "rights privileges, or immunities" on 
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which§ 1983 suits may be premised. Where, on the other 265 
hand, federal law simply regulates the conduct of the 
States or their officials without creating entitlements 
for particular individuals or promoting the interests of a 
specific class of citizens, it cannot be said that 
statutory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or 270 
immunities" of individual persons within the meaning of 
this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some 
contexts, it is necessary to place some limits on the 
right of action created in§ 1983 in order to be faithful 275 
to the manifest intent of Congress in enacting that 
provision. Its purpose was to protect individual rights, 
not to authorize private suits by every citizen affected 
by a violations of all federal regulatory statutes under 
color of state law. The present case is an example of the 280 
need for some limiting principle. The FWPCA and the MPRSA 
impose duties on the states and municipalities in the 
water pollution area in order to benefit the Nation as a 
whole. 22 While it is true that respondents as fishermen 
Footnote(s) 22 appear on following page(s). 
18. 
and clammers have a significant economic stake in proper 285 
enforcement of these acts, their interest is not 
comparable to that of a Social Security recipient denied 
authorized benefits by an act of a State administrator. 
Such a recipient is deprived of a federal statutory 
"right." Respondents, by contrast, merely allege an 
injury resulting from a violation of an essentially 
regulatory statutory scheme. 23 
22congress was concerned about the fishing 
industry in these Acts, but this was only one element of a 
larger effort to maintain water quality for the benefit of 
all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; MPRSA § 
2, 33 u.s.c. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not mean to 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does in statutes 
that select out particular classes of citizens for 
specific benefits. 
23The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same 
distinction. In First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F.2d 195 (1980), cert. 
denied, U.S. (1981), involving a claimed violation 
of federal bankingstatutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain 
rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the 
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act •.•• 
The Supreme Court in Thiboutot makes clear that 
section 1983 does protect rights established by 
statutes enacted pursuant to authority other 
than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory 
rights protected by section 1983. Thiboutot 
involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights 
•.• represent important personal rights akin to 
fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. • • . On the other hand, rights 
incidental to the National Bank Act are 
qualitatively different and not within the 
contemplation of section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op. at __ ("In 




Because § 1983 does not provide a right of 
action to respondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, we 295 
turn to the decision of the Court of Appeals that there is 
an implied right of action directly under these statutes. 
We find no persuasive evidence of a congressional intent 
to authorize implied rights of action. This conclusion is 
supported by the structure o~ the Acts, their purpose, 300 
and legislative history. 
Al though these statutes neither authorize nor 
expressly rule out private suits for damages, there are 
elaborate enforcement provisions. The FWPCA, for example, 
authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to violations 305 
of tne Act with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 
33 u.s.c. § 1319. 24 He may seek a civil penalty of up to 
$10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (d), and 
criminal penalties also are available, id., § 309(c), 33 
establish the violation of a federal statute. Rather, the 
statute violated must be one that confers a federal right 
upon the plaintiff."). 
2 4The Administrator is 
States an opportunity to take 
himself. 33 u.s.c. § 1319(a) (1). 
authorized to give 




U.S.C. § 1319(c). States desiring to administer their own 310 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials 
possess adequate authority to abate violations through 
civil or criminal penalties or other means of enforcement. 
Id., § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (7). In addition, if "any 
interested person" believes that the standards being 315 
applied by the EPA are themselves violative of the Act, 
-<£212 
under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) he may seek judicial review in --
Unit~d States Court of Appeals of various particular 
actions by the Administrator, including establishment of 
effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge 320 
of pollutants. Where review could have been obtained 
under this provision, the action at issue may not be 
challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding 
for enforcement. Id. , § 1369 ( b) ( 2) . 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have 325 
their counterparts under the MPRSA, 25 are supplemented by 
the express citizen-suit provisions in § 505(a) of the 
25The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil 
penalties by the Administrator, 33 u.s.c. § 1415(a), 
criminal penalties, id, § 1415(b), suits for injunctive 
relief by the AttorneyGeneral, id., § 1415(c), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id. ,-§-1415 (f). 
21. 
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and§ 105(g) of the MPRSA, 33 
u.s.c. § 1415(g). These citizen-suit provisions require 
~ days' prior notice to potential defendants and 330 
/\ 
provide only prospective relief.26 
The clear inference to be drawn from the 
ex i stence of these various enforcement provisions, 
especially the citizen-suit provisions, is that Congress 
did not intend to autho r i ze impliedly other judicial 335 
remedies for private citizens. As we stated in 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental 
canon of statutory construction that where a statute 
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U.S., 340 
at 19. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 
442 U.S., at 571-574. In the absence of strong indicia of 
a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to 
conclude in this kind of situation that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
26under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to 
the government, may also be ordered by the court. § 
505 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a). 
345 
22. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided 
this inference. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the 
existence of a citizen-suit provision in § 1365 (a) does 
not rule out implied forms of private enforcement of the 
Act. It arrived at this conclusion by asserting that 
Congress intended in § 1365 (a) to create a limited cause 
of action for "private attorneys general"--"non-injured 
members of the public" suing to promote the general 
welfare rather than to redress an injury to their own 
welfare. 616 F.2d, at 1227. It went on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged 
violation, as these plaintiffs allege they were, 
has an alternate basis for suit under section 
505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and the general 
federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Code. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 (e) 
is a savings clause that preserves all rights to 
enforce the Act or seek relief against the 
Administrator. Coupled with the general federal 
question jurisdiction it permits this suit to be 
brought by these parties." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
_5J- I'\.£~ 1~---1 





this reasoning. First, the language of the savings clause 370 
on which the Court of Appeals relied is quite ambiguous 
concerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies 
under the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in 
the citizen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which 
Of~ ( 
23. 
any person ... may have under any statute or common law to 375 
seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or 
to seek any other relief." It is at least unclear whether 
I J 
the phrase "any statute" includes the statute in which 
... 
this statement was contained.27 
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of 380 
Appeals relied is flawed because it draws an incorrect 
distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs entitled to 
bring a citizen suit and the "injured" plaintiffs who 
claim here a right to sue under the general provisions of 
the Act. "Citizen" for purposes of§ 1365 means "a person 385 
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely 
27 In fact the Senate Report the FWPCA Amendment 
of 1972 stated with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section 
would specifically preserve any rights or 
remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain 
availabl e. Compliance with requirements under 
th is Act would not be a defense to a common law 
ac tion f or pollution damages." s. Rep. No. 92-
414, p . 81 (1971} (emphasis added}. 
See also s. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971} (report on 
the MPRSA} (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict 
or supersede "any other right to legal action which is 
afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or 
the common law"}. 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent 
standard or limitation" in § 505(e} necessarily is a 
reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are 
unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this 
meaning. The phrase also could refer to state statutory 
limitations, or to "effluent limitations" imposed as a 
result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance. 
24. 
affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). This phrase was intended 
by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing 
standing under the terms of this Court's decision in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). S. Conf. Rep. 390 
No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This category of potential 
plaintiffs necessarily includes not only those suffering 
"non-economic" harms from pollution, but also persons like 
respondents who allege direct economic harms. Thus it 
cannot be inferred that Congress preserve a separate 395 
private remedy for direct economic injuries. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its analysis 
to the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that 
Congress evidenced an intent not to imply private remedies 
when it expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant 400 
provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost 
identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 u.s.c. § 1415(g). 
Although they do not expressly limit citizen suits to 
those who have suffered some injury from a violation of 
the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that 405 
Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of 
a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
25. 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin 
violations. 
The other major source for discovering 410 
legislative intent is the legislative history, which was 
one of the four factors identified by this Court in Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), as relevant to the 
question of legislative intent. This history does not 
lead to a contrary conclusion with respect to implied 415 
remedies under either Actw. Indeed, the reports and 
debates provide affirmative support for the view that 
Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits 
to apply to all private suits under these acts. 28 since 
28The citizen-suit provision of the FWPCA was 
expressly modeled on the parallel provision of the Clear 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 79 
(1971). The legislative history of the latter act 
contains explicit indications that private enforcement 
suits were intended to be limited to the injunctive relief 
expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for example, 
stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that 
conferring additional rights on the citizen may 
burden the courts unduly. I would argue that 
the citizen suit provision of S. 4358 has been 
carefully drafted to prevent this consequnece 
from arising. First of all, it should be noted 
that the bill makes no provision for damages to 
the individual. It therefore provides no 
incentives to suit other than to protect the 
health and welfare of those suing and others 
similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather 
than the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with 
no hope of financial gain and the very real 
prospect of financial loss, will initiate court 
action under this bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 
(1970). 
26. 
the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 420 
both point toward an absence of intent to create an 
implied remedy,29 we need not look further to less 
important indicia of legislative intent, such as the 
remaining three Cort factors. See Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, supra, 442 U.S., at 576. 30 Where, as here, 425 
Congress has decided that a separate private remedy is 
unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are not authorized 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, 
Senator Muskie, in response to concerns expressed by other 
Senators, contrasted the citizen-suit provision with the 
terms of a separate bill, s. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and 
a remedy for recovery of fines and restitution, 
and other monetary damages. The pending bill is 
limited to seek [sic] abatement of violation of 
standards established administratively under the 
act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 
116 Cong. Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that 
the availability of damages "would encourage frivolous or 
harassing suits against industries and government 
agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland Park 
v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
29see generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky 
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (CA? 1979)..L_cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
30we note, however, that the only other Cort 
factor dealing directly with Congressional intent--the 
underlying purposes of the statutory scheme--does not 
provide support for resondents' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling pollution through 
administrative channels, providing litigation remedies 
only to correct administrative abuses prospectively. See 
n. 28, supra. 
27. 
to ignore this legislative judgment.31 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted 430 
certiorari relate to respondents federal claims based on 
the federal common law of nuisance. The principal 
precedent on which these claims were based is Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), where the Court found that 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the 435 
federal common law issues raised by a suit for injunctive 
relief by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin 
municipalities and public sewerage commissions, involving 
the discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In this case, 
we need not decide whether a cause of action may be 440 
brought under federal common by a private plaintiff, 
~ 
seeking damages. We have recently held that the federal 
common law of nuisance, in the area of water pollution, is 
entirely preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the 
31Even if one assumes that Congress did not 
consider the question whether to provide such a remedy, 
this question remains essentially legislative, and our 
decisions have made clear that courts should not asssume 
the legislative ( ct" role of making policy judgments 
concerning appropr~ ate statutory remedies. 
a.." 
28. 
FWPCA, which was completely revised soon after the 445 
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, U.S. (1981) . 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' 
federal common law claims, since there is no reason to 
suppose that the preemptive effect of the FWPCA is any 450 
less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue. To the 
extent that this case involves ocean waters not covered by 
~ 
the FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRSA, we see no reason 
to suppose that federal common law should be applicable. 
The regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no less 455 
comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than are 
analogous provisions of the FWPCA.3 2 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law 
claims because their 1:1n.dei:-:I...y4-ng- legal basis is now 
1. ().J) yv, , .... 
~ comp.J:.etely unaerm.in@G. As discussed above, we also 460 
I 
. 
dismiss the claims under the MPRSA and the FWPCA because 
~ 
32 Indeed, as noted supra, at n. 13, the ocean 
dumping of sewage sludge must end altogether by December 
31, 1981. To the extent that Congress allowed some 
continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this 
represents a considered judgment that it made sense to 
allow entities like petitioners to adjust to the coming 
change. 
29. 
respondents lack a right of action under those statutes. 
We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 465 
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No. 79-1711, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National 
Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1754, Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties v. 
National Sea Clammers Assn. 
No. 79-1760, City of New York v. National Sea Clammers 
Assn. 
No. 80-12, EPA v. National 
~ i~~se,. involving alleged 
I 
damage to 
fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of 
5 
10 
sewage and other waste, we · are faced with questions 15 
concerning the availablity of a damages remedy, based 
either on federal common law or on the provisions of two 
Acts--the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as 
amended, 33 u.s.c. § 1251 et seq., and the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 20 
33 u.s.c. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members 
harvest fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and 
New Jersey, and one individual member of that 25 
organization. In 1977, they brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
against petitioners--various governmental entities and 
,., 
2. 
officials from New York, 1 New Jersey: and the federal 
,::: 
government. 3 Their complaint alleged that sewage, sewage 30 
~ 
"sludge," and other waste materials were being discharged 
into New York Harbor and the Hudson River by some of the 
respondents. In addition it complained of the dumping of 
such materials directly into the ocean from maritime 
vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a result of these 35 
activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, and 
it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
said to have appeared offshore in 1976. 4 It then stated 
1The New York defendants were the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; the 
City of New York; Abraham Beame, Mayor of New York; the 
West Long Branch Sewer District; the County of 
Westchester; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen 
Cove. 
2The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection; David J. Bardin, 
individually and as Commissioner of that Department; _ the 
Bergen County Sewer Authority; the Joint Meeting of Essex 
and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewer age Authority; 
the Linden-Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown 
Sewerage Authority. 
3The federal defendants were the Environmental 
Protection Agency; Russell E. Train, individually and as 
EPA Administrator; the Army Corps of Engineers; and Martin 
R. Hoffman, individually and as Secretary of the Army. 
4The complaint alleged that this growth of 
algae was caused by the discharges of sewage and "covered 
an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging from approximately 
the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to a point 
approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and 
extending from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles 
out to sea," Complaint t 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief 
in this Court states that when 
3. 
that this pollution was causing the "collapse of the 
/ 
fishing, clamming and lobster industries which operate in 40 
the waters of the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 
respondents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 
million in compensatory damages, and $250 million in 
punitive damages. The District Court granted summary 
judgment to petitioners7 on all counts of the complaint. 8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court 
1
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals 
settled on the ocean floor, creating a condition 
of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about 
the water near the ocean's floor. This 
condition resulted in the death and destruction 
of an enormous amount of marine life, 
particularly with respect to the shellfish and 
other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief 
for Respondents 4. 
5complaint ,1 39, App. 26a. 
6Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the 
MPRSA; federal common law; §13 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 33 u.s.c. §407; the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4361; New York and 
New Jersey environmental statutes; the Fifth, Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Cons ti tut ion; 
the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 
42 u.s.c. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u.s.c. 
§§1346(b), 2671; and state tort law. 
7The court previously had dismissed claims 
against the New York and New Jersey environmental 
protection agencies and their directors. These defendants 
are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8The court's judgment with respect to the 
pendent state-law claims was without prejudice. 
45 
4. 
rejected respondents' nuisance claim under federal common 
law, see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), on the 
ground that such a cause of action is not available to 50 
private parties. With respect to the claims based on 
alleged violations of the FWPCA, the court noted that 
respondents had failed to comply with the 60-day notice 
requirement of the "citizen suit" provision in § 505 of 
the Act, 33 u.s.c. § 1365(b) (1) (A). This provision allows 55 
suits under the Act by private citizens, but authorizes 
only prospective relief, and the citizen plaintiffs first 
must give 
violator. 
not~M•to the EPA, the State, and any alleged 
-i!)! Because respondents did not give the 
requisite notice, the court refused to allow them to 60 
proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general 
jurisdictional grant in 28 u.s.c. §1331.10 The court 
9see n. 28, infra 
emphasizing the limited forms of 
the Act). 
(legislative history 
relief available under 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the 
original FWPCA, added in the 1972 Amendments, with 
parallel citations to the United States Code. 
lOin so holding the court rejected an argument 
that the notice requirement is inapplicable because of the 
"savings clause" in§ 505(e), which states: 
"Nothing in this section shall 
restrict any right which any person (or class of 
5. 
applied the same analysis to respondents' claims under the 
MPRSA, which contains similar citizen-suit and notice 65 
provisions. 33 u.s.c. § 1415(9) • 11 Finally, the court 
rejected a possible claim of maritime tort, both because 
respondents had failed to plead such claim explicitly and 
because they had failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements of the federal and state tort claims acts. 12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the 
MPRSA, the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime 
persons) may have under any statute or common 
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard 
or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a 
State agency)." 33 u.s.c. § 1365(e). 
llLike the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings 
clause," which states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by 
this subsection shall not restrict any right 
which any person (or class of persons) may have 
under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against 
the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State 
agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1415(9) (5). 
12 see 2 8 u . S • C • § § 13 4 6 ( b) , 2 6 71 et seq • ; N • Y • 
Gen. Mun. Law§§ 50-e, 50-i; N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. The 
District Court noted th ~ respondents had given timely 
notice to one defendant--New°'York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court 
raised questions concerning the applicability of state 
tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment to tort suits 
in federal court. These questions are not, however, 




tort. 616 F.2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, 
the court held that failure to comply with the 60-day 75 
notice provision in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33 u.s.c. § 
1365 (b) (1) (A), does not preclude suits under the Act in 
addition to the specific "citizen suits" authorized in§ 
505. It based this conclusion on the savings clause in§ 
505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), preserving "any right which 80 
any person (or class of persons) may have under any 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent 
stan~ard or limitation or to seek any other relief." 616 
F.2d, at 1226-1227; seen. 9, supra. The Court of Appeals 
then went on to apply our precedents in the area of 85 
implied statutory rights of action, 13 and concluded that 
"Congress intended to permit the federal courts to 
entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA] , preserved by the savings clause of the 
Act, on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who 90 
have been or will be injured by pollution in violation of 
13Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 
U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66 (1975). 
7. 
its terms." 616 F.2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the 
MPRSA, concluding again that the District Court had erred 
in dismissing respondents' claims under this Act. 95 
Although the court was not explicit on this question, it 
apparently concluded that suits for damages, as well as 
for injunctive relief, could be brought under the FWPCA 
and the MPRSA.14 
With respect to the federal common~ law nuisance 100 
claims, the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's 
conclusion that private parties may not bring such claims. 
It also held, applying (I . . 1 common, law pr1nc1p es, that 
14After holding that there is an implied right 
of action under the FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal 
government defendants' sovereign immunity 
argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 
of title 28 make clear that sovereign immunity 
has been waived in all suits by plaintiffs 
seeking injunctive relief against federal 
agencies or officers. Whether damages can be 
recovered from the federal government is a 
separate question to which the Federal Tort 
Claims Act speaks." 616 F.2d, at 1231. 
~This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court 
had concluded that the statutory rights of action it was 
' creating included damages relief. An additional 
indication is that by the time of the Court of Appeals 
decision, any relief other than damages was probably 
unnecessary. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was 
not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1412a(a), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping of 
sewage sludge by December 31, 1981. 
8. 
respondents "alleged sufficient individual damage to 
permit them to recover damages for this essentially public 105 
nuisance." 616 F.2d, at 1234. It thus went considerably 
beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, which involved purely 
prospective relief sought by State plaintiff. 1 5 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a 
vareity of arguments were filed in this Court by a group 110 
of New Jersey sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties in New Jersey 
(No. 79-1754), by the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-
1760), and by all of the federal defendants named in this 
suit (No. 80-12) . 16 We granted these petitions, limiting 115 
review to three questions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA 
imply a private right of action independent of their 
l5The court also held that respondents had 
offered allegations sufficient to make out a claim of 
maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty jurisdiction. 
It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
with its various procedural requirements, 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1346 ( b) , 26 71 et. seq. , applies to any of respondents' 
federal-law claims against federal defendants, although it 
did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage recovery 
against federal agencies based on state law." 616 F.2d, 
at 1236. 
16see n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 
79-1754, and 80-12 also named the remaining petitioners as 




citizen-suit provisions, ( 2) whether all federal common~ 
law nuisance actions concerning ocean pollution now are 
~ 
preempted by the legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA 120 
~ 
and the MPRSA, and (3) if not, whether a private citizen 
has standing to sue for damages under the federal common 
law of nuisance. We hold that there is no implied right 
of action under these statutes and that the federal common 
~ 
law of nuisance has been fully pref mpted in the area of 
ocean pollution. 17 
-""'l: ~ 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was 
first enacted in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 
1155. It emphasized state enforcement of water quality 
standards. When this legislation proved ineffective, 
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. !!ai- 92-500, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 
et seq. The Amendments shifted the emphasis to "direct 
restrictions on discharges," EPA v. State Water Resources 
17we therefore need not discuss the question 
whether the federal common law of nuisance could ever be 





Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it 
"unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without 
obtaining a permit and complying with its terms," id., at 
205. 18 While still allowing for state administration and 
enforcement under federally approved state plans, § 140 
402(b), (c), 33 u.s.c. § 1342(b), (c), the Amendments 
created various federal minimum effluent standards, id., 
§§ 301-307, 33 u.s.c. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. '9 93-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to 145 
create comprehensive federal regulation of the dumping of 
materials into ocean waters near the United States 
coastline. Section 101 of the Act requires a permit for 
any dumping into ocean waters, when the material is 
transported from the United States or on an American 150 
vessel or aircraft. 33 u.s.c. § 14ll(a) . 19 In addition, 
18The Act applies to discharges of pollutants 
from any source into navigable waters, including the 
"territorial seas," 33 u.s.c. §1 1362(7), (12), and applies 
as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel or 
other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the 
high seas, id., §8 1362(9), (10), (12). Sees. Rep. No. 




19These permits are issued by the Administrator 
Environmental Protection Agency, 33 U.S.C. § 1412, 
in the case of dredged materials, which may be 
under a permit issued by the Secretary of the Army, 
11. 
it requires a permit for the dumping of material 
transported from outside the United States into the 
I~ 
territorial seas or in the zone extending <twelr.1 0 -- miles 
from the coastline, where "it may affect the territorial 155 
sea or the territory of the United States." Id., § 
1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under 
these two Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall 
into two categories. The main contention is that the EPA 160 
and the Army Corps of Engineers have permitted the New 
Jersey and New York defendants to discharge and dump 
pollutants in amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. 
Complaint ,1,1 26, 28, 31, 55, 59, 75. In addition, they 
seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey defendants 165 
have violated the terms of their permits. Id., ,1 75. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and 
monetary relief, where such a suit is not expressly 
authorized by either of these Acts. 170 
id. , § . 1413. 
12. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the 
principles set out in recent decisions concerning the 
recurring question whether Congress meant to create a 
private right of action under a federal statute without 
saying so explicitly. The key to the inquiry is the 
intent of the legislature. Universities Research 
Association v. Coutu, U.S. (1981) ; 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 
11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the 
statutory language, particularly to the prov is ions made 
therein for enforcement and relief. Then we review the 
legislative history and other traditional aids of 
statutory interpretation to determine congressional 
intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific 
statutory provision authorizing a private suit for damages 
under either the FWPCA or the MPRSA.20 We therefore 
20The Court of Appeals did state that the 
savings clause in § 505(e) of the FWPCA "provides an 





normally would proceed directly to the question whether an 190 
implied private cause of action nevertheless may be 
inferred. Arguably, however, there is here an alternative 
source of express congressional authorization, not 
suggested by the parties. Last Term, in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, !fj_f U.S. (1980), the Court construed 42 195 
u.s.c. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations 
by state officials of rights created by federal statutes. 
Accordingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue 
the municipalities and sewerage boards among the 
petitioners 21 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a 200 
right of action created by§ 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the 
applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, 
notice requirements of section 505(b) ." 616 F.2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings 
clause is itself an express authorization of private 
damages suits. Instead, it held that the savings clause 
acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in§ 505(b). 
The court went on to apply an implied-right-of-action 
analysis before concluding that a private suit for damages 
is among the pr ~ xisting remedies preserved by the savings 
clause. , 
21These petitioners appear to fall within the 
category of municipal governmental entities suable as 
"persons" under our decision in Monell v. Department of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
14. 
despite the failure of respondents to raise it here or 
below. This case began long before that decision. 205 
Moreover, if controlling, this argument would obviate the 
need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize 
private suits to enforce these particular federal 
statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls within 
the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit 210 
by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, U.S. 215 
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
whether (i) the statute at issue there was the kind that 
created enforceable "rights" under § 1983, and (ii) 
whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself. Id., at Each 220 
of these exceptions may be applicable to the present case. 
The second one--possible congressional 
preclusion of§ 1983 suits to enforce this Act--may apply 
where it is clear that Congress has provided a 
15. 
comprehensive enforcement scheme. As discussed infra, at 225 
, the FWPCA and MPRSA do provide relatively 
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, Justice 
Stewart, who later joined the majority in Maine v. 
Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights 
Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 673, n. 2 (1979) (dissenting 230 
opinion), that when "a state official is alleged to have 
violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983."22 This analysis would seem to 
apply here. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia 
State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va 1980) 
(rejecting a§ 1983 action against the Chairman of a State 
Water Board, based on the comprehensiveness of the 
remedies provided and the federalism concerns raised). 
We need not, however, decide whether Congress 
22see also Maine v. Thiboutot, Yfl U.S. , 
__ , n. 11 (1980) (POWELL, J., d1ssent1ng);Meyersonv. 
Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op. , at , F. Supp. 
, __ (Ariz. FebcB l.l•El' 12, 1981) 7[T]he remedial 
provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the 




can be said to have rejected§ 1983 remedies in this case, 
since we hold that such remedies are unavailable under the 
other exception suggested in Pennhurst. Section 1983 
authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under color of 245 
state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities," as it applies to 250 
claims based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. 
Thiboutot did not mean to authorize suits for damages 
under § 1983 in all cases in which a citizen has been 
injured by federal statutory violation under color of 
state law. Rather, we must distinguish between two 255 
distinct examples of statutory violations by state 
officials. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual benefits administered by state officials, or 
imposes a duty on the State to respect the rights of a 
particular class of citizens, the statute can be said to 260 
create "rights privileges, or immunities" on which§ 1983 
suits may be premised. Where, on the other hand, federal 
17. 
law simply regulates the conduct of the States or their 
officials without creating entitlements for particular 
individuals or promoting the interests of a specific class 265 
of citizens, it cannot be said that statutory violations 
infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" of 
individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 
statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some 270 
contexts, it is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted 
the right of action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress 
was to protect individual rights, not to authorize private 
suits by every citizen affected by a violations of all 
federal regulatory statutes under color of state law. The 275 
present case is an example of the need for some limiting 
principle. The FWPCA and the MPRSA impose duties on the 
states and municipalities in the water pollution area in 
order to benefit the Nation as a whole. 23 While it is 
23congress was concerned about the fishing 
industry in these Acts, but this was only one element of a 
larger effort to maintain water quality for the benefit of 
all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; MPRSA § 
2, 33 U.S.C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not mean to 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does in statutes 
that select out particular classes of citizens for 
specific benefits. 
18. 
true that respondents as fishermen and clammers have a 280 
significant economic stake in proper enforcement of these 
acts, their interest is not comparable to that of a Social 
Security recipient denied authorized benefits by an act of 
a State administrator. Such a recipient is deprived of a 
federal statutory "right." Respondents, by contrast, 
merely allege an injury resulting from a violation of an 
essentially regulatory statutory scheme.24 
B 
24The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same 
distinction. In First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette 
National Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F.2d 195 (1980), cert. 
denied, U.S. (1981), involving a claimed violation 
of federal bankingstatutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain 
rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the 
rights protected by the Civil Rights Act. 
The Supreme Court in Thiboutot makes clear that 
section 1983 does protect rights established by 
statutes enacted pursuant to authority other 
than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory 
rights protected by section 1983. Thiboutot 
involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights 
... represent important personal rights akin to 
fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . • . On the other hand, rights 
incidental to the National Bank Act are 
qualitatively different and not within the 
contemplation of section 1983." Id., at 198. 
/S ee also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op.1 at __ ("In 
order to have an action under§ 1983, it is not enough to 
establish the violation of a federal statute. Rather, the 
statute violated must be one that confers a federal right 
upon the plaintiff."). 
285 
19. 
Because § 1983 does not provide a right of 
action to respondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, we 290 
turn to the decision of the Court of Appeals that there is 
an implied right of action directly under these statutes. 
We find no persuasive evidence of a congressional intent 
to authorize implied rights of action. This conclusion is 
supported by the structure of the Acts, their purpose, 295 
and legislative history. 
Although these statutes neither authorize nor 
expressly rule out private suits for damages, there are 
elaborate enforcement provisions. The FWPCA, for example, 
authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to violations 300 
of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 
33 U.S.C. § 1319. 25 He may seek a civil penalty of up to 
$10,000 per day, id., § 309(d), 33 u.s.c. § 1319(d), and 
criminal penalties also are available, id., § 309(c), 33 
u.s.c. § 1319(c). States desiring to administer their own 305 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials 
25The Administrator is 
States an opportunity to take 
himself. 33 u.s.c. § 1319(a) (1). 
authorized to give 




possess adequate authority to abate violations through 
civil or criminal penalties or other means of enforcement. 
Id., § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (7). In addition, if "any 
interested person" believes that the standards being 310 
applied by the EPA are themselves violative of the Act, 
under 33 u.s.c. § 1369(b) he may seek judicial review in 
the United States Courts of Appeals of various particular 
actions by the Administrator, including !establishment of 
./ 
effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge 315 
of pollutants. Where review could have been obtained 
under this provision, the action at issue may not be 
challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding 
for enforcement. Id., § 1369 (b) (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have 320 
their counterparts under the MPRSA, 26 are supplemented by 
the express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the 
FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and§ 105(g) of the MPRSA, 33 
u.s.c. § 1415(g). These citizen-suit provisions require 
26 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil 
penalties by the Administrator, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a), 
criminal penalties, id, § 1415(b), suits for injunctive 
relief by the AttorneyGeneral, id.,§ 1415(c), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id.,-§-1415(f). 
21. 
60 days' prior notice to potential defendants and provide 325 
only prospective relief. 27 
The clear inference to be drawn from the 
existence of these various enforcement provisions, 
especially the citizen-suit provisions, is that Congress 
did not intend to authorize impliedly other judicial 330 
remedies for private citizens. As we stated in 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental 
canon of statutory construction that where a statute 
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U.S., 335 
at 19. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 
442 U.S., at 571-574. In the absence of strong indicia of 
a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to 
conclude in this kind of situation that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided 
this . inference. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the 
27under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to 
the government, may also be ordered by the court. § 
505 (a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a). 
340 
22. 
existence of a citizen-suit provision in § 1365(a) does 
not rule out implied forms of private enforcement of the 
Act. It arrived at this conclusion by asserting that 
Congress intended in§ 1365(a) to create a limited cause 
of action for "private attorneys general"--"non-injured 
members of the public" suing to promote the general 
welfare rather than to redress an injury to their own 
welfare. 616 F.2d, at 1227. It went on to conclude: 
//"A private party who is injured by the alleged 
violation, as these plaintiffs allege they were, 
has an alternate bas is for suit under section 
505 (e), 33 u.s.c. § 1365 (e), and the general 
federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 (e) 
is a savings clause that preserves all rights to 
enforce the Act or seek relief against the 
Administrator. Coupled with the general federal 
question jurisdiction it permits this suit to be 
brought by these parties." 616 F.2d, at 1227 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at least two problems with this 
reasoning. First, the language of the savings clause on 
which the Court of Appeals relied is quite ambiguous 
concerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies 
under the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in 
the citizen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which 
any person may have under any statute or common law to 








to seek any other relief." It is at least unclear whether 
the phrase "any statute" includes the very statute in 
which this statement was contained.28 
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of 375 
Appeals relied is flawed because it draws an incorrect 
distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs entitled to 
bring a citizen suit and the "injur~d" plaintiffs who 
claim here a right to sue under the general provisions of 
the Act. "Citizen" for purposes of§ 1365 means "a person 380 
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely 




fact the Senate Report 
197 2 stated with respect 
on the FWPCA 
to the savings 
"It should be noted, however, that the section 
would specifically preserve any rights or 
remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain 
available. Compliance with requirements under 
this Act would not be a defense to a common law 
action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-
414, p. 81 (1971) (emphasis added). 
ee also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on 
the MPRSA) (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict 
or supersede "any other righy-to legal action which is 
afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or 
the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent 
standard or limitation" in § 505(e) necessarily is a 
reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are 
unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this 
meaning. The phrase also could refer to state statutory 
limitations, or to "effluent limitations" imposed as a 
result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance. 
24. 
by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing 
standing under the terms of this Court's decision in 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). S. Conf. Rep. 385 
No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This category of potential 
plaintiffs necessarily includes not only those suffering 
"non-economic" harms from pollution, but also persons like 
respondents who allege direct economic harms. Thus it 
cannot be inferred that Congress preserve a separate 390 
private remedy for direct economic injuries. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its analysis 
to the MP RSA. But here again we are persuaded that 
Congress evidenced an intent not to imply private remedies 
when it expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant 395 
provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost 
identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 u.s.c. § 1415(9). 
Although they do not expressly limit citizen suits to 
those who have suffered some injury from a violation of 
the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that 400 
Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of 
a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin 
25. 
violations. 
The other major source for discovering 405 
legislative intent is the legislative history, which was 
one of the four factors identified by this Court in Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), as relevant to the 
question of legislative intent. This history does not 
lead to a contrary conclusion with respect to implied 410 
remedies under either Act. Indeed, the reports and 
debates provide affirr,,ative support for the view that 
Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits 
to apply to all private suits under these acts. 29 Since 
29The citizen-suit provision of the FWPCA was 
expressly modeled on the parallel provision of the Clear 
Air Act, 42 u.s.c. § 7604. Sees. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 79 
(1971). The legislative history of the latter act 
contains explicit indications that private enforcement 
suits were intended to be limited to the injunctive relief 
expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for example, 
stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that 
conferring additional rights on the citizen may 
burden the courts unduly. I would argue that 
the citizen suit provision of S. 4358 has been 
carefully drafted to prevent this consequnece 
from arising. First of all, it should be noted 
that the bill makes no provision for damages to 
the individual. It therefore provides no 
incentives to suit other than to protect the 
health and welfare of those suing and others 
similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather 
than the ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with 
no hope of financial gain and the very real 
prospect of financial loss, will initiate court 
action under this bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 
(1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, 
Senator Muskie, in response to concerns expressed by other 
26. 
the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 415 
both point toward an absence of intent to create an 
implied remedy,30 we need not look further to less 
important indicia of legislative intent, such as the 
remaining three Cort factors. See Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, supra, 442 U.S., at 576. 31 Where, as here, 420 
Congress has decided that a separate private remedy is 
unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are not authorized 
to ignore this legislative judgment.32 
Senators, contrasted the citizen-suit provision with the 
terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and 
a remedy for recovery of fines and restitution, 
and other monetary damages. The pending bill is 
limited to seek [sic] abatement of violation of 
standards established administratively under the 
act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 
116 Cong. Rec. 33102 (1970). 
//He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that 
the availability of damages "would encourage frivolous or 
harassing suits against industries and government 
agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland Park 
v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 
424 U.S. 927 (1976). 
30see generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky 
Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
31we note, however, ~t the only other Cort 
factor dealing directly with ongressional intent--the 
underlying purposes of the s atutory scheme--does not 
provide support for resondents' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling pollution through 
administrative channels, providing litigation remedies 
only to correct administrative abuses prospectively. See 
n. 28, supra. 
32Even if one assumes that Congress did not 
consider the question whether to provide such a remedy, 
27. 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted 425 
certiorari relate to respondents federal claims based on 
the federal common law of nuisance. The principal 
precedent on which these claims were based is Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), where the Court found that 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the 430 
federal common law issues raised by a suit for injunctive 
relief by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin 
municipalities and public sewerage commissions, involving 
the discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In this case, 
we need not decide whether a cause of action may be 435 
brought under federal common by a private plaintiff, 
seeking damages. The Court recently has held that the 
federal common law of nuisance, in the area of water 
r ., 
pollution, is entirely preempted by the more comprehensive 
~ 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 440 
after the dee is ion in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See 
this question remains essentially legislative, and our 
decisions have made clear that courts should not asssume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning 
appropriate statutory remedies. 
28. 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, U.S. (1981). 
T~is decision disposes entirely of respondents' 
federal common law claims, since there is no reason to 
~ 
suppose that the preemptive effect of the FWPCA is any 445 
~ 
less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue. To the 
extent that this case involves ocean waters not covered by 
the FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause 
~ 
for different treatment of the pref mption question. The 
regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, 450 
with respect to ocean dumping, than are analogous 
provisions of the FWPCA.33 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law 
claims because their underlying legal basis is now 
~ 
preempted by statute. 
t 
As discussed above, we also dismiss 
the claims under the MPRSA and the FWPCA because 
respondents lack a right of action under those statutes. 
We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
33 1ndeed, as noted supra, at n. 13, the ocean 
dumping of sewage sludge must end altogether by December 
31, 1981. To the extent that Congress allowed some 
continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this 
represents a considered judgment that it made sense to 
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In).'&- cast\ involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
J 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal ·water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research , and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and Ne,v Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage. sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
R1ver by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of s11ch materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that. as a resdt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean ,vas becoming polluted. 
and it made si::iecial reference to a marnive growth of algae 
said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
1 The N ew York defendants "·ere the New York Depa;tment of En-
vironnwntal Conscrrntion; Ogden R. lleid, indiYidually and as Commis- ./J. t,_ 
sioncr of that D epartnwnt; the City or'N CW York: Abraham Bea me, --i::i c,.avC... 
l\foyor of 'N'ew York: the ,vc~t Long; <fugn.cli)Se"·~Di:;t ri ct: 9-ic Co\mty -
of Westchester the City of LongB:'ach; and the City of Glen Co··e. 
~ The :i\"ew , crscy defendants were)he New Jpr;;~y Depa rtment of En-
vironmental Protection; D:wid J. Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of th[lt D epartment; the Bergen County Se\\"er Authority; the 
J oifit Meeting of E:;:;ex [l1Jd Union Co11nties; the Paf.~aic Valle~, Sewerage __,,(' ~ 
Commi~cioncrs; the l\1iddlciex County 8e\\"eyge Authority; the Linde~ -
Roselle ScwC'rage Authority; [Ind the l\fiddlcto\\'n Se\\'ernge Authority. 
3 The fed :'rn l defenda nts were the Envir6timcntal Protection Agency; 
Russell E."' Train, indi,·idually :),Ile! as EPA Admini~trator; the Ar'h1y 
Corps ot' Engineers; and l\Iartin n. Hoffman, indi,·idunlly and as Secre-
tary of the Anny. 
4 The comp!::tint alleged that this gro,Yth of algae \\·as C[!Used by the-
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this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in lhe waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a · wide variety of legal theories ,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
discharges of sewage an,d "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the soutlrn·est portion of Long Island, Kew York to 
a point approximately clue east of Cape l\lay, New J ersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. R espondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean fl cor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and 
dcst rurtion of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfoih and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for R espondents 4. 
5 Complaint ir 39, App. 26a. 
6 Rc:-:pondents based cla ims on the FWPCA; the l\IPRSA; federal com- b 
O-Q_ law; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors .-\ct of 1899, 33 U. S. C. ~
407: the National Environmental Policy .-\ct of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ --13~; New York and New J ersey eni,·ornmcntal sintutes; the 
n iftµ, --N inth2..-~ourteenth Amendments to the Unit0)iit~tes Constitu- _<?.----' 
ion ; the CE--'tension of Admiralty :rncl ::\I:tritinw Jmisdiction Act, ~ . . ,:..:..:.-----
U. S. C. § 7--10: the Frcleral Tort Cbims Act, 28 U. S. C. §r-3'46 (b). 
and state tort Jaw. 
1
, 
7 Tfie court JJl'e,· iousl~· had dismissed claims ngnin~t the New York and 
New .Jr rsey enYironmentn l protection agenciC'S :rncl their directors. These 
defendant s arc not among the petiti-oners in this Comt. 
8 The court's judgment with res11ect to the pendent state-law claims 
was without prejudice. 
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comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) ( 1) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens. but authorizes only prospective relief. and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. Ibid.9 Because respondents did 
not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed ,vith a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33·, 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g) .11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
~ 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and , 
,/-, 1 , 
1
, \ / state tort claims act. s.12 
: /\ / r~ r 'l • i _____ _ 
i r· I ' I \ ----,. .• ,---•---·· .. ~ ...... -...-----·.,.. .......... ----- ~ . . -•·• 
\:'._------- 9).See n. i .8, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief ava ilable under the Act). •" 
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In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with par:1llel citat ions to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rej ec ted an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 (e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict :1ny right which any person (or class 
of persons ) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(ineludi11g relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 




~ike the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection sh:111 not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may l1:1ve under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
_.,.,. _ _,,---~-~~~ny otl~~!' relief (inclu~iing relief ag:1in~~-~~ !\~1~i_12.ist~~ 
\ _ \ retary, or a State agency." / , 3& U . &.-G. § H15 (gj(5). _ _ _ ··-~"-.. 
j j _ J , ) _ 12 See 2S U. S. C. ~ 1346 (b), '.!671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
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Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf--
(1) against any person (including (i) the United 
States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is 
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent 
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an 
order issued by the Administrator or a State with 
respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is 
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any 
act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to 
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to 
enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an 
to order the Administrator to perform such act or 
duty, as tfie-c.a..s.e.._ay be, and to apply any appropriate civil 
penalties under sect"\n 1319(d) of this title. 
(b) No action may be commenced--
(1) under subsection (a) (1) of this section--
(A) prior to sixty days after the 
plaintiff has given notice of the alleged 
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) 
to the State in which the alleged 
violation occurs, and (iii) to any 
alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
(B) if the Administrator or State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a 
civil or criminal action in a court of 
the United States, or a State to require 
compliance with the standard, limitation, 
or order, but in any such action in a 
court of· the United States any citizen 
may intervene as a matter of right. 
(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section 
prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given 
notice of such action to the Administrator, 
except that such action may be brought immediately after such 
notification in the case of an action under this section 
respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this 
I f 
.. J' 
( !:3.:> v .... -- ,; ~ ') 
<-:, ,,.. .. ----___...,....J 
~/,,..,.,~-:w- 2. 
title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such 
manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 
u.s.c. § 1365(a), (b). 
~-~ _,.::, 
\--:---~-_ ·) •T.~e Administr-ator l may intervene in any citizen suit. 
! S ,:;_::i l{ L--l- ✓ \ ( ", \ t?.._1?. I! ,t.. /' I 
~ - .I- ..,J ) ....,_':___ V\ J/- • t 
ra.,1§ 136slcTT1). -
- (\ 
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The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
~ (g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States and 
any other governmental instrumentality or/ agency (to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to t He Constitution), who 
is alleged to be in violation of any proMibition, limitation, 
criterion, or permit established or issuTd by or under this 
subchapter. The district courts shall h ~ve jurisdiction, 
without regard to the amount in controve W' or the citizenship 
~ the parties, to enforce such prohibition, limitation, 
c ? iterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
II 
.' I 
(2) No action may be commenced--
(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the 
violation has been given to the Administrator or to 
the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of the 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of 
the United States to require compliance with the 
prohibition, llmitation, criterion, or permit; or 
(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to 
impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this 
section, or if the Administrator, or the Secretary, 
has initiated permit revocation or suspension 
proceedings under subsection (f) of this section; or 
(D) if the United States has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court 
of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 u.s.c. § 
1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit 
brought under 
,._ ~.lL~ c · J 
the Act ~ § 1415(3) (B). 
fl I 
/ 
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/ The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b) (l)(A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) (1) (A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this co~1~usion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1~,W(e), pre-
serving "any right which any person (or class of persons~./ 
may have under any statute or common la,v to seek enforce'.. 
~ 
9 ment of any effluent standard or limitation or tO...§£~k -~?J'.:. _____ . ® ··_· 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at~ ; seen. ~pra. The / () 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,1 3 and con-
-, 
~\~ 
l.~ ~·· ( . ~ ~-~ ~ 
/ 
t. 
I tx-- \NW~ \I-¼" 
·+V\t. ( \~ U · 
r . 
...,. 0 ( {'I', I <', ) 
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [F\VPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, ~t 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
§§ 50--t'r, ~ N. J. S. A. 59: 1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
rcspm1dents had given timely notice to one defcuclant-New York City. 
, The petitions for certiorari in this Court rai~ccl questions concerning 
the applicability of ~tate tort claim~ acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These qnc~tions arc not, however, within 
the scope of the questions on which review wa~ granted. 
1 3 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. L ewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
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eluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA. 14 
With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rej ected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d. at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
sitpra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
P etitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argui 1 
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
se"·erage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court sta ted: 
"HaYing so held , we reject the federal government defendant s' sover-
eign immunity a rgument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make cle:1r that sovereign immunity lrns been waived in all suits b~· plain-
:'\ tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
('.t t" 0 \·e. o~,\\eJJ• damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate oc question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at __. 
I\ _.., 
/ 
12~ ----- ·;. 
This p:1ssage suggests that, as a ge al matter, the court had concluded f , " ? '' 
th:1t the_ ~tatut~ry _rigl:ts o! acti01 it wa~ :ating, i-rrci1:1dea damages relief. ...__ ';V<:tij•~ · 
--- ~ An :1c!.d.lt1011nL 1_!1Q!__g_~_!2011 1s that by thhim-e- of the Court of Anneals ~ 
\ 
-(i-- i decision, any relief other than damages ~~~ --_ 
(_(. ;,, · C \. \ ~-·\ '\ algal bloom a~o_ut which respondents coinpla!n died in 1976. The Court 
• \ · of Appeals dec1s10n was not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 
i , 
1 
J ,-, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a ), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping 
l·\(t ve, QR ..... ,:'./\!\ \ of H'wage sludge by December 31 , 1081. 
• 1 j _ / 15 The court abo held that respondents had offered allegations suffi cient . 
-·\ to \ y \\if)D ( \ QJ\;I.,\ 1· to make out a claim of maritime tor t, cogni z::i blc , und er admiralty juris-
• ~ ,: ~ diction. It did not decide whether the FedN::il Tort Cla ims Act, "·it!~ 
\ - , , _ _, •\• , •1 (_ - c i v::i r; 1s procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ l:l-!6 (h), '.2671 cflfseq., -n·i ., - . h , I . , v ;; ' 
11.. \ ' ,:,.(--' ' ·., ' .- a1 )l ies to any of respondents' federal- law rla ims aga in~t federa l de-
~ f ndants, although it did hold that the Act pred11drd a " mone.,· di1mag:e 
- •••··•· .. =•'·demi age,cies b"sed on state b,§ ~~J: 
~ l lo F2c9 J 12 '3b . . ' 
t" F 2.&1 o-..+ 
G 
T\(\ . \- ~ "' 
_) 
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Essex and Union Counties in New Jeney (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760) , and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12).10 
'\Ve granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(2) whether all federal com~mn .1 nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean_ poll~tion now ar re-emptedbyllie legidati~e 
scheme con tamed m the FWP d- tne MPRSA, and (3) 1f 
not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for dam-
ages under the federal common law of nuisance. We holeJ/ 
that there is no implied right of action under them statutes 
and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully 
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. \---
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204 
( 1976), and made it "unlawful for any persion to discharge 
a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with 
its terms," id., at 205.1 8 While still allowing for state ad-
16 Sec ('ii. 3,J supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711 , 79-1754, and 80-12 
abo murl't!ct--Tf(c remainillg petitioners as respondents, based on cro::s-claims 
filed in the District Court. 
17 We therefore need not discuss the quest ion whether the federal com-
mon law of nui~aucc could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
(\. o k~ fl,.~ ? 
( r ~-,;" vw..J< 
~ L k ,IV\-"-(\'"'-
G \, .fr-r r'I I~ 
el(, re l 
18_Thc Act app~ies to discharges _of pollutants from any source into _ ( \"l, ') 
~gable waters, mcludrng the ·'terntorrnl seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362~ 7), ) 
:(12) ~ and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
r£ 
;)-. 
~ ~~Ilk· f 
c,'O,,e,-,J.U' 0-  - ~ 
~~1P'i 
. t ~ - . . ,-f,d ~ • t,,fVV" . 
v'·"'~ 
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ministration and enforcement under federally approved s~ 
plans, §§ 402 (b), (c) , 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), (c)J'\ u:e J ~-'I 
Amen~ments created various feder~l minimum effluent stand- )--"7 ~ · J"'-4-(.. 
ard~ , id., §§_301-307, 3~ U.S. C. §§ 1311-1317. . tfv_;. c,,v..J.., 
The Manne Protection , Research, and Sanctuaries Act of !, --o 1 [ /? l,) 
19~-532. 86 Stat. ·1052 sought to create compre- ~L- L• ~ 
hensive federal reg11lation of the dumping of materials into 1)1,I ~CJA.-' 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 · -
of the Act requires . a permit for any dumping into ocean ~ .. 
waters, when the material is transported from the Unite.cl 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
~ 1411 (a).19 In add ition, it requires a nermit for the dump'~/ 
ing; of material transported from outside the United States 
into the t~rr · torial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the cca::tl ine. ~ii.ere 5'vmay affert the tnritorial s ea or 
th8 t'.:rritory of' the United St::ites." Id., § 1411 (b). 
The exact nat1 1 re of resnondents' cla;ms under tl-.ese two 
Acts is not rl ear. but the claims anpear to fall into two rate-
gories. · The main ront 0 ntion is trat. the EPA and the Army 
Corns of Engineers have permitkd the New Jersev and New 
York defendants to d;schargc n11 d dump pol111tants in /'"'::) 
B.mo"nts fhflt fire not. perrn=tterl bv the Arts. ~~
~~ In Bddition. the:v srem to :illeire 
that the New York and New Jersev defrndants have violnted 
the terms of their permits . ..:l~.--•··Th·~~ues+ion he!ore 
us is whether r rsnonde1~ts may rn;se eitl1er of tl-ie"e claims 
in r, nr=vat 0 rnit for in iunrt=ve ::ind monrtnr:v n·lif,f. where 
siwh a. suit is not, expressly authorized bv eit]1rr of tl--iese Acts. 
It is unnecessary to d;scuss at length the principles set 
or other floatinii; craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id .. ~~ 1362 9) , (10) , (12). See S. R ep. No. 92-414 , p. 75 ( 1971). 
10 T~ erm1 s a re ~sued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
/0tc 0 tion Agenc~·, 33 U. S. C . § 141'.2 , except in the case of dredged ma-
~ t:rials, which mny b 2 _dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
( ~) O of tho Mmr d., § 1413. , 
(_\ 2,) ) ( l o) > 
(., 
-----------------------------~---~~ 
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. out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
. .---\ -r , , :, .. ,( r - , ~hetherC~~· to "create a "i)r1vater1ght of "il.cfi~ 
/ } \ : ' · ; .. -:, · · · \ under a federal statute without saying so explicitly. The 
\ ___ __ ...J key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Univer- _ Ass I w'\ 
,.._..-- sities Research ~ v. Coutu, - U. S. -, -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 4f 
U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
fµ 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first , of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein 
for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative 
history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation ,-
to determine congressional intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a private suit for damages under either the 
F\YPCA or the MPRSA. 20 We therefore normally would 
proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
came of action nevertheless may be inf err2d. Arguably, 
hmYever, there is here an alternative sonce of express con-
gressional authorization , not suggested by the parties. Last 
T erm, in Ma·ine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980) , the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizin~ suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights creakd by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among 
20 The Court of Appeals d:d state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "proYides an independent remedy for injured parti es un-
burdened by the noti ce requirements of section 505 (b) ." 61G F. 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause i~ itself an 
expre~s authorization of prirnte damages suit s. Instead, it held that the 
savi nrr ' · use acted to preserve any existi11g right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, cit iz ~ns-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The court went 
on to apply an implied-right-of-action anal ysis before concluding that a 
pri,·ate suit for damages is among the pre-exist ing remedies preserved by 
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the petitioners 21 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is apropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has / 1 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. ·' ' 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst ~ \ 
State School and H Ospital V. Halderman, - u. S. - -------1 ( r) J\ 
(1981) , we remanded certain claims for a determination~ A ~
1 
whether-fiJ-the-st-atu t-e--a-t--isst1e-t-here-·w-aS-the-ki-~ __J--
~ created-en forceabl~~igh ts:'-t1naer~4 983,a~her 
n ( (_ · 'j ·. \ 1 Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of that stat_t:,!_e_.Q_ 
) vi V\ 0 
11 
\ in the enactment itself) Id., at -. Batfi vof tliese excep- -~\ 
,, i/
11 01.,/.;x f(,.Q \ ~tionsR~ ~ pplicab~~ to _t~-~-_!~_res_ent ca_~~:- -:---· ____ be •t -~ ~ \ 
VV 
1
\. '; ' 1 L \ rhe second-fm~··}t~~ !~: ~
,,,.  \ o .. ( :.d 'C 0-~ --auits--ttr-etrf-e-I'ee--clris--A"Ct-..n1a,y-~¥here th a 
; ...- e I; ,.; 'f/,.!h c \ pongr.e.ss-h-as -provicled-a--e0H1tweh-e.i.sw<~).n-f~me.J 0. Y- e 
1 
":) ::> ·, , , ,.,' I fAs -discussed·-infra;-at---=;'--tm-filW-f'Cn.·---rm.11···M,PR8A=et 
l;J tAS I t,.._'? ~ 1 ✓,,\ ~rovide--.relati;v.0ly-001nprehens~~-e&rerce:tnen-t,....meeh~~. 
\ {$' ·i ~ 
·r ~'('/J /' rcir., i , r(; 1\,f~ JUSTICE STEWART, who later joined the majority 
r ~ , ' · \ in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Houston Wel-
] V,\o \((_ i: r-,, L i:· \ fare R iohts Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 (1979) 
wke'\1 'fl'-' ('e nH'c,\,~ I 
(( '( i a. (1 { c ' IJ..,Y',J~x / (dissentingJo-r,i0,1;ii~ when "a state official is alleged 
-.J "'-" ~ / 1tohave v10lated a federal statute which provides its own 
~k~\CE'=> ~<:ov'tclc cl 
I\\ o__ (i)o.{ \- i c. U- \o ,r-
" ,J..., \j ('/\ . ' c 11 (l ~: .)' , _ ✓/ ,,, / comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that ~ - '-'- ,,,,,,✓ I t-v\ o,._{e ~ !,(_ ·H· i (I (,j , 
I 
I - --,,.· 
8J 
21 These petitioners appear to fall within the ca tego ry of municipal 
goYernmcntal entitir·s suable as "persons" under our decision in lvfonell v. cwvp,rt l\e v, s \ v cJ 
~ 'l 
/--------___) -y\,s.t\ tv' 0-~ -SV-\t:cc b 
D epartment of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
/ J" 1 · • \ , \ + tv I · .._, .. ~,, 1 f , ,, ,.,.. \ . • ,.. 
/ , , .• ·-1 , '.::> 1 1 jl-~ , C)\I\~ r r <;Si ~}':i. [_ IV\ &vv , 
- r,. , _ ... , :, .-1- -4 ( , r ,,... . -· cl.,, -t. ..... ' ''I• T \ I ,,c '('.:; ,, C~ll r''rt,_- '::./)·\ '.:;, UJ\,\ -:...'( 
\ 
''I q k':: A-
~.:> \ i."~ - · , s 
........... 
. ~ t~., 4W'.,. .. Uri~ -r--i.t ·tL,; 
~ " M . ~Le. J ,;, .,,...t ~ ~1£.t 
ll~t.J I\~ 1.,. "~:~:', }f C/)...J_[ 
/ 
( ~ _;f ✓-./ 
~ 'b 11 ~ l'\,n, c--J:c.i-,-~ " 
A } AL -
I - _l 
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enforc®J,ent prac.edure may not be bypassed y bringing suit 
~ directly under § 1983."~ · · · ~ 
A'S CA \ S Cu~ S'='C( \I,l~. See Chesapeake Bay Foundatioi ~- Virginia State / 
. { }Vater Control Board, 501 ... :f:_§ypp. ~:,H_J~_:Q_Y~:....!~-~Q) . .C.~~:., 
! If .\. 'lfQ_ o,Y- ecting a§ 1983 action!gainst the Chairman of a State Water 
l-U'cl~ ,fk 
FuJTLA-
~ ) , ._ - J oard, based on the fomprehensiveness of the remedies pro-
7~ rw rC f\- ided and the federalism concerns raised). ------../ 
l I/' (', r-CJ::. _We need not; however, ~G~.,.. 1:bijt~er ~tt,gFoss . cap ~ e._ 1 ( • • :J-r () IV\\ ~ ' ---' t-:l SQ-I6.-t-tl-fra-Ve-rejected--,§-1983'"'Femea1esin"""tirtS" case;=15mee~-e~ (J e C..I $ I OY1 
l . ! hold_that ,such~emedies- -are-un~~<ler-t,lct~~-- Q__ \ \ frv..... 0.. (~ !) (u,( c) V 1c\c oot:,tioo-..su.gg.estoo-in-P+innJ~-See-t--ien-W83- authorizes,1 ~ e__ f 
1 
)-' - .~ suits .to redre_ss_ a depri~ation ~~der color of state law _"of ~ v....c.\r 1/i'-J./v,},,'!~;,-u,:;~ 
~ ~ any rights, pnvrleges, or 1mmumt1es secured by the Constrtu- '-..J j 
Jif. eV- tion and laws." Under Maine v. Thiboutot the phrase "and I , f ~J- (_0""0~'ES5 
t", l] . ,i\ --r- \ rH \,'11 laws" includes federal statutes. It remains, however, for ~ ~ 
_/JV / !'-' '( .....  __ \·: \I'S ' ' "I this Court to define the phrase "rights, privileges, or immuni- '/'~ kS ,_- ~\ ~Ve_ 
(' \ L ! ties," as it applies to claims based on violations of federal . • I { I "' 
C,,\ \\ D .._-CC (VJ_;\\; \ l statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot did not mMl'fts authorize \ 11,J'QYC.:; 0~ 1 ' 
.\,\ (- .. t y ·,c;(f,S, f suits for d~1:1ages under§ 1983 in all cas:s in_which a citizen _ Y.--'. , , (J,.'.[;-;C 
/ 1, 1 · • Cv--..J)... \ _ , has been mJured by federal statutory v1olat10n under color J.1, -,,,t,L.1.,c t~t-'I-L'1..-· \ v 
r .\- ; S V\O--rcA. fo \ of state law. Rather, we must distinguish between two dis- , .l -{1 1..... c.. 
·-'--
1 
' / ,_ tin ct examples of statutory violations by state officials. \ ~ \ 0-.--\ L,, .. \ e _j , 
.bC'.. \;wt '{-.... /.1,\_~ 
1
Where a fed_er_al law creates an e~titlemen_t to individual ', r o, ~- 1fJc3 
/'\: ·' . /) (;5 I ! -;crJE,:\ -i benefits adm1111stered by st~te officials, 0: Imposes a d~t! ' '-7 -E'..G,1.c )'\ 1 D 
\_ .) Y',3'f. .(I .J,, /011 the State to respect the _rights of a par~rcular cl_a~s of c1t1- l J.oe7 (\..-0~ by 
·h"\ ~(,?~ ~ •(\f ' 1 • ..Q / zens, the statute can be said to create "rights, pnvrleges, or i • j 1 
~ IQ~ :3 y ; (\ tJ· u~ { immunities" on ·which § 1983 suits may be premised. Where, \ 1 ,-s cJUJ ~\ fQ { ~Y'.'J , 
V l. a -~ r on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the conduct \ rJJ)(J I 1-1 t· (! 
r. 1\ -1 -·; <fY\ W~ of the States or their officials without creating entitlements : \ \j \ \Q_ '{' e._ 4' ~ · 
.J, .. :u\ 1 l ! for particular individuals or promoting the interests of a spe-
1 
---- .. \ + ( y Q. ~j {1, Su i cific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statutory viola-
,;, \ ~ 
QJJ.J <; () {' (' \ ~-l L. I 2~ See al~o ~J~-++8~'.""'8:""',_ ,- · ,-...,.11 ,..(JIJ80~-... . >'--- ' 
f{\_ ' \ ) 1. / (,Pe ~ ~ cn@&-nt,ingt, Meyerson _v. Arizon~, Civ. No. }0-715, slip o~., ,,, f 1: l: .( ,'I , C/ r at -, - F. Supp. - , - (Anz. Feb. 12, 1981) ( [T]hc remedial 
'7 i.>~\(.,\, \ '-' 1 / proYision of § 1983 cannot be used to ci rcumvent the remedial provisions 
( 
J; t'.tif . '.)~ '. (Y': / / of the Revenue Sharing Act."). 
V vi , .1 \ ... 1• · ',) \ '---
1 .,,I --- -----
; y\ (. ( V ~(, v.O,_ ·tfr-J_ . 1--vJ O , -- -- . -" -,., 
' I ,_., ,. -- /' ,\ .,11 C 
1 , •'t , 1 :- 'I\ .. C.. : , . -,., p· .r f\ \J ! '-,; I \. , , L . /'j l t-- ·~ I _, _\! ' ' 1 u 
I 
~ - "ri",~ "~ ..,,,{tf) /.} 
(;,kJ '\ 
Jf •' ..,.. vt . 2,,-0 \ 
J 
/ )'"0_;;p: 
')tf"~ .tfi . 
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tions infringe the "rights. privileges, or immunities" of in-
dividual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts, it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by every 
µ~~)0.l~ 
-lL 
citizen affected by a violations of all federal regulatory stat-
utes under color of state law. ,(Tlierresent case is an mmm, 
-pl.e-e-~iw.eEl-£0~ limiting principle. The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipali-
ties in the water pollution area in order to benefit the Na- . 
tion as a whole.23 "While it is true that respondents ii 
fishermen and clarnmers have a significant economic stake 
in proper enforcement of these acts. their interest is not com-
~ -~t.• 
~) 
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author-
ized benefits by an act of a state administrator. Such a 
recipient is deprived of a federal statutory "right." Re-
spondents, by contrast. merely allege an injury resulting from 
r--------.---~a~v~io~l~ation of an essentially regulatory statutory scheme.24 
C\t We_ U"l' ( ·,,1,, .• _;~\ ~3 Congress was concerned about the fishing industry in these Act~, but 
-{ 
1 
c' .r. _,.., \ this irns on}~, one clrm_c?t of a larger effort to maint ain water quality 
I 1'DJ\ - ~ / 'ft .t. ( for the benefit of nil c1t1zC'ns. Sec FWPCA § 101 , 33 U. S. C. § 1251; 
_. t- ._./ , . MPRSA _§ 2, 83_ U. S. C. § 1401. Cc:tainly ?ongrcss did not mean to 
~'fi(' r) (\...Bj ~ 1 () ·,, :1(., \ create "rights" m the same sense as 1t · docs m statutes that select out 
., , • particular classes of citizens for ~pecific benefits . . , ., ) I (} r I rM -:X_ c}\ .7 r ·1 I . Y1 24 The 0 ighth Cirr11it rerentlv drew tl11s same dJ::ifinrtioi1. I11 First 
· G National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National Bani,:, of Minn eapolis, 
-1.... . 
0 
.~ _ . , _'\ , . ·( 636 F . 2d 195 (1980), cert. dt•ni cd, - U. S. - (1081), involving a 
: 0 X ;(v·0 ,: ' \ / S claimed violation of federal banking statutes under color of state law, the 
j :-i \ \ , court st:ited: 
l}N ' ·
1
· ' ; , , ,'-.:1__. \ "A bank's ability to _charge _a certain rate of interes_t , in cicl r ntal to a. broad 
(- . j (__., ( f'. (1 •. · (' rrg:ulatory scheme, 1s not 111 the nature of the nghts protected by the 
\ • / \ ' Civil Rights Act. . . . The Supreme CourtJ_m Th iboutot makrs clear 
' · f .. -. ,, \ 1 that sec tion 1983 cloC's protect rights establi~hcd by statutes enacted pur--lt j / '/t t\'.'. Sh , '. suant to authority other than thr Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
I -· .- ,.,/" ho,1·c1·er, docs not changr the type of sta tutory rights protected by sec-
-------- tion 19S3. Thiboutot involved the rights of indiYicluals pursuant to a 
----- . -~~..-· 
-~ ; 
Jt -;;~c. 
N' ''-'"( '1 1"~, \,. 
(_ \ . e. H . ~ - . l'i,¼ 
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B 
r-Beeause~..14J~es-no.t,.-1:>F0¥i.de- -a-right-0£,ctiofl-t~ _ _,J___ 
i spondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, we turn·--t 
. ~ the-decisio1f~f)J the Court of Appeals that there Is. _an- ii~plie 
; right of action directly under these st~tutes. · We find n~ 
persuasive evidence of a congressional intent to authoriz~ 
implied rights of action. This conclusion is supported by the; 
structure of the Acts,~-th~ir purpose, and legislative history.I 
Although . these,..,~tatutes neither authorize nor expressli. 
rule out p~ivate suits Jor- damages,-there arEn~·Jaborate-€-~ . 
forcernent proyjsien&,-.t'~ FWPCA, _!.~!-exa_ml~~-~"-~utl'.~~ 
the EPA Administrator to reipond to violations of the Act 
,vith compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 13HF" He may seek a civil penalty of up to $10,0'.)0 per 
day, id., §309 (d), 33 U.S. C. § 1319 (d) . and criminal pen-
alties also are available, id., § 309 ( c), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 ( c). 
States desiring to administer their own permit programs must 
demonstrate that state officials possess adequate authority 
Cto--abate violations through civil or criminal penalties or 
other means of enforcement. Id. , § 402, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 
(b) (7). In addition, if "any interested person" believes that 
the standards being applied by the EPA are themselves vio-
lative of the Act, under 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b) he may seek 
judicial review in the United States Courts of Appeals of 
various particular actions by the Administrator, including 
federally-created welfare program. These rightsC.Jrepresent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights prot'ecfecl by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to the National 
Bank Act are qualitatiYrly different and not within' the contemplation of 
sect ion 1983." Id ., at 198. 
Sec abo Meyerson v. Arizoua, supra,~ at - ("In order to haYe an 
action under § 1983, it is not enough to establi~h the Yiolation of a federal 
statute. Rather, the statute violated must be one that confers a federa l 
right upon the plaintiff."). 
2
" The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
r 
_,l\..i . ) 
~ \ ----.," 





1 r II ·I..,) ~ w\'' J . )x.,~,J, 
f) rLi-x-· 
\] ' ' , .. \ V 
(_ -{" - ' A r, / c \ V\.~ __ ._A,_,, 
~ .. --,_r,- ~• 
0-;,1 (3 
~f-±6-f B~L 
We turn, therefore, to the decision of the court of 
Appeals that there is an implied right of action directly under 
these statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a 
congressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, 
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion 
H 
is supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, 
and legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement 
provisions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both 
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establishment of effluent standards and issuance of permits 
for discharge of pollutants. Where review could have been ---e___ 
obtained under this provision, the action at issu~ 11or-
be challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding 
for enforcement. Id.,§ 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,20 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365(a))..._and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). J!hese c1fizen-s'Cl'.it provisiom--r~ 
.6~!....rwi:tH1-Hetiee· to potential defendants and ~ 
?nly prospective relief.21 ..---:-;-------
. The clear inference to be gr..a..wll"-from the existence of these 
· enforce~-1)rovisionsr= especia.Uy--ifle·--citizen-su.i.t~ 
at Congress did not intend to author,ize-im-...-i 
pliedly ·-other ··-judicial- r.emedies ... for- t}rwa.te--oit-ffitffi&r {1'\s we 
stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an 
elemental canon of statutory construction that where a stat-
ute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U. S., 
at 19. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 
~;Jc , 
1) 
U. S., at 571-574. In the absence of strong; indicia of a con-
trary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude -in-X__ 
this....lciud,..oL.~~ that Congress provided precisely the 
remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer- .,,,_... . .-----.... 
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, i~--~~!Ltb.?.Uh,e e~i~~~~J--ij· t:' .) :: / 
a citizen-suit provision in § 1-365 (a) does not rule out im- C 1 
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived -----..........· 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
~ 26 The MPRSA proviclc8 for asse~~mcnt of civil penai\)Jes by the Admin-
btrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties , icl , § 1-!15 (b) , suits 
~ for i11junctive relief by the Attorney General, id ., § 1415 (~ permit·--------
JV"'\ ' suspen~ions or revocations, id., § l-!15 (f). ~ 
~ 
I' C 27 Under the FWPCA, ci\·il penalties, payable to the government, may 
-------- ~ so be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). /\ 
-v 1 {I - ,c..t, 
('\ t> 








See nn. 9, ~ supra. These citizen-suit provisions authorize 
~ private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these 
(J) ~ statutes. Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must 
/ . e- $l comply with specified procedures--wh ~h j spondents here ignored-
~ 
' -including in most cases 60 days' prior noice to potential 
A 
defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it 
cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. 
... 
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MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 15 -§ I.365 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private 
attorneys general"-"non-injured member~uoTic" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. · 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
- -- (s] 
( e), and the general fed er esti n..juris..diction of the ,/\ 
Judicial Code U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
7
.) 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves a}lrights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question · jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
/ 
~\ There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, 
St.? I? '{\ , \ U; ..) the language of the savin~s clause on which the Court of 
) TT,ppeals reliecD,, is (qmteJ ambiguous concerning the intent of , t ,-, \ C, ongress to "preserve" remedies under the FWPCA itself. \ v) \J..._1/) t merely states that nothing in the citizen-suit provision \ J . - / "shall restrict any right which any person ': .. may have 
, under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of 
', any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other re-
lief." It is __ at~~a.L::.\~hethi.rr.the phrase 11any stat-
~" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
, contained.28 
r'\ 28 In fa ct the Senate R eport on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with re~pect to the saving~ clau~e: 
"It should be uoted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
~' 
Q..J """ --- . '-ct~"' 
{;fl"' °\;,,;V-,\ifl""'r.v,,t 
~ ··~ 1Y..~ I 
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
I 
See abo S.~cp. No. 02-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the l\1PRSA) 
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. .rM-oTeovet;-1:h-e reasomhgo11---which- the·"Court of Appeal] 
relied is flawed because it draws an incorrect distinction be-
tween "non-injured" plaintiffs entitled to bring a citi,en suit 
~nd the "injured" plaintiffs who claim here a right to sue
1 
1;1nder the gen_e~l provisions of the Act. "Cit!zen" f?r pur- / 
poses of § 1360 m·e~ns "a person or persons havmg an mterestl 
which is or may be' ad_versely affected." 33 U. S. C. § 1365) 0 
(f). This phrase was ·int.ended by Congress to allow suit~_,r---
by all persons possessing ·standing under the terms of thi~ 
Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton , 405 U. S. 727 
(-1972). S. Conf. Rep. No. 92_::1236. p . 146 (1972). ThiJ 
c~tegory of potential plaintiffs nece~sarily includes not onlf 
those suffering "non-economic" harms' fi:_om pollution, bu} 
also persons like respondents who al1ege'·,,c]irect economi~ 
harms. Thus it cannot be inferred that Co~ess preserve• 
r'. separate private remedy for direct economic i~'j·u.ries. \ 
The Court of Appeals also applied its analysi~"-to the ~ - "' I ~1PRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Cong{~Ss 
;evidenced an intent not to implyfr-~va-t~--remedies-when..-.:itJ 
(ex.f}Tessl-v:.::a.uthorized ··citizeR-Suits. The relevant provisions 
in the MPRSA are in many respects almost identical to those 
of the FWPCA. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do 
not expressly limit citizen suits to those who have suffered 
some in,iury from a violation of the Act , we are not persuaded 
by this fact alone that Conirress affirmatively intended to 
imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after set-
ting out expressly the manner in which private citizens can 
seek to enjoin violations. 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law") . 
It might be argued that the phrase "any efflu en t s tandard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessa rilv is a referrnce to the t erms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, nre un11ersuadecl that Congress nece~sariI~, intended this meaning . 
The phrasr also could refer to stat e stntutory limitations, or to "eflluent 
limitat ions" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law 
of nuisance. 
j 
, ) . . I · r 
.. , j 
. :'- ·' t -.. i (,,·.J<_ t c::. L--
,--r ;~ t\ Q• J J . 
--!.-- JI \ . .e"~-- ✓0{ 
c'"' 
UJ1 !lo 
- Ps---0-4:/-1-1/ 8i: Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court 
of Appeals relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a 
distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring 
citizen suits to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the 
"injured" plaintiffs in this case who claim a right to sue 
under the Acts, not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, 
but rather under the language of the savings clauses. In fact, 
it is clear that the citizen suit provisions apply only to 
persons who can claim some sort of injury and there is, 
therefore, no reason to infer the existence of a separate right 
of action for "injured~ laintiffs. 
A 
"Citizen" is defined in the citiz(n-suit section of 
the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is 
§ 505 ~ . 33 u.s.c. §1365(1 ). or may be adversely affecte4 
It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase 
was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club 
2. 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Sees. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 
p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential plaintiffs 
necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these 
statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "non-
economic" and probably non-compensable, and persons like 
respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible 
economic injuries because of statutory violations. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to 
the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private 
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The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
is the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
(1975) , as relevant to the question of legislative intent. 
This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
\ that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
l - ~~s to a~,_:o all private suits under these acts.
29 
Since 
~ ~ ---~ 
2s: t1fo••·citizen-suit provision of t11e FWPCA was expressly modeled on 
the 
I 
parallel provision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See 
. .. -··-- · .. -~ 
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act contains explicit indications that private enforcement suits were in-
tended to be limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Sen-
ator Hart , for example, stated: 
"It has been argued , however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue th:-it the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prewnt this con-
sequence from arising. Fir~t of all, it should ·be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather th:in the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages : 
"Se11:1te bill 3210 provide"' damages and a remedy for recovery of fin es 
and rest itu tion, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards establi~hed administra-
tively under the act, and expresdy excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a. staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or h:-ira "'::cing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. Sec also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 6S1, 690-691 (CA.7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
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the structure of the Acts and their legislative history both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem-
edy,30 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factors. 
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
576. 31 Where, as here, Congress has decided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are / 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.32 / 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents fed eral claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972) , where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public se>verage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of @·· J 
action may be brought under federal common y a private /0.,1 ..  J 
plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court recently~as held that 
the federal common law of nuisance~ie area of water --'2..____ 
. pollution_., is entirely pre-empted by the more-c01iiiJrelle11s1ve· -.. 
/ 30 See genernll~- City of Evansville v. K entucky Liquid R eC11cli11g, Inc., 
,.,..-.._ 604 F. 2d 100S (CA7 19i0 ) , eert. denied, 44-! U.S. 1025 (1980). 
• '"' '- 31 ,ve note, ho\\·evcr, that the only other Cort fa cto r ciC'a ling directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purpo~es of the statutory 
scheme-does not provide support for respondents' argument. CoPgrros 
manifested a purpose of co ntrolling pollution through administrative rhan-
nels. ~dint; litigation remedies only to correct administratiw abus2s 
~C'ctively. See n":""~, supra. 
3 ~ Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the qwstion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this quest ion remains e,;sentially lef(iS-
latiYc, and our deci::;ions have made clea r that comts should not as~ume 
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scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respo-ndents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the F\VPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption' question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than,are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.33 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
C for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
( 
t It is so ordered. 
~-------- ------ a--z· 
33 Indeed, as noted supra, at 11. Ul, the ocran dumping of sewage sludge / 4 
must end altogether by D ecC'mber 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this rep re-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
petitioners to adjust to the coming change. 
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In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts----the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government. 3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a res11lt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it ma.de special reference to a massive growth of algae 
said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, indiYidually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mavor of New York ; the West Long Branch Sewer District: the County 
of Westchester; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen Co,·e. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New J ersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection; David J. Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passa ic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The fed 2ral defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army 
Corps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secre-
tary of the Army. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
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this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New J ersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. '.Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean flcor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen defi ciency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area ." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 4321-4361; New York and New J ersey enivornmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion; the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 
2671; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law claims 
was without prejudice. 
~\(\ Q_ 
'i'9-1711, '19-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
4 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. lbid. 9 Because respondents did 
not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
9~ee n. ~' infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 (e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
/ U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
...,_ 1?:ike the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
stat s : 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief including relief a@inst the Administrator, the Sec- ~ 
retary, or a State agency." eB U. 0. Q§ 1415 (g"f(5J, 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
T~ ~- 1 
-f'S• 84 ,':tti fS-'1-
Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a} Except as provided in subsection (b} of this section, 
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf--
~(l} against any person (including (i} the United 
States, and (ii} any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution} who is 
alleged to be in violation of (A} an effluent 
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B} an 
order issued by the Administrator or a State with 
respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
't'-( 2) against the Administrator where there is 
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any 
act or duty under this chapter which is not 
fl 11 discretionary with the Administrator. 0 The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to 
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to 
enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an 
order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or 
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil 
penalties under sectin 1319(d} of this title. 
qf!Jt(b} No action may be commenced--
- ~ (1} under subsection (a} (1) of this section--
tY (A} prior to sixty days after the 
plaintiff has given notice of the alleged 
violation (i} to the Administrator, (ii} 
to the State in which the alleged 
violation occurs, and (iii} to any 
alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
~ (B} if the Administrator or State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a 
civil or criminal action in a court of 
the United States, or a State to require 
compliance with the standard, limitation, 
or order, but in any such action in a 
court of the United States any citizen 
1 
may intervene · as a matter of right. 
~ 2} under subsection (a} (2) of this section 
prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given 
C..C: notice of such action to the Administrator, -< 
( ~xcept that such action may be brought immediately after such 
notification in the case of an action under this section 
respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a} of this 




title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such 
manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." J• '33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b). 
_ ) The Administrator! may 
L 5D~ ( e, l1')) 33 V, s,c. . 
Id. J § 1365(c) (~). 
intervene in any citizen suit. 
<=fl' 
91JM b 1 ~ fr,1. 4 
'" PS O 4/1."6/8-l-
qr-rhe citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
«{g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf to enjoin any person, including the United States and 
any other governmental instrumentality or agency {to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who 
is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limitation, 
criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this 
subchapter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, 
without regard to the amount in controvery or the citizenship 
or the parties, to enforce such prohibition, limitation, 
criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
-J c2) No action may be commenced--
W(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the 
violation has been given to the Administrator or to 
the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of the 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit: or 
li.J {B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of 
the United States to require compliance with the 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit: or 
IY {C) if the Administrator has commenced action to 
impose a penalty pursuant to subsection {a) of this 
section, or if the Administrator, or the Secretary, 
has initiated permit revocation or suspension 
proceedings under subsection {f) of this section: or 
0 {D) if the United States has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a criminal action in a court 
of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 u.s.c. § 
1415 {g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit 
3 3 U ') ,(, ' 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b) (I )(A), 33· U. S. C. § 1365 (b) ( 1) (A) , does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclus.ion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1356 (e) , pre-
serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1227; seen. f," supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,1 3 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
§§ 50-e, 50-i; N. J . S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petit ions for cert iorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within 
the scope of the questions on which review was granted. 
1 3 Transamerica Mo rtgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. R edington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
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eluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff .1 5 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
1 4 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument . The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity bas been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231. 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of act ion it was creating included damages relief. 
A_n additianaLinJli.£.ation is that b the t ime of the Court of Apeals ---e....... 
decision, any relief other t han damages ~i fllObNb!y Wllll'!tCSuuF;r~The 
algal bloom about which respondents complain died in 1976. The Court 
of Appeals decision was not handed down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a ), the EPA is required to end all ocean dumping 
of~ ewage sludge by December 31 , 1981. 
1 5 The court also held that respondents bad offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of marit ime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. It did not decide whether the F ederal Tort Claims Act, with its 
various procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b) , 2671 et . seq., 
applies to any of respondents ' federal-law claims against federal de-
fendants, although it did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage 
recovery against federal agencies based on stat e law." 616 F. 2d, at 1236. 
79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 7 
Essex and Union Counties in New Jersey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79- 1760) , and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12).1 6 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(2) whether all federal common law nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legislative 
scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and (3) if 
not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for dam-
ages under the federal common law of nuisance. We hold 
that there is no implied right of action under these statutes 
and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully 
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pa.Esed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204 
(1976) , and made it "unlawful for any persion to discharge 
a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with 
its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for state ad-
1 6 See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cross-claims 
filed in the District Court. 
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
1 8 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
79-1711, 79-1754, '79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
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ministration and enforcement under federally approved state 
plans, §§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), (c) the 
Amendments created various federal minimum effluent stand-
ard£!, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 93-532. 86 Stat. 1052 sought to create compre-
hensive federal regnlation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
~ 1411 (a).10 In addition, it requires a l)ermit for the dump-
ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the t"rr·torial seas or in the zone extending J2 miles/ 
from the coastline. where "it, may affect the krritorial sea or 
the territory of the United States." Id. , § 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims nnder these two 
Acts is not clear. but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main cont2ntion is that, the EPA and the Army 
Corns of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
,Xork defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in ,e__ 
amoq1ts that are not, perm:tterl bv the Acts. ~mclfflnt 
,,,,,... J ,:r,r 26, 2>1. Bt. 55. 59. Ji~ In addition . they seem to :ilJege 
that the New York and New Jersev def~ndants have violated 
the terms of their permits. ~ - The question before 
us is whether resl)ondents may ra;se either of thePe claims 
in r, pr:vatA suit for iniunct=ve and monetary reli ef . where 
su~ a. suit is not expressly authorized bv either of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to d;scuss at length the principles set 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., ~~ 1362 (9), (10) , (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
10 These permits are i~sued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Prote~tion Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
terials, which may b2 dumped· und·er a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, Id:, § 1413· .. 
l 
~.~"'--. 
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!mt in recent decisions concerning the recurring question ___p 
whether Congresi~ to create a private right of action ~ 
under a federal s atute without saying so explicitly. The 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Univer-
sities Research Association v. Coutu, - U. S. -, -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 44.4 
U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein 
for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative 
history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation 
to determine congressional intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a _ private suit for damages under either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA. 20 We therefore normally would 
proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however, there is here an alternative sonce of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits . Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act; 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The court went 
on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding that a 
private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies preserved by 
the savings clause. 
) ().V\_J (; i) 
wkttk.r +t.R. 
'S toJlAJe o.J:-
is s u,e i1,w {'(!_ 
w cx.s tw k.; vJ 
tirJ- C v--eJ~J 
Q.V\.+8 v-ce olck 
ar;~5,"' ~Qy 
; lct~3 . 
_..,,. 
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the petitioners 21 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is apropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst~ 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. - ( ~) 
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination f / 
whdse1 ti) the sta:t,ute itt isstte there was thQ kind th.~t;. _J---
oreate4-enrorcmrble4.ights~ H1del'-§-!9S3, B;I'l:d: ~ whether 
Con Tess had fore losed private enforcement of that statu~ 
in the enactment itself Id., at -. l3:,iil::: these excep- {) 1 
~a5...Jle TuEplicable to the present c~ __ p2) fV'I 
S~"::!::;,;; =~:t 
f:icussed- myta, at , .th~ PW'~- . , _ _ _ J-:QD. ~ess nas-~~iaeo 81"'@@om~~~v,a. _ ii.~f!~==~~ 
~d<~- r.elativQ.l;r QOlnp,reh.eft&in0 0ttforeen, • - · r---... 
~ov~ JusTICE STEWART, who later joined the majority ~----------
in Maine V. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman V. Houston Wel- wke...vi ~ ('QyV\-eJ.,~I 
fare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 (1979) J. , t d.. 
~dissenting @pisninP, l!llilit when "a state official is alleged (J,.tV\0?.~ ~f'0V1G\.-E' 
o ave v10lated a federal statute which provides its own · \ \\ 0.... ~(}-'( \-i' C. v.. \0- ("" 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that ,J.. \J (\(\ , L 
21 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
{}.(.j\ o--{e ~ L1:tt1c,e-J7 
.--:----' C.t~4"t ~tV'I 5 \Ve) 
~ \ M~ ~IAf tier b 
~ re.;",, ~ ·,vJJ- iv 
,n,,,,,.,, ~ o{-- ~ ~ ts i,w.J-e,-r 
Department of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
d ~trv\GT,CM't 
~ ( e~f t -H t 
1qg:3, As 
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1::11iu1i.;1::1 may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
--- directly under § 1983." 22 A'S J~ S Cu~ ~J,\,..~t.ffl"fl. See Chesapealie Bay Foundation v. Virginia State . (' l ater Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re: 
I V\\ 1.[Q,_ oJ- , ecting a § 1983 actionj'against the Chairman of a State Water 
~ ) O - J oard, based on the a ~prehensiveness of the remedies pro-
I ~ r l,A) , C ~ ided and the federalism concerns raised). _ 
1/\ 11 () 0 ~ {\ :Ve need not; however, ;?ogitJ&1 ,uhot;her ?;~FBillil . car ~ e._ _ I 1 • 
(}JN:I\_ I ~\ t' t\. ~fl ~eo-ted.-§-198-s,-femedi.esrn"""'t'h~e, smos-we ie_ (I e_c..,1$ I Jvt 
~ 
, ~ hQJ.d._that. such- remedies a~i¼Sleil~ un<Jor the •otihs~ \ L.1 ~ 0.. 
DV 1C,\Q.. 
1 
a0~tiQ,n. SJ.Jgg€lsted itt PAAT ... •Bt.. • :;:;eeti~ authorizes ?) e.,.7 ,t suits _to redre_ss_ a depri~ation ~~der color of state _law _"of ' , • J, ~~'lo• 
~ 
t' any nghts, pnvileges, or immumties fsecured by the Constitu- ~ ~ · 
1 €__ 1 tion and laws." Under Maine v. Thiboutot the phrase "and I 1 / qj; ~,8/t e C,$ 
\ ' ! laws" includes federal statutes. It remains, however, for ~ C,aYv\-r y-a_ \'\e. ~,s,v this Court to define the phrase "rights, privileges, or immuni- VY\ IA..S t- ~ML 
r, . . . L ties," as it ap?lies to cl~ims bas~d on violations of fede:al . _ Al t I 
0\J\'\ D (C €. '('{\!).JvJ\ statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot did not Ht@11rt::io authonze \ vJ.'<../V'{J'··~JJ,.. Y\ 
V\ 
€._ J' \(\.\ t;M~ ] suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases in which a citizen _ -f:~:A J 1. /ls e 
/' OJ\.0- 1 has been injured by federal stat~t~ry ~iolation under col_or ~ ,-V-V tVW 
..-i-,- ' ? hC~:(o\ fo jof state law. Rather, we must distmgmsh between two dis- " 1 _ ,i1 .. +-c, S 
.,J..., 
1 ., j. "' t tinct examples of statutory violations by state officials. S TC,L,\Vv\ '- • 
bz_ \ 1 €.A)~ 1V\..11\o Where a federal law creates an entitlement to individual /" _ D: I fl 17 3 
/' ~ ~.$ I Y\.terJB benefits administered by st~te officials, o: imposes a d~t: '7(:c;nb-r\, 1 ~ 
L.. ~ '(' ;--(,....e on the State to respect the nghts of a particular clai::s of citi- r}....oe 5 ~ 'b._, 
11) ~r,e~~l(Vf }zens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privileges, or , J l. . 
C. l Ct~ 3 y ; r. 1 6- D~1· immunities" on which § 1983 suits may be premised. Where, 1 k cJW ~ ,e ( n,1':> J 
's a·; 011 the other hand, federal law simply regulates the conduct , l 
~; b-Y\ ~ of the States or their officials without creating entitlements CK.ff ~ kv- e '1 !/f 
J I for particular individuals or promoting the interests of a spe-\ t cf t. ~ {q ~() ' cific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statutory viola-
.11/\ {)JJJ.f ~Qe t\~1L 22 See also Mm"@ rw fPkibm:t t, iH8==l-J'?&@. , =, rv l b{JP!3@,- s;2 
Jf\.:---: \ ' Wt HJ J:;=d;88',~ M eyerson v. A rizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., 
+ A 
1 /Jl) f / at - , - F. Supp. -, - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial 
~ ~ provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions 
( f./1/iA -eclt et, of the Revenue Sharing Act."). 
i ~dvi'1~ 'jk. f-wo , , 
0 t~ 2e.AA- 6lA.1 + fl l)\fl <;, I 00..4 I 
' .,, 
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tions infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" of in-
dividual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. - While this line may become blurred in some contexts, it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by every 
citizen affected by a violations of all federal regulatory stat-
utes under color of state law. The present case is an exam-
ple of the need for some limiting principle. The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipali-
ties in the water pollution area in order to benefit the Na-
tion as a whole.23 While it is true that respondents as 
fishermen and clammers have a significant economic stake 
in proper enforcement of these acts, their interest is not com-
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author-
ized benefits by an act of a state administrator. Such a 
recipient is deprived of a federal statutory "right." Re-
spondents, by contrast. merely allege an injury resulting from 
a violation of an essentially regulatory statutory scheme.24 
' --.:...:: p J We. ~c.\.u&Q 
, \'\.oJ- ~ 19i3 
<ues ~ fC C\Ji6L 
rJ-. r; ft Df oct~ 
tn f e ~bv\d ~ s 
~~ ~ 
f-' \jJ ~ C [\_ a,J 
t0 MP~s~. 
23 Congress was concerned about the fisl1ing industry in these Acts, but 
this was only one element of a larger effort to maintain water quality 
for the benefit of all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U. S. C. § 1251; 
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not mean to 
create "rights" in the same sei1se as it ' does in statutes that select out 
particular classes of citizens for specific benefits. 
24 The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same distinction. In First 
National, Bani~ of Omaha v. Marquette National, Bank of Minneapolis, 
636 F. 2d 195 (1980), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1981) , involving a 
claimed violation of federal banking statutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a, broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the rights protected by the 
Civil Rights Act. . . . The Supreme Court in Thiboutot makes clear 
that section 1983 does protect rights established by statutes enacted pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by sec-
tion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
o/9-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
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B 
esoaes@ ~ IQ~~ claeii' l~P9¥ide. a,-right-of-'::ret-rett -4;Q~ 
:pondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, we turn -t 
the decision/\:£ the Court of Appeals that there is an fmplie• 
right of action directly under these statutes. We find n 
persuasive evidence of a congressional intent to authoriz 
implied rights of action. This conclusion is supported by th 
structure of the ~,.-their p~rpose, and l~gislative history 
Although,_ these statutes neither authorize nor expressl 
rule out private suits .,for damages, -there are-eh!bora-te-Bn,s; 
~~WPCA, for example_c auth~ 
the EPA Administrator to respond to violations oftbe Act 
with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1319.25 He may seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per 
day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), and criminal pen-
alties also are available, id., § 309 (c) , 33 U.S. C. § 1319 (c). 
States desiring to administer their own permit programs must 
demonstrate that state officials possess adequate authority 
to abate violations through civil or criminal penalties or 
other means of enforcement. Id. , § 402, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 
(b) (7). In addition, if "any interested person" believes that 
the standards being applied by the EPA are themselves vio-
lative of the Act, under 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b) he may seek 
judicial review in the United States Courts of Appeals of 
/ 
various particular actions by the Administrator, including 
federally-created welfare program. These rights . . . represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by t he Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to the National 
Bank Act are qualitat ively different and not within' the contemplation of 
section 1983." Id ., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op., at - (" In order to have an 
action under § 1983, it is not enough to establish the violation of a federal 
statute. Rather, the statute violated must be one that confers a federal 
right upon the plaintiff."). 
25 The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
c_ 
(;<,JL,r (_ <]_~~ ~ {3 
-i>S O 4 / le ,' B·i--
We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of 
Appeals that there is an implied right of action directly under 
these statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a 
congressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, 
there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion 
is {upported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, 
and legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement 
provisions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both 
on government officials and private citizens. 
.,-
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establishment of effiuent standards and issuance of permits 
for discharge of pollutants. Where review could have been 
obtained under this provision, the action at issues may not 
be challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding 
12!:..enforcement. Id., § 1369 (b) (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,26 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
\
U . S. C. § 1415 (g). f!11ese citizen-suit 1,ro ~isio~e 
pO -dayii'--;wiefl- Retice to potential defendants and m:,oJd 
only prospective relief .F 
The clear inference to be d rr""rrom the existence of these 
:various enforceme ovisions~e-citizen,.g_ui~ 
-r . _ _ . ___ at Congress did not intend to authorize jm"' 
I pliedly other judicial remedies for. priva,te--cittz~ ---
, stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an 
' elemental canon of statutory construction that where a stat-
I ute expressly provide; a particular remedy or remedies, a 
I court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U. S. , 
I at 19. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. R edington, supra, 442 
I. U. S., at 571-574. In the absence of strong indicia of a con-
, trary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude ,in, 
-this kind ..Gf sitl.l&tia& that Congress provided precisely the 
.._twedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
{ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it h'2lg that the existence of 
~ citizen-suit provision in § 1-866 (a) does not ruleoutim-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
2 6 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penatlies by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a ), criminal penalties, id ., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (c), ·and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f). 
27 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, may 
also be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
KiJQ, 
1) 
; d_e ( 




See nn. 9, ~ supra . These citizen-suit provisions authorize 
private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these 
statutes. Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must 
C 
comply with specified procedures--whih rspondents here ignored-
~ 
-including in most cases 60 days' prior no! ce to potential 
defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it 
cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. 
) 
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(a) to create a limited cause of action for "private 
attorneys general"-"non-injured members of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
- • an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal questio11 jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the ' Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the genera} federal question · jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these -parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
see 'f\ . . ,v) There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, e language of the savings clause on which the Court of 
ppeals relie~ is quite ambiguous concerning the intent of 
. 0~) Congress to "preserve" remedies under the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-suit provision 
"shall restrict any right which any person ... may have 
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of 
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other re-
ll.tf." It is~ t •ahvir y:betber ~the phrase "any stat-
the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.28 
28 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause : 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
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-MoteOver, tlie reasoml'1g on -which ·the C"ourt orAppeals 
refied is flawed because it draws an incorrect distinction be-
twee~ (.'.non-injured" plaintiffs entitled to bring a citizen suit 
and the ' "iajured" plaintiffs who claim here a right to sue 
' hnder the geh~l provisions of the Act. "Citizen" for pur-
poses of § 1365 m . ns "a person or persons having an interest 
hich is or may be dversely affected." 33 U. S. C. § 1365 en. This phrase was i "htended by Congress to allow sui 
by all persons possessing )t~ding under the terms of thi 
ourt's decision in Sierra Club, v. Morton, 405 U. S. 72 
1 (f 972). S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). Thi 
category of potential plaintiffs nec~a_rily includes not onl 
those suffering "non-economic" harms'irom po1lution, bu 
atso persons like respondents who alleg~ Qfrect economi 
.arms. Thus it cannot be inferred that Cong:ress preserve 
separate private remedy for direct economic i~ ries. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its analysis to the 
PRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Con ess 
videnced an intent not to imply ,,Pri-vate-renrecl-r1 
~"1v a,uthorized citizen suits.J The relevant prov1s10ns 
in the MPRSA are in many respects almost identical to those 
of the FWPCA. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do 
not expressly limit citizen suit,s to those who have suffered 
some injury from a violation of the Act, we are not persuaded 
by this fact alone that Conii.Tess affirmatively intended to 
imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after set-
ting out expressly the manner in which private citizens can 
seek to enjoin violations. 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitatibns" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law 
of nuisance, 
tcle_r, E I 8n It 
-PS--0-+/-l-'r--/itl Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court 
of Appeals relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a 
distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring 
citizen suits to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the 
"injured" plaintiffs in this case who claim a right to sue 
under the Acts, not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, 
but rather under the language of the savings clauses. In fact, 
it is clear that the citizen suit provisions apply only to 
persons who can claim some sort of injury and there is, 
therefore, no reason to infer the existence of a separate right 
of action for "injured plaintiffs. 
"Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of 
the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is 
or may be adversely affected". § 505(f), 33 u.s.c. §1365(f). 
It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase 
was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club 
2. 
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972}. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 
p. 146 (1972}. This broad category of potential plaintiffs 
necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these 
statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "non-
economic" and probably no~2ensable, and persons like 
respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible 
economic injuries because of statutory violations. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to 
the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private 
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The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
is the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
(1975) , as relevant to the question of legislative intent. 
This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.29 Since 
citizen-suit prov1s10n of tbe FWPCA was expressly modeled on 
the ' parallel provision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U . S. C. § 7604. See 
S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 79 (1971). ~ legislative history of the la-t-te_r_.._. ..
act contains explicit indications that private enforcement sui ts were in-
tended to be limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Sen-
ator Hart, for example, stated: 
., -t,lt £as been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
cit izen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should ·be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfa re of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted t he citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages : 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution , and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970), 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
u. s. 927 (1976) . 
• 
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the structure of the Acts and their legislative history both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem-
edy,30 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factors. 
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
576.81 Where, as here, Congress has decided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.32 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee , 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of / 
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi- @ 
action may be brought under federal common y a private /~ 
plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court recently~eld that 
the f~dera! com_mon law of nuisance..._ in the area of w~ 
. pollut10n
1 
1s entirely pre-empted by the more comj)re1ierisive ---... 
30 See generally City of Evansville v. K entucky Liquid R ecvcling, Inc., 
604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1025 (1980) . 
31 We note, however, that the only other Cort factor dealing directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purposes of the statutory 
scheme-does not provide support for respondents' argument. CoPgrcss 
manifested a purpose of contro!ling pollution through administrative rhan-
nels, ,11roviding litigation remedies bnly to correct administrative abus2s 
j5'ro°spectively. See n. 'I!, supra. 
32 Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the qu ~stion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this question remains essentially legis-
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning appropriate 
statutory remedies. 
I -
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scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.33 
We thtrefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for -further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
33 Indeed, as noted supra, at n. t::l, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu. 
t ion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq. , and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents a.re an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government. 8 Their complaint aUeged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materia:ls directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a resdt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted. 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Maver of New York ; the West Long Branch Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester ; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen Co'"e. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection; David J . Bardin , individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the Bergen County Sewer Authority ; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commi~sioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority ; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
8 The federal defendants were t he Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
Corps of Engineers ; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secre-
tary of the Army. 
4 The com.plalnt alleged that this growth of algae was caU$ed .by the 
' 
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this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia , or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 : the Nat ional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 4321-4361 ; New York and New Jersey enivornmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion ; the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 
2671 ; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent ::;tate-law clailll.S 
wa~ without prejudice-, 
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comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provisfon in § 505_ of the Act, 33 U. S. C. ij 1365 (b H 1) 
(A) . This provision allows suits under, the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective re}ief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first ·muE?t give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged vio1ator. lbid. 11 Because respondents· did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: 
" (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (1) a,gainst a.ny person (including (i) the United Sta.tes, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under ~this chapter or 
(B) an· order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is· alleged a failure of · the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty tinder this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, 'without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of tbe parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as tbe case maybe, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may .be commenced-
" ( 1) under subsection (a)( 1) or this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after · the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Admfoistrator, -(ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occur:;, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
lunitation, or order, or 
"(B) if the Adruinistrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the Uriited States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of tliis section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after sucb notification in the 
case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
chizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. §.1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citize:n-sui~ · and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
given in such manner as the ,4(iµiinistrator shall prescribe by regulation,'' 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., 505 (c)(2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 29, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited fom1s of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections . of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel_ citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-. 
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relier 
(including relief agaim;t the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit, provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap--
ter. The district. courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship or the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty day:;; after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
t he prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit ; or 
"(Bi) fJf th'e' Attorney General-has commenced· and is diligently pro~eciit'-
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply wi~h the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. _ 616 
F . 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l)(A), 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1356 (e), pre-
serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (3) (B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states : 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief aga.inst the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency." Id. , at § 1415 (g)(5) . 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i; N . J . S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within 
the scope of the questions on which review was granted, 
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may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1227; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms/' 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' ciaims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as weli as for injunctive relief; 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979) r 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni~ 
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979) ; Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 6t:l' 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
ei"gn immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain. 
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks."· 616 F . 2'd, at 
1231. 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
t hat the statutory righh, of action it was creating included damages relief. 
An additional indi"cation is that by the time of the Court of Appeals 
decision, any relief other than damages could not have been too impor-
tant to respondents. The ~ bloom about which respondents complain 
died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed down until 
1980, Under the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a) , the EPA is requiredl 
t@ end ,aU ocean dumping, of sewage sludge by December 31, 198!~ 
i,/? 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims; 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
it thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.1 5 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the ioint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New JerEey (No. 79-1754) , by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12) .1 6 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions : (lJ whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(~ , whether all federai common iaw nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legi•htive 
scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and (.il1 If (_ u l 
not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for dam- 7 
ages under the federal common iaw of nuisance. We hoid 
that there is no implied right of action under theEe sta.tutes 
and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully 
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.1 7 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, with its 
various procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b) , 2671 et . seq., 
applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against federal de-
fendants, although it did hold that t he Act precluded a "money damage 
recovery against federal agencies based on state law." 616 F. 2d, at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra . Petitioners in Nos. 79-171 1, 79-1754, and 80-i2 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cross-claims 
filed in the District Court. 
11 We therefote need not discuss the question whether the federal comi.-
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II 
·T he Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
tate enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92- 500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204 
(1976), and made it "unlawful for any persion to discharge 
a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with 
its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for state ad-
ministration and enforcement under federally approved state 
plans, §§ 402 (b ), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b) , (c) the 
Amendments created various federal minimum effluent stand-
ards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research , and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 93-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
orean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 I n addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
. ing of material transported from outside the United States 
· mon law of nuisance could ever be the ba8is of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
1 8 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
naviga ble waters, including the "territorial seas/' 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7) , 
(12), and applie., as well to discha rges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other :floating craft '·· into t he "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id , §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971 ). 
10 These permits are· issued by the Administrator of the Environmenfo1 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
terials, which may be dumped under a permit is8ued· by the Seccetar.y. · 
' of the ~tt-my, Id , .§ 14-i3, 
~ 
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into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, where "it may affect the territorial sea on 
the territory of the United States." Id., § 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge arid dump pollutants · in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New· Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. · -The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of actio 
under a federal statute without saying. so ~xplicitly0£.e 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. · Univer-
sities Research Association v. Coutu, - U. S. -, - . 
(1981) ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 44.4 
U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979).A We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein 
for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative 
history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation 
to ·determine cong,Tessional intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing ~ private suit for · damages under either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA.20 We therefore normally would 
aiThe. Court of Ap?e,~ls di~ sta te that the savings _cl~u~e i.n § ~05 (e) 
~ '? 
~' 
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proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however, there is here an alternative source of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among 
the petitioners 21 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is apropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine'\. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. Th~ claim .brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine. v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming tha.t a federal statute has 
been violated under c_olor of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to ·the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981) , we remanded certain claims for a determination 
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b)." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The court went 
on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding that a. 
private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies preserved by 
the savings clause. . 
21 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities .suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
V 
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(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
tha~ statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
·statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id., at-. Both of these exceptions 
are applicable to the present case. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to pre-empt the remedy of suits 
und~r § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. "Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. H ous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
to })ave violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
· enforcement procedure may not ·be bypassed by bringing suit. 
directly under § 1983." 2:2 As discussed infra, at -, the 
FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it cre-
ated so many specific statutory remedies including the two 
citizen-suit provisions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. 
Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED 
Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the feder-
alism concerns raised). 
We need not, however, rest our decision solely on a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have intended in enacting 
these statutes. Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, ap-
ply here. It authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under 
color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities ___., 7 
----- v 22 See also Meyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715,~~t -, ~ ,P ~ _, 
F . Supp. - , - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) (" [T]he rem~provision of i 
§ 198~ cannot be u,;ed to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve- ~ 
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.secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court t-0 define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities," as it applies to claims 
based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot 
did not authorize suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases 
in which a citizen has been injured by federal statutory vio-
lation under color of state law. Rather, we must distinguish 
between two distinct examples of statutory violations by 
state officials. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual ben~fits administered by state officials, or imposes 
a duty on the State to respect the rights of a particular class 
of citizens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" on which § 1983 suits may be premised. 
Where, on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the 
conduct of the States or their officials wit-hout creating en-
titlements for particular individuals or promoting the inter-
ests of a specific class of citizens, it cannot be sa.id that statu-
tory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" 
of individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts, it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by every 
citizen affected by a violations of ~ federal regulatory stat-
utes uuder color of state law. The present case is an exam-
ple of the need for some limiting principle. The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipali-
ties in the water pollution area in order to benefit the Na-
tion as a whole.23 While it is true that respondents as 
23 Congress was concerned about the fishing industry in these Acts, but 
~ 
thi.s was only one element of a larger effort to maintain water quality ~ 
for the benefit of all citizens. See FWPCA § 101 , 33 U. S. C. § 1~  " 
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not J.DQa.&~ co 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does in statutes that ~
particular cla$Ses of citizens for specific benefits. c)--' ~¼ 
~ (<t.<J--S~~ 
~lS~s 4~ci_f-
--,-. 7>~- ~ Jd<--~ 
~~ ~{khd.o~~- -~--
~~'11,J' ~Uiv~ IG~~ 
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~~~ 
fishermen and clammers have a significant economic stake 
in proper enforcement of these acts, their interest is not com-
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author~ 
ized benefits by an act of a state administrator. Such a 
recipient is deprived of a federal statutory "right,;rire: 
spondents, by contrast, merely allege an injury resulting from 
a violation of an essentiaily regulatory statutory scheme. 24 
We conclude that § 1983 does not provide a right of action 
to respondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA. 
n 
We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
that there is an implied right of action directly under these 
statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a con-
gressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, there 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion is 
24 The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same distinction. In First 
National, Bank of Omaha v. Marqy,ette National, Bank of Minneapolis, 
636 F. 2d 195 (1980), cert. dt:nied, - U. S. - (1981), involving a 
claimed violation of federal banking statutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the rights protected by the 
Civil Rights Act. . . . The Supreme Qourt ii~ Thiboutot makes clear 
that section 1983 do~s protect rights established by statutes enacted pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by sec-
tion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights . . . represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to the National 
Bank Act are qualitatively different and not within the contemplation of 
section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op.,. at - ("In order to have an 
· action under § 198a, it is not enough to establish the violation of a federal 
statute. Rather, the statute violated must be one that confers a federal 
• right Upon the plaintiff.'') . 
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supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, and 
legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.25 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d , 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 , 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administe eir own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state cials possess 
adequate authority to aba.te violations th gh civil or crim-
inal penalties 6r other means of enfor ment. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 13 b ( 7). ~"a~H?"m;,<-;+-u,,,-n,-..;m-trr_...,,,+-r-;; 
son believes that .tae standards,_,.0~~~~!C1 by the EPA 
are themselves violative of the ct, under 33 U. S. C. § 136' 
(b) he may seek judicial review in the United States Courts 
of Appeals of various particular actions by the Administra'-
tor, including establishment of effluent standards and issu-
rmi r disch o tan . ere review 
could have been obtained under this provision, the action at 
issues may not be challenged in any subseqtient civil or crim-
inal proceeding for enforcement. Id., at § 1369 (b) (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,26 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11 , supra. These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
2~ The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1) . 
26 The MPRSA provides for as:;essment of civil penatlies by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id, § 1415 (c), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f). 
n )f~0 
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enforce these statutes.~r Plaintiff~ invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize · by 
implication additional · judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in · Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, mpra, 442 U. S., at 571-574. In 
the absence of strong iridicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies · it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided ·this infer-
ence. · Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § ·505 (a) · does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. · It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured members of the public" suing 
to promote the general welfare rather than to redress an in-
jury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went on 
to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs · allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e) , and the general federal question jurisaiction of the 
Judicial Code. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976) . Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
27 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, may 
· alao be' tirde-r"ed by the court. § 505 (a), 3',3 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, 
the langua.ge of the savings clause on which the Court of 
Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous concern-
ing the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under the 
FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-
suit provision "shall restrict any tight which any person ... 
may have under any statute or common law to see en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.28 
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" pla.in-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
28 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
'l,Jt should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre~ 
serve any rights ot remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-4141 p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added) . . 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees unden· the common law 
o.f n~nce .. 
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} 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
. ~ the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
- the citizenjsuit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the exi~ence of a separate right of action for "in-
ju~ain~!~ 
~it1zen is defined in the citizen-suit section of the 
FWPCA as "a 'person or persons having_ an interest which is 
or may be ad~rsely affected." § 505 (f), 33 U. S. C. § 1316 
(f). It is clear from .the Senate Conference Report that this 
phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
· possessing standing under ~his Court's decision in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-
1236, p. 146 (1972). · This broad category of potential plain-
tiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
these statutes as private attorneys general, whore injuries 
are "non-economic" and probably noncompensable, and per-
sons like respondents who assert that they have suffered 
t~ible economic injuries because of sta.tutory violations. 
--'the Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here ·again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these' Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. - The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they -do not expressly limit 
v- ~ citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
~ 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
~ ~ { of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
t ..v211anner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
( ii\ __ The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
t C
1 
f./ »7) is the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
' l · identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
t(1975)) , as relevant to the question •of legislative intent. 
~ Vff\/~ ~ 
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4'his history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-, 
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts. 29 Since 
the structure of the Acts and their · legislative history both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem-
29 The Senate Reports ·on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
iimited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-45i, 
P. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 8i (i971) . In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for 
example, stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary', person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits tor damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690--691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
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edy,80 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factor~. 
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442· U. S., at . . 
576.31 Where, a.s here, Congress ha.s decided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts .~re 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.32 
III 
The remaining two issues o~ which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1912), where the Cburt found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federai common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipaiities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common Ia·w by a pri-
vate plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court r~ Ny haspci 
that the federal common law o(nuisance in tlie area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
so See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Reqjcling, Inc., 
604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied; 444 U. S. 1025 (1980). 
81 We note, however, that the only other Cort factor· dealing · directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purposes of . the statutory 
scheme--does not provide support for responden-ts' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling pollution through ·administrative chan-
nels, providing litigation remedies only to correct administrative · abuses 
prospectively. See n. 29, supra. 
82 Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider · the qu~stion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this question remains essentially legis-
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
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~fter the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee. 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). ' 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re• 
spect to ocean dumping, than are anaiogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.83 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
/or further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered1 
83 Indeed, as noted supra; at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by. December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
petiti~ners to adjust to the coming chang~ 
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In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common ,law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts--the Federal Water Pollu~ 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq. , and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2-
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a resdt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted. 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of ale:ae 
said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York ; Abraham Beame, 
Mavor of New York; the West Long Branch Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester ; the City of Long Beach; and the City of Glen Co'"e. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection; David J. Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Authority ; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army 
Corps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secre-
tary of the Anny. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
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this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 4321--4361; New York and New Jersey enivornmental statutes ; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
t ion; the Extension of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Act, 42 
U. S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 
2671; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law claims 
wae without prejudice., 
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comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. ij 1365 (b)(l) 
(A). This provision allows suits under . the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective re!ief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. Ibid. 9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (I) against any person (including (i) the United Sta,tes, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the e:,,,.ient permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is · alleged a failure of · the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, ·without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of tbe parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 ( d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
" (I) under subsection (a) (1) of this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the Uriited States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the 
case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
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hot give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
dtizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. §. 1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citize:n-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
given in such manner as the 4~µiinistrator shall prescribe by regulation." 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., 505 (c) (2), 
33 U.S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 29, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-. 
:riJ.ent of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relier 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap:.. 
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship or the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(B) jif th'e' Attorney General has commenced· and is diligently prosec4t~ 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1356 ( e), pre-
serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U.S. C. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (3) (B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency." Id., at § 1415 (g) (5) . 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59: 1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not , however, within 
the scope of the quest.ions on which review was granted. 
I 
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may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 ·F. 2d, at 1226-1227; seen. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCAJ, preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by poiiution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' ciaims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, a.s well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advuiors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979) ; 
Touche Ross & Co. v. R edington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni~ 
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979) ; Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66' 
(1975) . 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated : 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
t iffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2a, at 
1231. 
This passage suggests that , as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was creating included damages relief. 
An addit ional indi'cation is that by the time of the Court of Appeals 
decision, any relief other than damages could not have been too impor-
tant to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents complain 
died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed down until 
1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a), the EPA is requiredl 
t<nJ eml .all o-cean dnmping of sewage sludge by December 31, 198!.. 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims; 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerabiy beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New JerEey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80--12).10 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(2) whether all federai common iaw nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legi"iative 
scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and (3) If 
not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for dam-
ages under the federal common iaw of nuisance. We hold 
that there is no implied right of action under theEe statutes 
and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fuliy 
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, with its 
various procedural requirements , 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et. seq., 
applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against federal de-
fendants, although it did hold that the Act precluded a "money damage 
recovery against federal agencies based on state law." 616 F. 2d, at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra . Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-i2 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cross-claims 
filed in the District Court. 
1.7 We there.fate need not discuss the question wheth~r the federal conii:. 
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II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 204 
(1976), and made it "unlawful for any persion to discharge 
a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with 
its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for state ad-
ministration and enforcement under federally approved state 
plans, §§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), (c) the 
Amendments created various federal minimum effluent stand-
nrdf! , id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 93-532, 86 Stat. 1052. sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 In addition , it requires a permit for the dump-
. ing of material transported from outside the United States 
· mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas;" 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
19 These permits are· issued by t he Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
terials, which may be dumped under a permit" issued by the Secretary · 
of tlhe Army, Id., .§ 14i3,.' 
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into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, where "it may affect the territorial sea on 
the territory of the United States." Id., § 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
. gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New· Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. · The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for iiljunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 
It is unnecessa.ry to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a, private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly. ·The 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Univer., 
sities Research Association v. Coutu, - U. S. -, - -
(1981) ; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu., 
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein 
for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative 
history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation 
to determine congressional intent. 
A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a private suit for damages under either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA. 20 We therefore normally would 
20 The _ Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured ·parties 1.tn-
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proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however, there is here an alternative source of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among 
the petitioners 21 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is apropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. · This case began · long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine_ v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under c_olor of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to explicit, citizens-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The court went 
on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding that a 
private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies preserved by 
the savings clause. . 
21 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
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(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
tha~ statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
·statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id., at-. Both of these exceptions 
are applicable to the present case. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to pre-empt the remedy of suits 
und~r § 1983. As JUSTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
to qave violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
· enforcement procedure may not ·be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." 22 As discussed infra, at -, the 
FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it cre-
ated so many specific statutory remedies including the two 
citizen-suit provisions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. 
Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED 
Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the feder-
alism concerns raised). 
We need not, .however, rest our decision solely on a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have intended in enacting 
these statutes. Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, ap-
ply here. It authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under 
color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
22 See also Meyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80--715, slip op., at -, -
F. Supp. -, - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of 
§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve-
nue Sharing Act."). 
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secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities," as it applies to claims 
based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot 
did not authorize suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases 
in which a citizen has been injured by federal statutory vio-
lation under color of state law. Rather, we must distinguish 
between two distinct examples of statutory violations by 
state officia.ls. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual ben~fits administered by state officials, or imposes 
a duty on the State to respect the rights of a particular class 
of citizens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" on which § 1983 suits ma.y be premised. 
Where, on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the 
conduct of the States or their officials without creating en-
titlements for particular individuals or promoting the inter-
ests of a specific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statu-
tory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" 
of individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts, it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by every 
citizen affected by a violations of a.Il federal regulatory stat-
utes under color of state law. The present case is an exam-
ple of the need for some limiting principle. The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipaJi. 
t ies in the water pollution area in order to benefit the Na-
tion as a whole.23 While it is true that respondents as 
23 Congress was concerned about the fishing industry in these Acts, but 
this was only one element of a larger effort to maintain water quality 
for the benefit of all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 ; 
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not mean to 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does in statutes that select out 
particular classes of citizens for specific benefits. 
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fishermen and clammers have a significant economic stake 
in proper enforcement of these acts, their interest is not com-
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author .. 
ized benefits by an act of a state administrator. Such a 
recipient is deprived of a federal statutory "right." Re-
spondents, by contrast, merely allege an injury resulting from 
a violation of an essentiaily regulatory statutory scheme.24 
We conclude that § 1983 does not provide a right of action 
to respondents under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, 
B 
We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
that there is an implied right of action directly under these 
statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a con-
gressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed. there 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion is 
24 The Eighth Circuit recently drew this same distinction. In First 
National, Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nati,onal, Bank of Minneapolis, 
636 F . 2d 195 (1980) , cert. denied, - U. S. - (1981), involving a 
claimed violation of federal banking statutes under color of state law, the 
court stated: 
"A bank's ability t o charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the rights protected by the 
Civil Rights Act. . . . The Supreme Qourt if! Thiboutot makes clear 
that section 1983 does protect rights established by statutes enacted pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by sec-
t ion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursua11t to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights . .. represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On t he other hand, rights incidental to the National 
Bank Act are qualitatively different and not within the contemplation of 
section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, slip op ., at - ("In order to have an 
action under § 1983, it is not enough to establish the violation of a federal 
statute. Rather, the statute violated mu:;t be one that confers a federal 
· right Upon the plaintiff.''). 
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supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, and 
legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.25 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 (c), 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U.S. C. § 1342 (b)(7). In addition, if "any interested per-
son" believes that the standards being applied by the EPA 
are themselves violative of the Act, under 33 U. S. C. § 1369 
(b) he may seek judicial review in the United States Courts 
of Appeals of various particular actions by the Administra'-
tor, including establishment of effluent standards and issu-
ance of permits for discharge of pollutants. Where review 
could have been obtained under this provision, the action at 
issues may not be challenged in any subsequent civil or crim-
inal proceeding for enforcement. Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,26 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
25 The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
26 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penatlies by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (c), and pennit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f), 
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enforce these statutes.'21 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
:first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
· implication additional · judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it• is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S. , at 571-574. In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a)° does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. -It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for ''private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured members of the public" suing 
to promote the general welfare rather than to redress an in-
jury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went on 
to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
27 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, may 
aho be o·rde-r-ed by the court. § 505 (a), 3,3 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, 
the language of the savings clause on which the Court of 
Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous concern-
ing the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under the 
FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-
suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person ... 
may have under any statute or common law to see en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.28 
Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
2s In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
'·'-It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). . 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or t he common law") . 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation"· 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees unden ~ common law 
Qf nws.nce~ 
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not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured plaintiffs. 
Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of the 
FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is 
or may be adversely affected." § 505 (f), 33 U. S. C. § 1316 
(f). It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this 
phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
· possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-
1236, p. 146 ( 1972). · This broad category of potential plain-
tiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
these statutes as private attorneys geiieral, whom· injuries 
are "non-economic" and probably noncompensable, and per-
sons like respondents who assert that they have suffered 
tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. · The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
is the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
· identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
!(1975\), as relevant to the question of legislative intent. 
19-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 1~ 
q'his history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-, 
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view · 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.29 Since 
the structure of the Acts and their legislative history both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem-
29 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
iimited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-45i, 
P. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 8i (i971). In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Ha.rt, for 
example, stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 . ' )" - . u . .S\ 927 \ 1976). 
79-l'.711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80--12-OPINION 
20 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
edy,30 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factors. 
See Touche Ross .& Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
576.51 Where, a.s here, Congress has decided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.3~ 
III 
The remammg two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1912), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipaiities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a. pri-
vate plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court recently has held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
30 See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc. , 
604 F. 2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) . 
31 We note, however, that the only other Cort factor dealing directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purposes of the statutory 
scheme-does not provide support for responden·ts' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling pollution through administrative chan-
nels, providing litigation remedies only to correct administrative · abuses 
prospectively. See n. 29, supra. 
52 Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the qu,stion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this question remains e:;sentially legis-
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning appropriate 
sta,t1\tory rerrtedies, 
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11fter the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are anaiogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.83 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legai basis _is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered, 
83 Indeed, as noted supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
petiti'tJners to adjust to the coming change, 
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In this case, involving alleged · damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availaoil-
ity of a tlamages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts--the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPC1,\.), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York aiid New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. · In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New · York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudson 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint ·alleged that, as a result of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, indfridually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District ; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the Bergen County Sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
C-orps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, ·individually and as Secre--
ta17- of the Army, 
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$aid to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the compfaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see_ 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court sta.tes that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean 's floor . This condition resulted in the death and · 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine , 
life unable to escape the blighted area."· Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and · Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq .; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, an<l Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U.S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
• The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-Jaw claims 
was without prejudice. 
> \ 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed - to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b )( 1) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. lbid.9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: _ 
" (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (1) against any persoi;i (including (i) the United Sta.te1,, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitut.ion) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator . . 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without · regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the ' Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any .appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 ( d) of this title. 
" (b) No action may be commenced-
" (1) under subsection (a) (1) of t~is section-
" (A) prior to sixty days _ after the plaintiff has given - notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
!imitation, or order, or 
" (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced ·and is -diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States,. 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
" (2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the· 
case of an action under this section respecting : a violatio_n of section::. 
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n.ot give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictionai 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit · and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). . 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 29, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e), which 
l'ltates: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf t-0 enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subcha~ 
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without rega rd · to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
" (2) No action may be commenced.:_ 
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(n) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
':. 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort; 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) (1) (A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the spedfic "citi• 
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 D.S. C. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1415 (3) (B) . 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency)." Id., at § 1415 (g) (5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort :suits in _ f~deral court. These questions are not, however, with.ln 
the scope of the questions on which review ~as granted, 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCAJ, preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F . 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U, S. 560 (1979); Canrwn v. Uni-
versity . of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). _ 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, ·the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action is was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
down until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U, S. C. § 1412a, (a), the EPA 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance· claimsJ 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not ,bring such claims. · It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d. at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. --Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this C~mrt by a group of New Jersey 
sewera.ge authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New JerEey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York '(No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12).16 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions : (1) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(2) whether all federal common law nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legi,lative 
scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and (3)' if 
not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 'dam-
ages under the federal common law of nuisance. We hold 
that there is no implied right of action under theEe statutes 
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F . 2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal cH endants, 616 F . 2d, at 1237; although it did hold tl:iat the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on · 
state law," id ., at 1236. 
io See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12. 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based :on cross-clain'.Ls; · 
tiled . in the District Court, 
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and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully 
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.17 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
Californw ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, § § 402 (b), ( c) , 33 U. S. C. § § 1342 (b), 
( c) , the Amendments created various federal minimum effiu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
·or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territ?ry of the United States." 1d., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the Ne~ ~ersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits.' The 
question before us is whether respondents m_ay raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.19u The 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature: Univer-
sities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. -, - (1981); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.· v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 
15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look first, of course , to the statutory lan-
guage, particularly_ to the provisions made therein for en-
forcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history 
and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to _de-
termine congressional intent. 
t erials, which may be dtJmped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of t he Army, id., § 1413. 
1.9u In recent years, the question has arisen ·with increased frequency. 
See C{Lrmon v-. Univer8ity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979). 
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In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a private suit for damages under either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA. 20 We therefore normally would 
proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however , there is here an alternative source of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by sta!,e officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipal!ties and sewerage boards among 
the petitioners 21 under the _FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this Eetting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize priva.te suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot bec~use it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has' 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by t he notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at° 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of pri.;,ate damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
21 These petitioners appear to fa ll within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services; 436 U\ S. 658 (1978) . 
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been violated under color of state law, causing an ·injury, 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to .the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
( 1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id., at-. Both of these exceptions 
are applicable to the present case. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to pre-empt the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JUSTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion) , when "a state official is alleged 
to have violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." 22 As discussed infra, at -, the 
FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it cre-
ated so many specific statutory remedies including the two 
citizen-suit provisions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. 
Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 ~(ED 
Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reason-
ing based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided 
and the federalism concerns raised). 
22 See also Meyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., at -, -
F . Supp. - , - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial ·provision of 
§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve-
·· '' nue Sharin~ · Act."). 
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We need not, however, rest our decision solely on a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have intended in enacting 
these statutes. Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, ap-
ply here. It authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under 
color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
'secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities," as it applies to claims 
based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot 
did not authorize suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases 
in which a citizen has been injured by federal statutory vio-
lation under color of state law. Rather, we must distinguish 
between two distinct examples of statutory violations by 
state officials. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual benefits administered by state officials, or imposes 
a duty on the State to respect the rights of a particular class 
of citizens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" on which § 1983 suits may be premised. 
Where, on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the 
conduct of the States or their officials without creating en-
titlements for particular individuals or promoting the inter-
. ests of a specific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statu-
tory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" 
of individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts; it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. · The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by every 
citizen affected by a violations of all federal regulatory stat-
utes under color of state law. · · The present case is an exam-
ple of the need for some limiting principle.· The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipali-
ties i n the ,water pollution ftrea ,in '.orqer .to benefit the N~-
. -
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tion as a whole.23 While it is true that respondents as 
fishermen and clammers have a significant economic stake 
in proper enforcement of these acts, their interest is not com-
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author-
ized benefits by an act of a state administrator. Such a 
recipient is deprived of a federal statutory "right." " Re-
spondents, by contrast, merely allege an injury resulting from 
a violation of an essentially regulatory statutory scheme.24 
We conclude that § 1983 does not provide a right or-action 
to respondents und~r the FWPCA and the MPRSA. 
23 Congress was concerned about the fishing industry in these Acts, but 
this was only one element of a larger effort to maintain water quality 
for the benefit of all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U. S. C. § 1251; 
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not mean to 
create "rights" in the same sense as it does in statutes that select out 
particular classes of citizens for specific benefits. 
24 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently drew this same 
distinction. In First Nationai Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National 
Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F. 2d 195 (1980), cert. denied, - U. S. -
(1981), involving a claimed violation of federal banking statutes under 
color of state law, the court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, 1s not in the nature of the rights protected by the Civil 
!lights Act. . . . The Supreme Court ded,;ion in Thiboutot -makes clear 
that section 1983 does protect rights established by statutes enacted -pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by sec-
tion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights . . . represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to -the -National 
Bank Act are qualitatively different and not within the contemplation· of 
section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See al,;o Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, - F. Supp., at - ("In order to 
have an action under § 1983, it is not enough to establish the violation of 
a federal statute. Rather, the ,:;tatute violated must be one that confers a 
fetierar right upon the plaintiff."), 
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We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
that there is an implied right of action directly under these 
statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a con-
gressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, there 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion is 
supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, and 
legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials a.nd private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.25 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 ( d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 ( d), 
and criminal penalties also a.re available, id., at § 309 ( c), 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U.S. C. § 1342 (b)(7) . In addition, if "any interested per-
son" believes that the standards being applied by the EPA 
are themselves violative of the Act, under 33 U. S. C. § 1369 
(b) he may seek judicial review in the United States Courts 
of Appeals of various particular actions by the Administra-
tor, including establishment of effluent standards and issu-
ance of permits for discharge of pollutants. Where review 
could have been obtained under this provision, the action at 
issue may not be challenged in any subsequent civil or crim~ 
inal proceeding for enforcement. Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,26 are supplemented by the 
25 The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take act ion before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
26 The MPRSA provides fo r assessment of civil penalties by the Ad.min-
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e'Kpress citizen-suit provisions in .. § 505 (a) of the ·FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions_ to 
enforce these statutes. 21 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
potice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Trans-
(J,merica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 57-1~574; In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it ·held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-. . 
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleg~d violation, 
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties , id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f). · · 
27 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, also 
may be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First, 
the language of the savings clause on which the Court of 
Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous concern-
ing the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under the 
FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-
suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person ... 
may have under any statute or common "law to see en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained. 28 
28 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other ·1aw. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em~ 
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to ''effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law 
of nuisance. 
19- 1711 , 19--1754, 79-1760, "& 80-12-OPINION 
18 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
Moreover, the reasoning on which .the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws I:!, distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. 
"Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of the 
· FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is 
or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 U. S. C. § 1316 
(g). It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this 
• ·phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-
1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential plain-
tiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries 
are "non-economic" and probably noncompensable, and per-
sons like respondents who assert that they have suffered 
tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that CongTess 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts -apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have_ suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
m.anner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin .vjolations. 
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The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
ls the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
(1975), as relevant to the question of legislative intent. 
This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.29 Since 
29 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971). In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latrer act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for 
example, stated: 
" It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution , and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous 9r harassing suits against indus-
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the structure of the Acts and their legislative 4istory both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem-
edy, 30 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
•, 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factors. 
See Touche Ross & ' Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
576. 31 Where, as here, Congress has dec_ided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary 0r undesirable, the courts -are 
not authorized to ignore ~his legislative judgment.32 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents ' federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive -relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a -pri-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of-Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 ·1975), cert. denied, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976) . . 
30 See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 
604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
3 1 We note, however, that the only other Cort factor·· dealing-directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purposes of the statutory 
scheme-<loes not provide support for respondents' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of c01itrolling ·pollution through administrative chan-
nels, providiJJg litigation remedies only to correct administrative ·abuses 
prospectively. See n. 29, supra. 
3 2 Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the qurstion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this question remains essentially legis-
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning appropria'te 
statutory .remedies. 
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:vate plaintiff, seeking dama.ges. The Court recently has helq 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of watev 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.33 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action u1:1der those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is · so ordered, 
33 Inrleed, as noted supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities lik{l 
petitioners to adjust to the coming change, 
?-~ 
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ity of a tlamages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Researph, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member,. of that organization. · In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New -York,1 New Jersey 2 
. and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint· alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into Ne_w York Harbor and the Hudson 
River by some of the respondents. In ·addition it complained 
of the dumping of such ma,terials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint ·alleged that, as a result of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation ; Ogden R. Reid, indi\-idually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities ; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the City of Glen Cove . 
~ The New J ersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Commis-
t!ioner of that Department ; the Bergen County · Sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex arid Union Counties ; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority ; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Ru&>ell E Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army 
e orps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, ·individually _and as Secre-
. ta~ or the Army. 
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$aid to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents· 
sought inj'unctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to' 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
clischarges of sewage and "covered · an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging · 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island; New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this mas:,ive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and · about tlie 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in tlie death and ' 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life,. particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and · other marine , 
life unable to escape the blighted area."' Brief for Respondents 4; 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law; § 13 of the Rivers and · Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pende,it state-law cla~ 
was without prejudice, 
' ' 
' 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed - to 
comply with the 60-day notice require~ent of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) ( 1) 
(A). This proyision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective· relief, and the · citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. Ibid.9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: _ 
" (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
tnay commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (I) against any persol:) (including (i) the United State:,, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is ,!lleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a stand11,rd or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. . 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without .regard to the-amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
.rtandard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the ·Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any.appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 ( d) of this title. 
" (b) No action may be commenced-
" (l) under subsection (a) (1) of t~is section-
"(A) prior to sixty days . after the plaintiff has given- notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in -which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and iff uiligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
hut in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene a:, a matter of right. 
" (2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after-
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator; except 
that such act10n may be brought immediately after-such notificatioff in the 
case of an action under this section respecting 1 a violaticm of sections: 
1-0- 1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
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not give the requisite notice, the court ref used to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based ion the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1~1.1° 'The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains · similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation:" 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., 505 (c)(2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c) (2). 
See n. S, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code, 
1o In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including reiief against the Administrator or a State agency).'; 33' 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) (1) Except ru; provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality' 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subcha1r. 
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard · to the 
smount iii controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced.:_ 
"(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged · violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"fij) ti the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosec'Ut-
' '· 
\ 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal' and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Thi.rd Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisanc~, arid maritime tort; 616 
F; 2d 1222 (1980) . With respect, to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) (A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specinc "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (-e.), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, crit_erion, or permit; or 
" (C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose -a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; or if the l\dministrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section ; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C: § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1415 (3)(B) . 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency) ." ld., at § 1415 (g)(5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59 :1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to to~ .'suits in. ff1eral c.o,urt. These questions are not, however, withln. 
the 8ct>pe of the questions -on which review .~as granted, 
' ~ I 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce .. 
ment of any effiuent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226--1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal · courts 
to entertain a private cause of actioJ! implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis .. 
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.u 
18 Transamerica Mortgage Advi.sors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity . of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975)._ 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, -the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action is was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents_ The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
down until 1980. Under the MPW,A, 33 U, S. C. § 141:}a (a), the EPA 
C iJ 
r9-1711, r9-1754, 79-1760, & 86-12--0PINION 
8 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
With respect to the federal common law nuisance-claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not , bring such claims. ' It· also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
·sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially, public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
rt th us went considerably beyond Illinois v. -Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective ·relief sought by 
state plaintiff.111 
Petitions for a writ of certi9rari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this C~urt by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-:--1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New JerEey (No. 79.::..1754) , by 
the City and Mayor of New York .(No. 79- 1760) , ahd by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12) .1 6 
We granted these p~titions, limiting review to three ques-
t ions : ct) whether FWPCA and MPRSA iniply a private 
right of act ion independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
whether all federal common faw nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution no_w are pre-empted by the legi"fative ~ 
scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, arid ~ -if 
not, whether a private cit izen has standing to sue for ·dam-
ages under the federal common faw of nuisance. ·we hold 
that there is no implied right of action under theEe statutes 
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents ·had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F. 2d, at 1236. It cl.id not decide whether the Fed.era] Tort 
Claims Act, with its various procedural requfrements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents'· federal-law claims against 
federal cbfendants, 616 F . 2d, at 1237: although it did hold that the Act 
p recluded a "money damage recovery again~t federal agencies based · on · 
state law ," id., at 1236. 
i.o See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-175{ and 80-12 . 
also named the remaining petitioners as respoadents, based ion cross-clain1sr 
uled" in th~ · District Court , 
1; 
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/ AUd that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully 
tie-empted in the area of ocean pollution.17 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, §§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), 
( c), the Amendments created various federal minimum eflhi-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a) .19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
·navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
·or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10) , (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971) . 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma--
~ 
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ing of material transported from outside the Unit~ States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, " to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the t~rrifi?ry of the United States." ' 1 d., 
§ 1411 (b) . 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that -the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the Ne~ J:ersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits.~· The 
question before ~s is whether respondents ~ay raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action ~ 
\, 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly . ..ac." The --
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature:- Univer-
s-ities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. -, - (1981); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, lnc.· v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 , 
15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co . ·v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statutory lan-
guage, particularly _  to the provisions made therein for en-
forcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history 
a11d other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to _de-
termine congressional intent. 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, -i,d, §.1413. 
In recent years, the 4uestion has arisen •with increased frequency. 
'-~ • See Cannon v, University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979}>.' 






~1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
MIDDLF$EX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 11 
A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a private suit for damages under_ either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA. :w-- We 'therefore normall;y- would 
proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however, there is here an alternat1ve source of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingiy, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalt~ies and sewerage poar2s amo~g 
the petitioners 'uiiaer the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this eetting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot bec~use it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute ha.if 
_,_-,.;JIJ The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at · 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of pri~ate d~mages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
/ These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. · 
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been violated under color of state law, causing an ·injury, 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to ,_the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in t4e enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kin<l that created enforceable 
"rights" under§ 1983. Id., at-. Both of these exceptions 
are applicable to the present case. 
When the remediai devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to pre-empt the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. H ous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n-. 2 
(1979) ( dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
to have violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." '11.11'"";\s discussed- in]ro, at - , the 
FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it cre-
ated so many specific statutory remedies including the two 
citizen-suit provisions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. 
Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 '" {ED 
Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reason-
ing based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided 
and the federalism concerns raised). 
.------.i See also Meyerson v. Arizoria, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., at -, -
F. Supp. -, - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) (" [T]he remedial provision of 
§ 1983 canno!, be used to circumvent the remedial ·provisions of the Reve--
"'- '' nue Shati~· Act."). 
~3 
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We need not, however, rest our decision solely on a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have intended in enacting 
these statutes. Section 1983 does not, by its own terms, ap-
ply here. It authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under 
color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
·secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities/' af! it applies to claims 
based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot 
did not authorize suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases 
in which a citizen has been injured by federal statutory vio-
lation under color of state law. Rather, we must distinguish 
between two distinct examples of statutory violations · by 
state officials. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual benefits administered by state officials, or imposes 
a duty on the State to respect the rights of a particular class 
of citizens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" on which § 1983 suits may be premised. 
· Where, on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the 
conduct of the States or their officials without creating en-
titlements for particular individuals or promoting the inter-
. ests of a specific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statu-
tory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" 
of individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts; it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. · The purpose of Congress was to protect 
1 individual · hts not to authorize private suits by ~ a 
c1t1ze ffected by violations of..ali"(federal regulatory stat- -
utes under color of state law. · · The present case is an exiiifi: 
ple of the- need for some limiting principle. · The FWPCA 
and the MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipali-
ties Jn the ·water pollution, fl!'eit :in __ orqer :to be~~fit the ·'.N°f1.-
C,r<' ~ ...,_c\... .(\i..,. 
~ \:12;,t, or;_,". 
- r:_ • .r .rlv.~ \.s. 
'(J\ \ '(\.. (}\ \ \J ' 
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ion as a Aole.~ While it is t rue that respondents as 
shermen and clammers have a si ificant economic stake 
n proper enforcement of these cts, 'their interest_ is not com-
parable to that of a Social Security recipient denied author-
ized benefits by an act of a ·,state administrator: Such a 
recipient is deprived of a ' federal ";'""statutory 11nghtCT R~ 
spondents, by contrast, mereiy ailege an injury resultin~m 
l!__violation of. an essentially reguiatory statutory scheme.111 ...i 
® 
@ 
We conclude that § 1983 does not provide a right oCactiori 
to respondents und~r the FWPCA and the MPRSA. 
@ ~ Congress was concerned about the fishing industry. in these Acts, but this was only one elemen,t of a larger effort to maintain water qual.ity ~ the benefit of all citizens. · See FWPCA § 101, 3~ U. S. C. § 1251 ;_ __t:.-
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not me;inhL 
creat~ "rights" in the same sense½s it does in statutes that~,c;;; 
particular classes of citiz~ specific benefitCt. ____ _ 
~ he Court of Appeals for _ the E_ighth Circuit recently drew this sam~ 
tlistinction. In First National. Bank of Ornah_a v. Marquette National 
Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F-. 2d i95 (1980), cert. denied, - U. S. -
(1981) , involving a claimed violation of federal banking statutes under 
color of state law, the court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, ii; not in the ilature of the rights protected by the Civil 
hights Act. . . . The Supreme Court dedsion in Thiboutot makes clear 
that section 1983 does protect rights established by statutes enacted pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by-sec-
tion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program, These rights .. . represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected bf the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to -the -National 
Bank Act are qualitatively different and not within the contemplation· of 
section 1983." Id., at 198 . 
. See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, - F. Supp., at - ("In order to 
have an action under § 1983, it is not enough to establish the violation of 
a federal statute. Rather, the ,,tatute violated mu:;t be one that confers a 
fi-tlerar righl J.ll)Oll the plaintiff,"). 




~~Jw ft - · ~ · ~/LJ 
(e.g., the Social Security Act or the Voting Rights Act). 
The fact that Congress provided expressly for 
"citizen!'uits" under the FWPCA and the MPRSA does not 
contradict this view of the statute. These suits were 
authorized in order to supplement the enforcement efforts of 
EPA and made available to any "private attorney general" 
could satisfy minimal standing requirements. Seep. 18, 
who 
ib ~ r:.,"- , 
4 P' 
They were not intended to vindicate the statutory rights of a 
particular, benefited class. 
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We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
that there is an implied right of action directly under these 
statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a con-
gressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, there 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion is 
supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, and 
legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits~. --'l /' 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.'"" He may seek acivil "peiialty o CT \o 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 (c), 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
~ .. ~¢+~J 
Q;<S~ 'O 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
Jual penal.ties or other means of_ ~nfor?ement . . Id., § 402, 33 ____)L_ 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7) . In add1t10n, if "a,ny 1nte~it~8 pet _ ____ _ 
~Yeo W~l•li•_• uf ~-~ unde~3 u. S. C.J 1369 6 5 Ma;;; i1-b'efie ves blurt the sta,ntltt110s ~sing-a • lied-h¥- the- EP.A• 
~ v(b )!f may seek Jud1mal review m the Umted States Courts 
~ Appeals of various particular actions by the Administra-
tor, focluding establishment of effluent standards and issu-
ance of permits for discharge o~ollutants.~Where review 
could have been obtained under[ this provision, the action at 
issue ma,y not be challenged in any subsequent civil or crim• 
inal proceeding for enforcement. Id., at § 1369 (b) (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,~e supplemented by the 
~ The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
( ',,)- V-.__. ta __ k€e__.a""~ion before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1) . 
~ The MPRSA prorid~ :•r .'"':~~-~ivil pendties by the ~dmln-
~ ~w-v-~{ ~ c; r , ir \) 
i]f ~,? 't':,t. ', $ 0~ {}-te Of<uv\ fo [o.].-. / f H<; '.'') 
\" {()V I?.\ !Jo • q ;}-_1-Wf) (i) , is- (lq ~J.\ Q}v-cl. ttw 5 r"": ~:"-"~ • 
S. ~ ,.1 ,.:11 • \ f:::J,oc.~&u.,\/'e 10 l\e><,voJe ~.\i-o,fl.V,~ ~ (.)._ \\ Q-.0..0\,I +1 !Tf\~ ~- 4- \J , ' . 't 
~ • t- . {-utce ~ ~c ' J t;, IJ.I)()\~~ w\ ~ c.1 t, 1 - . ~v.1 s 
£..Q..e,r-1 ~ ~ QJ~- r ,.... / , ~ 'h ~ >1- ' eJo ! l..aw ~7-88 . ~ . .".~ "'~ tJ , ... ' I... 0~ , :>e·t \N.. "O~l\<'f ~ . t-" 11\ V 1'fO'V\ f1t • r ,,.., .. \ 
@ 
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~press citizen-suit provisions· in ,§ 505 (a) of -the ·-·'.FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn,:,9, 11 , supra. These citizen-~uit 
provisions authorize private persons 'to sue for injunctions_ to 
tmt"orce these statut?. Plaintiffs invoking these provis1ons 
first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' _prior 
potice to potential defendants. _ 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Trans-
(1,merica Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See-also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 57-1~574. In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals a.voided this infer-
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it beld that· tlie existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) c,:Ioes not r11.le out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrive~ 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "privat~ at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
"A priv~te party who is injured by the_ alleg~d vi_olation, 
istrator, 33 U. S. C._ § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
@)::
ensions or revocations, id.,§ 1415 (f) . · · · · · 
Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to t he government, also 
y be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1~65 (a). · · 
3D 
?JD 
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as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to ·be brought by these parties;" 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) ( emphasis added . 
~ There are at least lito problems with this reasoning. First, 
the language of the sa.vings clause on which the Court of 
Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous concern-
ing the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under the 
FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-
suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person ... 
may have under any statute or common 'law to see en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat~ 
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
-~ 
~ In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
/ ~1-th respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other ·1aw. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not ·be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages;" S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
·see also S. Rep. No. 92--451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common ·1aw"). 
It might ·be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are ·unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to 1'effiuent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under the com~on law 
of nuisance. 
'f''D ~ 
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1\foreover, the reasoning on which ,the Court of Appeals 
relied is fl.awed for another reason. It · draws. ~ distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tifl's in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some aort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
Iured" plaintiffs.) 
< "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of the 
· FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is 
or m~y be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 U. S. C. § 1316 
(g). It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this 
-phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons 
possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-
\ 
1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential plain-
tiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce 
/ these statutes as private attorneys .general, whose injuries 
: are "non-economic" and probably noncompensable, and per-
1 sons like respondents who assert that they have suffered 
_ 1.J!t,ngi~ economic injuries because of statutory violations . 
..,.-..::::: The Court of Appeals also- applied its reasoning to the 
<fl F,·Vto. 11:y) ~ 
uv__t<\ ue. ~f fo.l~ 
~ <:A,
1 
!eel tD ~k~ 
a C-LOllMt 0~ ~ 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart- from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The r·elevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have. suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek-to enjoin :vJ?lations. 
r est o-f i-M-
~~rc.e~ 
~~e eJifr~"~(1 __ _ , . 
pr-ov,o{ec{ f.o ~ ~(e~~- - i\A-c.l~i,~ tk offor+u..¾,~ {~r 
ff~ \ ~+€Jfe5f~J ~sen'\ ti s~~ k j ~1·c ;o./ y-eviet,v 
0~ ~- V\'-A 'M loer Df f? Pf\ ~~l, 6"' => w, th,,~ q o d.°i:J 
~ ~ oq (l0, ?:. '3 u., ,;, <'.. ~ l 3 ,q ( t,), )ee. ~ , IS"-lb) !>"(rf'O.. , 
~----
'3 I 
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The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
ls the legislative history, which was one of. the four factors 
identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
(1975), as relevant ~ t,he question of legislative intent. 
This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.lMI"""" Since 
,_--- The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P. 23 (1971) ; S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) . In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971) . And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for 
example, stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970) . 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages : 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
t ively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970) . 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus .. 
3/ 
• 
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the structure of the Acts and their legislative Qistory both 
f\ Eoint toward an absence of intent to create an implie'd rem~ 
~ d'- - edy~ we need not look .further to less impor~ant indicia ·of 
legislative intent, such as the remaining three Cort factors. 
, See Touche Ross & ' Co. · v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
n 2 ~ Where, as here, Co?gress has deQided that a · separate 
::;:>.) · private remedy is unnecessary 8r undesii:able, the courts •are 




The remaining two issues on which .:we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents ' federal claims based on the federal 
commonJaw of nuisance. The prin_cipal precedent on which 
these cl;ims were based is Illitwis v. Mil~aukee, 406 U . . S. n 
(1972) , where the Court found that the federal courts have, 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive -relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a -pri-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of-Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 j975), cert. denied, 424 
u. s. 927 (1976) . _ 
/2 ~ ~ See generally City of Evan.sville_ v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc ., 
, -::> 604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 l979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
~ 
We note, however, that the only other Cort factor dealing-directly 
a h congressional intent-the underlying purposes of the statutory 
V eme--does not provide support for respondents' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling ·pollutiori through ·administrative chan-
nels, providi!}g litigation remedies only to correct administrative ·abuses 
prbspecfavely. See n.-,., supra. 
.- Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the qufstion 
whether to provide such a remedy, this question remains essentially le-gis-
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning appro-pria'te 
· statutory :remedies. 
3f 
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/ 
yate plaintiff, seeking damages. The Cour~ll!!ily hasl helq 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of wateIJ 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in fllinoi,s v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinoi,s , - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. 'To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. 'The reguiatoty 
cheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.----
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the cast\ 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is : 80 orderedt 
Indeed, a,; noted S'upra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
·sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
'petitioners to adjust to the coming change. 
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thority et al., Petitioners, 
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National Sea Clammers Association 
et al. 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union 
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79-1754 v. 
National Sea Clammers Association 
et al. 
City of New York et al., 
Petitioners, 
70-1760 v. 
National Sea Clammers Association 
et al. 
Environmental Protection Agency 
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80-12 v. 
National Sea Clammers Association 
et al. 
On Writs of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. 
[April - , 1981] 
J USTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu~ 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individua.I member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge,'' and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudson 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a result of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, indiYidually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York; the West Long Beach Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities; the City of Long 
Beach; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection; David J. Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the Bergen County Sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The fed2ral defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army 
Corps of Engineers ; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secre,-
ta~y of the Anny, 
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said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, -New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea;'' Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents; Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area:'' Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq. ; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fift.11, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent stat&-law claim'!; 
wae :without prejudice. 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
~omply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
1mit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
eitizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. lbid.9 Because respondents did 
-----
• Section 505 provides, in part: 
" (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (I) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
1tandard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
"(1) under subsection (a) (1) of this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
.alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
" (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right . 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior. to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the-
·case- of an action under this section respecting a violation of section!!: 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictionai 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.10 The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents; ciaims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation:'' 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 31, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
1o In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 (e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) (I) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
·"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecmt-
10--1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). · With respect to the FWPCA; the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60:day notice provision 
in§ 505 (b)(l)(A), 33· u. S. c, ·§1.365 (b)(l)(A), -does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. 'It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 ( e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is ·diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter·." 33 U. S: -C. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1415 (3) (B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states : 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency) ." Id ., at § 1415 (g)(5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N:·Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and · the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not , ·however, within 
' the scope of the questions on which review was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) . . 
:rp.ay have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard. or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in· 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,1 3 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act,' 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F . 2d, at 1230--1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
:piissing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
1 3 Transamerica Mortgage Advi-sors, Inc . v. Lewi,s, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975) . . 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated : · 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain~ 
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
c;lamages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concludeq 
.that the statutory rights of action is was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
,too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handeq 
t~w.n \mt~I !98?. Under t he MPRSA, 33 U.' S. C.' ! }4l~a (a;, the EPf 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New Jerrny (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
aU of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12).16 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuirnnce actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now sre pre-empted by the bgisla.-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 
damager. under the federal common law of nuisance. We 
hold that there is no implied right of action under these stat-
1s required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F. 2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents,. federal-law claims against 
federal defendants , 616 F. 2d, at 1237, although it did. hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against fed·eral agencies based on 
state law," id., at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and· 80--12' 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based· oll' cross-claims 
tiled in the District Court, 
?9-1711, 19-17541 -'79-1760, & 80-12~0PINION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS ·9 
utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution,17 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pa~sed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
Californi.a ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 2'.)4 ( !976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, §§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U.S. C. §§ 1342 (b), 
( c), the Amendments created various federal minimum efflu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
'States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 · In addition; it requires a permit for the dump-
1 7 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com• 
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a -suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362-(7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
'or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the 'high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p: 75 (1971). 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmenta1 
Protection 'Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged .ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the United State's 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
·gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to a.liege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. ·The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly. 20 The 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Univer-
sities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. -, - (1981); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 , 
15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 
068 ( 1979). We look first, of course, to the statutory lan-
guage, particularly to the provisions made therein for en-
forcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history 
and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to de-
termine congressional intent. 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit · issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, id ., § 1413. 
20 In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency . 
See Carmon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979) 
(Powell, J., di~enting). 
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A 
In the present case there is no specific statutory provision 
authorizing a private suit for damages under either the 
FWPCA or the MPRSA. 21 We therefore normally would 
proceed directly to the question whether an implied private 
cause of action nevertheless may be inferred. Arguably, 
however, there is here an alternative source of express con-
gressional authorization, not suggested by the parties. Last 
Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the 
Court construed 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to 
redress violations by state officials of rights created by fed-
eral statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respond-
ents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among 
the petitioners 2~ under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue 
of a right of action created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
n The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
22 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
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been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutQry violations. - In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v.. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981) , we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and · (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id., at-. · Both of these .exceptions 
are applicable to the present case. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive,· they may suffice to demon-
1,trate congressional intent to pre-empt the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined · the 
majority in Maine v. ·Thiboutot, stated. in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion) , wiien "a state official is alleged 
to have violated a fedetal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." 23 As discussed infra, at - , the 
FWPCA and MPRSA do ptovide quite comprehensive en-
forcement mechanisms. It is ha.rd to believe that Congress 
intended to preserve the f 1983 right of action when it cre-
ated so many specific statutory remedies including the two 
citizen-suit provisions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. 
Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED' 
Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA 
against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reason-
ing based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided 
and the federalism concerns raised) . 
23 See also Meyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., at -, -
F . Supp. - , - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) (" [T]he remedial · provision of 
§'1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions Qf the Rev~~ 
nue Shat1nt Act.") , 
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We need not, however, rest our decision solely on a judg-
ment as to what Congress must have intended in enacting 
these statutes. Section 1983 does not., by its own terms, ap-
ply here. It authorizes suits to redress a deprivation under 
color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws." Under Maine v. 
Thiboutot the phrase "and laws" includes federal statutes. 
It remains, however, for this Court to define the phrase 
"rights, privileges, or immunities," as it applies to claims 
based on violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot 
did not authorize suits for damages under § 1983 in all cases 
in which a citizen has been injured by federal statutory vio-
lation under color of state law. Rather, we must distinguish 
between two distinct examples of statutory violations by 
state officials. Where a federal law creates an entitlement to 
individual benefits administered by state officials, or imposes 
a duty on the State to respect the rights of a particular class 
of citizens, the statute can be said to create "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities" on which § 1983 suits may be premised. 
Where, on the other hand, federal law simply regulates the 
conduct of the States or their officials without creating en-
titlements for particular individuals or promoting the inter-
ests of a specific class of citizens, it cannot be said that statu-
tory violations infringe the "rights, privileges, or immunities" 
of individual persons within the meaning of this 1871 statute. 
While this line may become blurred in some contexts, it 
is a line drawn by Congress when it enacted the right of 
action of § 1983. The purpose of Congress was to protect 
individual rights, not to authorize private suits by citizens 
affected by violations of every federal regulatory statutea...,__ n 
under color of state law. The present case is an example of -C. 
the need for some limiting principle. The FWPCA and the 
MPRSA impose duties on the States and municipalities in 
the water pollution area in order to benefit the Nation as a 
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whole.24 While it is true that respondents as fishermen and 
clammers have a significant economic stake in proper enforce-
ment of these Acts, their interest is not comparable to that 
of a Social Security recipient denied &.uthorized benefits by 
an act of a state administrator. Such a recipient is deprived 
of a federal statutory "right" created for the benefit of in-
dividuals. Respondents, by contrast, merely allege an injury 
resulting from a violation of an essentially regulatory statu-
tory scheme. 25 
24 Congress was concerned about the fishing industry in these Acts, but 
this was only one element of a larger effort to maintain water quality 
for the benefit of all citizens. See FWPCA § 101, 33 U. S. C. § 1251; 
MPRSA § 2, 33 U. S. C. § 1401. Certainly Congress did not intend to 
create "rights" in t.he same sense as it does in statutes that identify 
particular classes of citizens entitled to specific benefits (e . g, the Social 
Security Act or the Voting Rights Act). 
The fact that Congress provided expressly for "citizen suits" under the 
FWPCA and the MPRSA does not contra.diet this view of the statute. 
These suits were authorized in order to supplement the enforcement efforts 
of EPA and made available to any "private attorney general" who could 
satisfy minimal standing requirements. See p . 18, infra. They were not 
intended to vindicate the statutory rights of a particular, benefited class. 
25 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently drew this same 
distinction. In First National; Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National 
Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F . 2d 195 (1980), cert. denied, - U. S. -
( 1981), involving a claimed violation of federal banking statutes under 
color of state law, the court stated: 
"A bank's ability to charge a certain rate of interest, incidental to a broad 
regulatory scheme, is not in the nature of the rights protected by the Civil 
Rights Act. . . . The Supreme Court decision in Thiboutot makes clear 
that section 1983 does protect rights established by statutes enacted pur-
suant to authority other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion, 
however, does not change the type of statutory rights protected by sec-
tion 1983. Thiboutot involved the rights of individuals pursuant to a 
federally-created welfare program. These rights . .. represent important 
personal rights akin to fundamental rights protected· by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . On the other hand, rights incidental to the National 
Bank Act are qualitatively different and ' not within the contemplation of 
section 1983." Id., at 198. 
See also Meyerson v. Arizona, supra, - F. Supp., at - ("In order to 
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We conclude that § 1983 does not provide a right of action 
to respqndents under the FWPCA and. the MPRSA., 
B 
We turn, therefore, to the decision of the Court of Appeals 
that there is an implied right of action directly under these 
statutes. We find, however, no persuasive evidence of a con-
gressional intent to authorize such an action. Indeed, there 
is substantial evidence to the contrary. This conclusion is 
supported by the structure of the statutes, their purpose, and 
legislative history. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.26 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d) , 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 ( c) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c) . Sta.tes desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b) (7). In addition, under § 509 (b) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1369 (b ) "any interested person" may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator, including establishment 
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of 
pollutants.27 Where review could have been obtained under 
have an action under § 1983, it is not enough to establish the violation of 
it federal statute. Rather, the statute violated must be one that confers a 
federal right upon the plaintiff."). 
26 The Administrator is authorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a ) (1) . 
27 This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provision 
of§ 509 are open to "[a] ny person:' S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 85 (1972), and ( 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.· 
Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). . 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA, 28 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) , and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g) . See nn. 9, 11 , supra. ·These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes?9 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specified procedures-:-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' -prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 571-574. In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the existence 
thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seek- ( 
ing to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505. 
See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 87-88 (1!}77) . 
28 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a ) , criminal penalt ies, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 ( d) , and permit 
suspensions or revocat ions, id., § 1415 (f). 
29 Under the F WPCA, civil penalt ies, payable to the government, also 
may be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U'. S. -C. § 13,65 (a ). 
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of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public'; 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
' on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation; 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, · has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e) , 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to. be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 ( footnotes omitted) ( emphasis added). 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to see 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute· in which this statement was 
contained.30 
so In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not' be a . defense -to a comn:ton 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for a.nother reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen~ defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supers·ede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitat ions, or to "effluent 
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-rest of the enforcement scheme expressly provided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b). See pp. 15-16, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
The other major source for discovering legislative intent 
is the legislative history, which was one of the four factors 
identified by this Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 
(1975), as relevant to the question of legislative intent. 
This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with re-
spect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the re-
ports and debates provide affirmative support for the view 
that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen 
suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.31 Since 
3 1 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) . In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 ( 1971) . And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for 
example, stated : 
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on t he 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
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the structure of the Acts and their legislative history both 
point toward an absence of intent to create an implied rem~ 
edy,32 we need not look further to less important indicia of 
legislative intent, such as the remafoing three Cort factors. 
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 
576.33 Where, as here, Congress has decided that a separate 
private remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.34 
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland· 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976). 
32 See generally City of E vansville v. K entucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 
604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1025 (1980). 
33 We note, however, that the only other Cort factor dealing directly 
with congressional intent-the underlying purposes of the statutory-
scheme--does not provide support for respondents' argument. Congress 
manifested a purpose of controlling pollution through administrative chan-
nels, providing litigation remedies only to correct administrative abuses 
prospectively. See n . 31, supra. 
34 Even if one assumes that Congress did not consider the question 
wlietbet to provide such a remedy, this question remains essentially legiS'-" 
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III 
The remammg two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federai 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federai courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federai common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illlnois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and pubiic sewera.ge com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance 111 the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean wa.ters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re• 
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the· 
FWPCA.35 
lative, and our decisions have made clear that courts should not assume 
the legislative role of making policy judgments concerning appropriate 
statutory remedies. 
35 Indeed, as noted supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to ' allow entities like 
peti-Honers to adjust to the coming. change. 
. ,-
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We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered, 
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J trsTICE Pov,ELL deli verf'd th e opinion of the Court. 
Tu this case, in volving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
raused by discharges and ocean clumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questious concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu .. 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA) , 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq, 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. · In rnn, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New· Jersey against petitioners-vario1·s govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint -alleged· that 
sewa.ge, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Rude-on 
River by some of the respondents.· In ·addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials d:rectly into th ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged -that, as a res· It of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was · becoming polhited 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation ; Ogden R. Reid, indi, idually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the City of New York ; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District ; the County 
of Westchester Depa.rtment of Environmental Facili"lies ; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the Chy of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Comm:s-
s1oner of that Department ; the Bergen County Sewer Autho~ity; t he 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties ; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority ; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority ; arid the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The fecbral defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency ; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
Corps of Engineers ; and Martin -R. Hoffman,. individually arid ·as Serre-
'lafy of t he Arfny. 
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said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this_ pollution was causing the "collapse of the, fishing; clam-
ming. and lobster indt:stries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,0 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, ·$250 m]l:on in 
compwsatory damages. and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal rommon law. see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by tl1e 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ra11ging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape M::iy, New Jersey, and extending· 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
135, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the orean fl -,or, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or o>..')'gen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, parti<'lllarly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint 13!), App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA ; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 : the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
~ 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes ; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq .; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law clallll16, 
\llaS. -without prf:ludi~ , 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A) . This provision allows suits under the Act- by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
. zen plaintVis ~rst must give notice to the · EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. 'Ibid.9 Because respondents ·did 
• Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
, may commence a civil action on his owri behalf-
" (I) against any person (including (i) ·the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or ·agency to ·the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to ' the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio~ 
la.tion of (A) a.n effluent standard or· limitation under 'this ·chapter, or 
(B) an order issuecf by ·the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation , or 
"(2) against the Administrator where 'there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
- discretionary with the · Xdministrator. 
"The district courts · shalr have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the ·citizen·ship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an oraer, or to order ihe ·Administrator 
to perform such act or·duty, as·the case may·be, arrd to apply any appro~ 
priate civil penalties under section·1.319 (a) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
" ( 1) under subsection ( a )(1) of ·this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after ·the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to ·the Aaniinistrator, "(ii) to ·the State in which 1:he 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order; or 
" (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of · the United States, 
or a State to require ·compliance with ' the standard, · limitation, -or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter oCright. 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of 'this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to· the Administrator) except 
that such action may' be brought immediately after such notification in the 
1 "(la1,e .of :,an .acfion 7.Under this ,section · respecting a violation of sections: 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to .proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
tJ. S. C. § 1415 (g) .11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.'1 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) , (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2) , 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c) (2) . 
See n. 31, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require.. 
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e) , which 
states : 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency) ." ·33 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e) . 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued ·by or under this stibchap-
ter. The district courts shall ·have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be . 
" (2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
· the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit ; or 
. , (B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United Sta~s Court of Appeals for the· Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the feqeral common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. 616 
F . 2d 1222 (1980). ' With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60..:day notice provision 
in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33· u.· s. C. · § 1365 (b) (1) (-A), ·does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in · § 505. · It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e) , 33 U. S. C. § 1365 ( e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
· with the prohibition, · limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
" (C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection ( f) of this section ~ or 
" (D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the· United States or a State to redress .- a 
violation of this subchapter." ·33 U. ·s. ·c. § 1415 (g) (1), ('2) . 
The United States may intervene· in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C.'P415 (3)(B) . 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause;" which 
states : 
"The injunctive relief provided· by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any o·ther relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency)"." Ia., at ·§' 1415 (g) (5). 
12 See ·zs U. S. C'. §§."1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen . Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59:Fl et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents· had given timely no"tice to one ·defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court · raised questions concerning 
t he applicability of state tort claims acts arid the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within 
- the· scope of ·the _questions on which revlew .was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effiuent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1223; see n. 10, supra. ·The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCAJ, preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms.~' 
616 F . 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979) ; 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) ; Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the-
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief aga1nst federal agencies or officers . Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal ·government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damag~ 
relief. An additional ·indication 1s the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
,down runtil 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a) , the EPA 
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With respect to the federal c6mmon law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not br:ng such claims. 'It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially p,ublic nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a var~ety of argu-. 
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. -79-1711), by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in ·New Jer~ey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this s'li:t (No. so....:12) .16 
vVe granted these petitions, iim'.ting review to three qucs~ 
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MFRSA imply a pr:vate 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuirnnce actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now _are_ pre-emp~ed by the legisla-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a pr:vate citizen has standing to sue for 
df.mrurer. under th federa1 common law of ff irnnce. ·we 
hold that there is no implied rig!~t of action under theEe stat-
is required to end all 02ean dumping of sewage sh;dge by Deeernber 31 , 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered all::gations sufficient 
to make out a c_laim of rn_aritime., tort , ccgni~1bl~ under admiralty juris-
diction . 616 F . 2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its varici'tts proc~dural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq. , apIJlies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal d2fendants , 616 F . 2d, at 1237, although _it did ho!d -that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal ·agencies based' on 
state law," id., at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra . Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79:...1754, ar::d 80:-12 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on croEs -claim~ 
lil!Af in the District Court. 
I' 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pafsed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92- 500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 ( r976) , and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, § § 402 (b) , ( c), 33 U. S. C. § § 1342 (b) , 
(c), the Amendments created various federal minimum efflu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311- 1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92- 532, 86 St.at. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a) .19 In addition , it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges. of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7) , 
( 12) , and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9) , (10), (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
19 Tnese permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma., 
,i,J l1 
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it ma.y affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition,. 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of/ their permits. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either· 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts! 0 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
·out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a fed eral statute without saying so explicit.ly! 1 The 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, id .,§ 1413. 
"' The Court .-,! Appeal,; did ,;lat e that the ,;avings clause in § 505 (t) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parti es un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F. 2d, at 
1227. But 1.he conrt did not conclude that the saviugs clause is itself an 
express authorization of priva te damages ~uits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
iu additi on to tlie explicit, cifizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The eourt 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-actiou analysis before concluding 
that a private sti it for damages is among the pre-existiug remedies pre-
~rrveJ by the savings clause. 
" ln rrcn1t yr,u ::; , the que::;t ion has a ri~eu with int:n•a::;ed frequrncy. 
Sec Cannon ,· . Cniven;z t y of Chicago , 441 l1 . S. 677, 741-742 (J979'J; 
, ( P0well , J ., di':s'en 1 ing). 
•1, 
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key to thP inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas 
!!!:_dustries, Inc. \'. Radcl1fj Materials, Inc., - U. S. --, -
( 1981); California qrra Club, _ _:_ U.S.-, - (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. --, - -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
·u. S. 11. 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S . 5t30. 568 (1979). We look first. of course, to the statu-
tory language, p.<J.rticularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional inte11t. 
These Acts contain unusually elab9rate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWFCA. for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
~ 309. 33 U. S. C. s 1;3H.J.22 He may :ceek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 ( d). 33 U . S. C. ~ 1319 (d). 
and criminal penalties also are available. id., at§ 309 (c). 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their llwn 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7) . In addition , under § 509 (b), 33 
TT. S. C. § 1360 (b) "any int8rested person ·· may seek judicial 
t·l'view in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator. including establishment 
of Pffillettt stand::irds ·and issuanC'e (1f permits for discharge of 
pollutants.23 \ 1/here review could have been obtained undt:>r 
"The Admin i.,; trntor i:s allthorized to give the State,; au opportunity to 
t,1ke artion before doing so himself. 33 U. S . C . § 1319 (a) (1) . 
·, ., Thi~ rt!view must L:· ,;o nght within 90 day1- . Thf• reviPw provi.,i :m~ 
0f § 509 a re open tn "ra ]ny person." S. Rep. No . 92-414 , p 85 (197'..:!), and 
1hu:;;. p rovide an additional lJl"OCPdure to " privatP attorneys general" seek -
ing to Pnfurrp the Aci, supplementing the citizen Htits authorized in§ 505, 
'3••(• W. Rodgers, En\"ironmental Law 87--Ri;: (1977). 
\ 
0 'fi-, '> ~:, tr.A 
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thjs provision, the action at issue may not be challenged ·in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. 
Id., at § 1369 (b) (2) . 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), arid § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. · These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.2~ Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
· first m~st comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ertts here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
· notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize · by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
· suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in ·Trans-
,. america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
·· of statutory construction that where a sta.tute expressly pro-
vides a pa.rticular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." · ;,i44·-u. S., at 19. See also· Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at ·571-574. · In 
the absence of strong i:ndicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that .Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the -FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision iri § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act.· It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d) , and permit 
suspern,ions or revocations, id., '§1415 (f) . 
2~ Under the FWI>CA, civil penalties, vayable to the government, l}lso, 
' may be ordered by the court. §"505 (a) , 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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~ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "privaJte at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public,,., 
~uing to promote the gen-era1 welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. '61'6 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
'"A private pal'ty who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they wel'e, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 3'3 U . S. C. § 1365 
(e) , and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial · Code, 28 1J. S. C. § 1331 (1976) . Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties.'' 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) . 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "sha.Il restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.28 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis- added). 
Soo ,also S. Rep. No. 92-45!, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain~ 
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured'' plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate ·Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by ·Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972) . See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" an:d probably noncom-
pensable, and persons· like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly p:,-ovided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
{the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law") . 
It might be argued that' the ·phrase "any effiuent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 {e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations,. or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under ,the common law· 
, of -nuisance. · · · 
1
..,._pf,eJ f.,,,11vlt 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, §509 (b) , 33 U.S. C. §1369(b). See pp. 15-16, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
e'dies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persu~ded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner ·11 which )rivate citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
11 Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (HJ75, _ :'f:W'Court iden-
tifieJ sever~ factors that •m~ nt to the ques-
.,,. ' ' ~ 1-tr. These include the legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there a11y indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one ?" ) . This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed. the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
~ view that Congress intended the limitatio11s imposed on 
citizen suits tu apply t,o all private rnits under these acts."7 
27 T he Sen:1 te Hepurt ,; 011 Loth Act:; plaeed pa rti cula r emphasis 011 the 
limit ed na ture of th e citizPn suits b eing a uthorized . S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
I'. 23 (1971) ; S. Hep . No. 92- 414, p . 81 (1971) . In addition, the citizen-
.0uit proYi'sio n of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parall el pro-
vision of the CIPar Air Act , 42 U.S. C. § 7604. Sep S. R ep , No. 92-414, 
p . 79 (1 971 ) . Aud the legislat ive history of the lat ter act cont ains ex-
pli r 1t ind icati ons that p rivate enforcement suits were int ended to b e 
limit ed to the in juneti\·e relief expressly provided fo r. Sena tor H a rt , for 
,,xample, sta ted : 
" It ha:s b een argued . however, that con ferring additional right s on the 
"irizen may burde n t he courts unduly . [ would argue tha t the citizen 
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sequence from ansmg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
Jllakes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
po incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of.those 
r;uing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
prdinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under .thifl 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
,suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would haYe 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fin e~ 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes ·damage actions." · 116 Cong . 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
· ~f damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against i11dus-
.. tries and government ·agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train , 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975) , cert . denied, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976) . 
• 0 SPe generally Cit -y of Evrmsville v. K ent'U-ck-y Liquid R ec-ycliny, In c., 
60-1 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1025 (1980) . . 
. ,. A~ noted above , Cort v_ Ash, -122 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), provided other 
fa ctor::; i11 par.ticular. cases . may aid in discerniug legislative int ent. 
See California . ·•·erra. Club. 1rupra. In this case, they do not lend 
signifi cant support. to. r ,_ dr 11t:::' argument . First, the .FvVPCA and the 
;,JPH8A imposl' dutie,- with re::tp o water pollutio11. nut for the "e:3peciul 
Lencfit ,'· 422 U. S., at 78, of any group , 1t for the bene.tit of the Nation 
a:; a wh)le. Congre::ts wa :;: concerned about t .tishing · industry, but thi::t 
com·ern was only one elcmf'nt of the large r congre;;;· al purpose of main-
taimng water quality for the benefit of all. Nor would a · nplied remedy 
be ' 'eonsi;;tent with r he underlying purpose,; of the legislat1 ·chemc ': 
lbicl . Congres::: int end.-d to control pollutiou through adminis . ive 
el1ann<'b , authorizing explicit judicial remedif'::t where it ,;aw a nc-ed to co 
i·ert ,\Jrni1\i~t rativf' . .1bu,;e~ prospectively. ~ee 11. '27 , S'upra. • .Finally, fl> 
! 
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\-Vhere, as he~e , Congress luLS----rnac:I~r that .a,. se~e pH'").. 
~enredy-1s-1:1-FH1ecessa-r--y-or-undes1rable, the courts are not 
this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a I 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. - (1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly , it could be argued that responden,ts may sue the munici-
palities and sewerage boards among the petitiouers "0 undet 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
1 t is appropria.te to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case · began ·1ong 
before that decision . Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether ·congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law . causing an injury. 
· The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of ~ 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hosp ital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
.,p1>I1dl'11t,-. arguaL!y receivt' some ::;u1Jpor t frum the fact that an iuu.;tftd 
remedy would not lie· a ·' ca U<ie of act1011 . .. t rndit · leg:c 
;f e ... ,~-Jc JJ..i 
law .'· 42:Z !J . S., ,: l 78-in vjor u.f-t..he l'se11t pnva;; ive federal regulation 
uf w:1ter pollution. 111 1t fhi ,- ~i 11glP factor en rrie,: little weight in the face 
,,[. .. , o many l'Orttr:iry rndi catiun~ of legi~lativl' inten t. l'> VV\.l ":;i-$1 ~ 
''" Thes1· petitioner~ appear to fall within tlw category of muuiripal 
go vernmental Pntitiei, st1able as "rwrsons" under our decision in i\fonell v. 
D P/Jrlrtmcn t of ~ocial Services, 4:l6 U. S. 6-'iS (1978). 
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(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) . whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under ~ 1983. Id., at ~- In the present case, ·be-
cause ·we find that Congres~ foreclosed a § 1983 remedy ·under 
these Acts, · we need not reach . -th""e-·second question whether 
\ ' 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude. the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JUSTICE STEWART/ who later joined the 
majority in Maine ·v. Thiboutot, stated in. Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, -441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
( 1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
to have violated a federal statute . which proyides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under ~ 1983." ai As discussed above, the FWPCA 
allCl MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the t\.vo citizen-suit pro-
visions . See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
H'ater Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § 1\)83 actiou under the FWPCA against the Chair-
man of a State Vl'ater Board, with reasoning based 011 the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federal-
i~rn concems raised). We therefore conclude that the exist- I 
e11 ce of these express remedies \!.:ot ~ ernoi1strate_j(tJ1at 
:n Stt' nl~o l'vJe ,,~rson v . Arizmm, Civ. No. S0--715, slip op., at -, -
F. Supp. - , - (Ariz . F eb. 12, 1981) (" [T] be remedial provision of 
§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve--




h1~ev.ded +I) ~ed,.Ie 1v,,,.p/1~d iJ""_;_~f& ~eli.n-~ ~ 
&so To ssr,t ... ra~ .,~..,,.._ed,; 1t..t..f :wPa.,(J ptfe.,,~ 
Ou-4.-~J"-t fc.., ~~ f ltJfJ. $. <!c • ls.11.." 6.-ec!"'I.<!.~ 
'/"I? H.S l'f; ),) (l1f 1) 
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'0id not i11tend to imply-oth-er- remedies- untl-er 
-rn 
lsoi, rechn:I-es-s-1:1i-t-s--based-o-1·~ ~19~l3. ~1 
III 
The remammg two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. · The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972) , where the Court found that the federal courts have 
-jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and ,tJublic sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of se,vage into · Lake Michi-
gan . In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
· action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
vate plaintiffs. seeking damages. The Court has now held 
· that th e federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA. which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaitkee 
v. Ill inois, - U. S. - (1981) . 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean "vaters not covered by the FWPCA, arid 
regulated ui1der the MPRSA, we see no clluse for · different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. · The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.:12 
"2 Indeed, a::, ;1ok<l :s·11.pra , at n. H , tlw uePa11 dumping of :;ewage :sludge 
mu:;t end a ltogether by DeC"ember 31, 1981. T o the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that da te, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sen:;e to allow entities like 
petit1oners to adju:;t to the coming change. 
, .. 
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We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
! t is so ordered. 
J 0, I 11 I ~, I f,1 t 'l, l '& 1 19 Xo: The Chief Justic8 Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
~ 9 1@@J_ 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu .. 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. · In 19-77, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for t~e 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-vario1·s govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint ·alleged-that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudc-on 
River by some of the respondents. · In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials d;rectly into fhe orean from 
maritime vessels. · The complaint alleged that, as a res· lt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was · becoming po1l11ted 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation ; Ogden R. Reid, indi, idually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York; the West Lorg Beach Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities ; the City of Long 
Beach; and the City of Olen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin , individually and as Comm:s-
sioner of that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Autho-ity ; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties ; the Pass:iic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The fed 2ral defendants were the Envir01:mental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
tor'ps of Engineers; a1id Martin . R. Hoffman,. individually a1id · as Serre-
t'ta'i'y of the Army. 
19-1711, 79-17-54, '19-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWE~. AUTJi .. v. SEA CLAMMERS 3 
s~id to have appeared offohore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this. pollution was causing the "collapse of the· fishing; clam-
ming and lobster indL"Stries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
so11ght injunctive and declaratory relief, · $250 m]ron in 
compensatory damages. and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 1 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Comt rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal rommon lnw. see 
Illinois v. Milwauk~e, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewnge and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ra11 ging 
from approximately the southwest pcrtion of Long Island, New York to 
n point approximately due east of Cape M1y, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to se1," Complaint 
135, App. 25a . Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this m'.lssive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean fl ~or, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean)s floor. Th1s condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amcunt of marine life, parti,.ularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint , 39, App. 26a . 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA ; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq. ; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq .; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey enYironmcntal protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court 's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law clainls, 
was without I?rejudice, 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 50{> of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) (1) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act~ by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintVfs ~rst JnUSt give notice to the · EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. ' lbid.9 Because respondents ·did 
• Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his owri behalf-
" Cl) against any person (including (i) ·the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or 'agency to ·the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to' the Constitution) ,vho is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or· limitation under this ·chapter, or 
(B) an order issuecf by ·the Administra.tor or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where lhere is alleged a failure of -the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
· discretionary with the · Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the ·citizen·sliip of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to otder the Administrator 
to perform such act or·duty, as -the case may ·be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section·1.319 (a) or-this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
" ( 1) under subsection ( a H1) of ·this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after ·the plaintiff has given notice of the 
· alleged violation (i) to ·the Aaministrator, •(ii) to ·the State in which 1:he 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order,· or 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with · the standard, limitation, -or order, 
but in any such action in a court ofthe United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of'right. 
" (2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to · sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to· the Administrator, except 
that such action may" be brought immediately after such notificaiiorr in the 
, -><:a£e .of .. an .acfion ·under this section · respecting a violation of sections: 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation ." 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 31, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e) , which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency) ." 33 
U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit ; or 
"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
i9- 1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the· Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). , With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60..:day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l)(A), 33· U.S. C. ·§ 1365 (b)(l)('A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in ·§ 505. · It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
• with the prohibition, · limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
" (C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section ; or 
" (D) if the United States · has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the ·Unite·d States or a State to redress:a 
violation of this subchapter." ·33 U: S. ·c. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene· in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act . 33 U. S. C.'§'1415 (3)(B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause;" which 
states : 
"The injunctive relief provided· by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common· law to seek enforcemwt of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other reli'ef (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency).'' Ia. , at ·§ 1415 (g)(5). 
12 See ·2s U. S. C §§''1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J. S. A. 59:1.:.1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents' had given timely notice to one deferidant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts arid the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in frderul court . These questions are not ,· however, within 
- the· scope of the _questions on which review was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1223; see n. 10, supra. ·The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,1 3 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms.~' 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as we11 as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
·Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) ; Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979) ; Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal ·government is a separate 
question to which t11e Federa1 Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additfonal indication 1s the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any re1ief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
,down 1until 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a) , the EPA 
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With respect to the federal c~mmon law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not br:ng such claims. 'It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a var:.ety of argu.., 
ments were filed in this Cot1rt by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. ·79-1711), by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New Jer~ey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Ma_yor ~f New York (No. 79-1760) , and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this su'.t (No. so.-:12) .16 
We granted these petitions, iim:ting review to three ques-
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MFRSA imply a prlvate 
right of action independent of their cltizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuirnnce actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-emp_ted by the legisla-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA_ and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a pr:vate citizen has standing to sue for 
df.mR _iref. under th federal _ common law of n· iea.nce. We 
hold that there is no implied rig~-: t of action under them stat-
is required to end all o~ean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered alkgations sufficient 
to mab out a claim of maritime tort , ccgniz1b!e ·under admiralty juris-
. '· , . '· ... · . 
diction. 616 F . 2d, at 1;236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its va rici't1s procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 ct seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal d:,fe1,dants, 616 F. 2d, at 1237, althcugh _it did hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based· on 
sta te law," id., at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra . Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711 , 79-1754, ar:d 80:-12 
also named the remaining petitioners as r2spondents, based on croes -claims 
'filed in the District Court. 
t I 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pafsed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 ( 1976) , and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, § § 402 (b), ( c), 33 U. S. C. § § 1342 (b), 
( c) , the Amendments created various federa.l minimum effiu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92- 532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges. of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9) , (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
i!1-17J t , 70-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 1'.;? miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it ma.y affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition,. 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms oV their permits. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either· 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts/0 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicit,ly!1 The 
terials, which may be dumped under a p ermit issued by the Secreta ry 
of the Army, id., § 1413. 
• 0 The Court . .-,t Appeal,; did sta te tha t the :savings cla u~e in § 505 (e ) 
of the FWPCA " provides an indep endent remedy for injured pa rti es un-
burdened by fhe notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F . 2d, at 
1227. But the con rt did not conclude that the savings clause i:; itself an 
express a uthoriza tion of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause act ed to preserve any e:-.-is ting r ight to enforce the act , 
in additi on to tl1e explicit , citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b ) . The rourt 
went on to a ppl y an implied-right-of-ac tion analysis befo re co ncluding 
tha t a privat e suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
sr rw J by the savings clause. 
21 In recent y<:'an;. the q11 e:;tio11 has a risen with incrPa:;eJ frequ <:' ncy. 
Sec Cannon v. Univen;it y of Chicago, 441 F. S. 677, 741-74'2 ( 1979)! 
•(Powell , J ., d i~enling) . 
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k ey to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. 'l'exa,~ 
Industries, Inc. v. Radslifj Materials, Inc., - U.S.-- , -
(H:l81); California v.1rra Club,_..:_ U. S. - , - (1981); 
Universities Re.search Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. - -, --
( H)81); Tran~samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U . S. 11. 15 ( 1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U . S. 560. 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-. . 
tory language, p~rticularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation t.o 
determine congressional intent. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. ·The FWFCA. for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
~ 309. 33 U.S. C. § 131!:l.22 He may rnek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 ( d), 33 U . S. C. ~ 1;319 ( d) . 
and criminal penalties also are available. id., at§ 309 (c). 33 
U . S. C. § 1319 (c) . States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U . S. C. § 1342 (b)(7) . In addition , under § 509 (b), 33 
TT. S. C'. ~ 1360 (b) "any int2rested person ·· may seek judicial 
rl'vie,v in the rnited States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator, including establishment 
of Pffit1e11t stirndRrds and issuanC'e of permits for discharge of 
pol luta11ts. 23 \Vhere revie,v could have been obtailled undrr 
·,2 The Admini~tra tor i,; al!thorizerl t o givt> tht Statt>~ au oppcriunity fl, 
1akc artio11 before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C . § 1319 (a)(l) . 
"" This revirw must Lt· ~ought within 90 day;. . Tht-- rt'vi ew provi~bn~ 
0f § 509 are open tn " ra lny person,'' S. TI. ep . :'\o 9:2-4 1-1 , p 85 (1972), and 
thu~ provide an addi tiona l procedure to " private attorneys general'' .;eek-
ing to enforrr U1e A<'t, ~uppl ernl'nting the citi zen ~uit s a uthonze<l in§ 505, 
'3,·r• \\' . Tiodgert-, EnvironmPnt;i] LlW 87 ·-~8 ( 1977). 
\ 
0 'fi., ~~;, tr.Y\ 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged ·in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. 
Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) , and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. · These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce , these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
. notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize · by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
· suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in · Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
·, of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." · ~«-u. S., at 19. See also' Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 571-574. - In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to co11clude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the -FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the· Act. - It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 ( d) , and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., ·§ 1415 (f) . 
~ 5 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, ~!so, 
' may be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 u. s. C. § 1365 (a). 
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'§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "privalte at-
torneys general"-"non-injured membeT[s] of the public")') 
<Suing to promote the general welf aTe rather than to Tedress 
'an injury to their own welfare. 61'6 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
tm to conclude: 
"A private pai·ty who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), '3'3 U. S. C. § 1365 
(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties.'' 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) . 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or cornmon law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.28 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added) . 
See ,also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
'i!l- 1711 , 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clea.r from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by ·Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private a.ttorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly p=-ovided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded· the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that· the ·phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the ·FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under ,the common law· 
• of -nuisance, · · · 
'i'9-17U, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80--12-0PINION 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, §509(b). 33 U.S. C. §1369(b). See pp. 15-16, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
e'clies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U.S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persu~ded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended 'to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner ·n which rivate citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
n Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (Hl75 _ ::rw"Court iden-
tified several other factors that may be re evant to the ques-
tion of legislative intent. These include the legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla-
tive inte11t, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one?"). This history does not lead to a coll trary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
T ndeed , the reports a11d debates provide affirmative support 
for view that Congress intended the limitations imposed on 
citizen suits tu apply t.o all private suits under these acts.'7 
"The Senate Bepurts 011 Lotli Aets plat:ed particular emphasi,; 011 the 
1:mited uaturc of the ritizpn suits b eing authorized. S. Rep. No. !)2----451, 
l' . 23 (1971) ; S. H.ep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) . In addition, the citizen-
~uit proYi'~iun of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act. 42 U. S. C . § 7604. See S . Rep. No. 92-414, 
p . 79 (1971) . And the legislative history of the latter act contaius ex-
plirit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to b e 
limited to the injuncti \·e relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart , fo-r-
example, stated : 
" It has been argued . however, that conferring additional rights on tlw 
r· irizrn may burden the courts unduly [ would argue that the citizelT 
cl.lit provision of S 43.'i8 ha~ been rarefully draftPd to p.n',·en t thi,- r'nn-
z_ I 
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$inee the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 
both poiut toward an absence of intent to create an implied 
remedy/~ the intent question must be considered settled. See 
T,xuche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at 576.2" 
sequence from arising. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
piakes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
po incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of .those 
;ming and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than .the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under thi~ 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec . 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator lVIuskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides· damages and a remedy for recovery of fin es 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under t_he act, and expressly excludes ·damage actions." · 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the _record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
· ~f damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against i11dus-
tries and government ·agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denif'd, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976). 
"" See gem·rally City of Evmisville v. K entucky Liqu.id R ecycling, !rt e., 
604 F . 2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). . 
"'' A6 noted above , Cort v. Ash. 42'2 U.S. 66 1 78 (1975), provided utlwr 
factor:< that in par.ticular, cases .may aid in . di;;ce rning legisla11ve inte11t. 
See California v . .Sierra Clu.b, oU'f!1'll. In thi" case, they do not lf'nd 
,;ignificaut till]JJJOrt to, re:::pondfilt s' argument. Firnt, the .F"\VPCA and the 
l\IPHSA impose dtities .with re~pect to water pollution, nut for the "e~µec ial 
benefit, '' 422 U. S., at 78, of any group. but for the benetit of the 1"atio11 
as a whlle. Congre::;s wa~ concl'rned about the fi shing indu:::try, but this 
t:011eern was. only one elrmPnt of the la rger congressional purpose of main-
taimng water quality for the brnefit of all. Nor would an implied remedy 
Le .'' consisten t with the undnlying purposf':; of tht> legislative scheme·'.' 
.Ibid. Cu11gres:a intenJ(0 d to control pollut1011 through admini:;trative 
eltaJ1J1('ls , a uthoriz ing explicit judicia l remedif';; wbt>re it saw a nC'ed to cor-
i-ert i1Jmi1\i~trativr .1bt1~P, pro"pt' C'l1vcly. SeL' 11 . '27 , ~-upm. Finally, re, 
I 
'rt~- t7!1, 18-1754, 7~J-'1760, & 8t>-12-0PIN10N 
· r-.HDDLESEX CTY. SEWEH. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 11 
'vVhere, as here, Congress has made clear that a separate pri-
vate remedy is unnecessary or undesirable, the courts are not 
~uthorized to ignore this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a I 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly , it could be argued that responde11ts may sue the munici.-
palities and ~ewerage boards among the petitioners ~0 under 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this rntting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or belo:V, ·This case · began ·1ong 
before that decision . Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether ·congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law , causing an irijury. 
The Court . however , has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of ~ 1983 to statutory violations. In Penrihurst 
.State School and Hospital v. Halderman , - · U. S. -
;; p,rnd t:' 11 t:-; a rgua!. ly receivt' :::o me :::tt!JJ)O rt frum the fac t tha t all implied 
n· rnt'd :v· would not bt· a '' ca use of act ion . . . t rnditioually rel t'gat ed to ,;tat c 
l:1 w.' ' 422 U . S ., ,:i 78- in viEw of th e prc"ent pervas ive fed eral rf'gulation 
of wa trr pollution . B11 t thi" ,-ingle fa ctor carri e,- little weight in the fac:c 
., r :-o many contra ry indi cation~ ~>f legislative int ent. l>VV\. t -:,Si b-'Y) 
''" The,;t• petitione r» a1J1Jt'll f' t o fall within tht· ca tegory of municipal 
g-o n irnmenta l entities sirnblc ::is "pt·rsons" under our decision in Monell v. 
[)Ppo.rtment of Social 8eruices, 4;l5 U. S. 6.'iS (J\)78). 
'' I 
.. 
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(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the eI).actment itself, and (ii) . whethe~ the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under ~ 1983. Id., at ~. In the present case, ·be-
cause ""·e find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under 
these Acts, · we need not reach ihe-·second question . whether 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. · 
'When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional inte11t to preclude the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JUSTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine \r. Thiboutot, stated in. Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. _S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion) , when "a state official is alleged 
to have violated a federal statute . which proyides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly u11der § 1983." ai As discussed above, the FWPCA 
aud MPRSA . do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Co11gress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
visions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § l!:)83 action under the FWPCA against the Chair-
man of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the 
comµrehe11sive11ess of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist-
ence of these express remedies not only demonstrates that 
3 1 St't' abo Me,JP.rson v. Ariz01ia. Civ. No. S0--715, slip op., at - , -
F. Supp. - , - (Ariz . F eb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of 
§ 1983 cannot be used to rircumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve-. 
_; nUe Sha ring f ct."). ! 
I 
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-Congress did not intern} to imply other remedies under the I 
Acts, but also precludes suits based on ~ 1983. 
III 
· The remammg two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. · The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
·jurisdiction to consider the federal common law · issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various "\Visconsin municipalities and 1public sewerage com-
rnissons, involving the discharge of se,vage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
· action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
vate plaintiffs. seeking damages. The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA. which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinoi,s v. Milwaukee . See ·Milwaitkee 
v. Illinois , - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon la,v claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
· involves ocean \vaters not covered by the FWPCA, arid 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for · different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. · The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehe11sive, with re-
spect to ocean dumpi11g, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.32 
"2 lndf'ed, as aot t:'d .H1,µra , at n . 14, the uet>a11 dumping of ,;ewage ,; ludgc 
must end altogether by December :n, 1981 . To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sen~e to allow entities like 
petitloners to adju:,t to the coming change. 
.. 
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We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu .. 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. · In 19-77, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for t~-e 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-variors govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint ·alleged· that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Rude-on 
River by some of the respondents. · In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials d;rectly into tJ,,e orean from 
maritime vessels. · The complaint alleged that, as a res· It of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was · becoming polh1ted 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, indiddually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the. City of New York; Abraham Bea me, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Lor.g Beach Sewer District ; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Faciffties ; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Comm:s-
sioner of that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Autho·ity; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Pass1ic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority ; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; arid the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The fecbral defendants were the Enviror.mental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator; the Army-
Corps of Engineers ; aiid Martin -R. Hoffman, . individually arid · as Serre-
·tl;afy of the Army. 
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sjl..id to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this_ pollution was causing the "collapse of the· fishing; clam-
ming and lobster ind t·stries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, · $250 m]Eon in 
comp2nsatory damages. and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 1 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common lnw. see 
Illinois v. Milwauk[;e, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The romplaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ra11ging 
from approximately the southwest pcrtion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape M::iy, New Jersey, a11d extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to se::i," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a. Respondents) Brief in this Court states that when 
"this m'.l o:sive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean fl "oi', 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean)s floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous am:::unt of marine life, partirularly with 
rrspect to the shelilish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint 13{!, App. 26a . 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407: the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C . 
~ 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environment.al statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, t o the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq .; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey endronm~ntal protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law clailli)S, 
was wit hout J?rejudice, 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act· by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs ~rst must give notice to the · EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. ' lbid.9 Because respondents -did 
• Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (I) against any person (including (i) ·the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or ·agency to ·the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to' the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio~ 
lation of (A) an effluent staridard or· limitation under this ·chapter, or 
(B) an order issued by ·the .Administrator or a State with respect t,o such 
a standard or limitation , or 
"(2) against the .Administrator where ·there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
· discretionary with the· Administrator. 
"The district courts · shair have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizen.ship of the patties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to otder the Administrator 
to perform such act or·duty, as -the case may ·be, alfd to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section·1.319 (d) of ·this title. 
" (b) No action mayoe commenced-
" ( 1) under subsection ( a )(1) of ·this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after ·the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to "the Administrator, •(ii) to ·the State in which ihe 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order,· or 
" (B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with -the standard, limitation, -or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
" (2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to · sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to· the Administrator; except 
that such action may' be brought immediately after such notification in the 
'•>ea£e .of can .action ·under this -section · respecting a violation of sections: 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation." 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) , (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2) , 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c) (2). 
See n. 31, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e) , which 
states : 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to see1c any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"{g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
" (2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit ; or 
"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
'i9- 1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPINION 
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the· Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). , With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60..:day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l)(A), 33· U.S. C . . § 1365 (b)(l)C-A), ·does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits" authorized in · § 505. · It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
· with the prohibition," limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a conrt of the ·unite"d States or a State to redress , a 
violation of this sub chapter." ·33 U. ·s. ·c. § 1415 (g) (1), ('2) . 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. §1415 (3)(B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause;" which 
states : 
"The injunctive relief provided· by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person ( or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcem2nt of any standard or ·limitation or to 
seek any other re!Jef (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency)"." Ia., at ·§ 1415 (g) (5). 
12 See '28 U. S. C. §§'"1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. · Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59:1.:..1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely no"tice to one ·defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in t11is Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts arid the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort st1its in federal court . These questions are not,' however, within 
· the· scope of the questions on which rev:iew was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person ( or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1223; see n. 10, supra. ·The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act. 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms.~' 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question , it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979) ; 
Touche Ross & Co . v: Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) ; Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979) ; Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated : 
"Having so held , we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 2S-
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits b:v plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional fodicafion 1s tl1e fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
,down iuntil 1980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a), the EPA. 
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With respect to the federal c@mmon law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not br:ng such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. · 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. M ilwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff .15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a var:ety of argu.., 
ments were filed in this _Cot.:rt by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New Jer.cey (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor ?f New Yo~k (No. 79-1760) , and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this s'Li:t (No. so.:...12) .10 
We granted these petitions, iim:ting review to three qu cs~ 
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MFRSA imply a pr:vate 
right of action independent of their cltizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuirnnce actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now _are_ pre-emp_ted by the legisla-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA_ and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a pr:vate citizen has standing to sue for 
dr.mRfl8$ under fr e federal _ common law of n- irnnce. ·we 
hold that there is no implied rig!-: t of action under them stat-
is required to end all o:ean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offer~d all egations sufficient 
to make out a clnim of maritime tort , ccgniz1b!e ·under admiralty juris-
dictian . 616 F . 2d, at 1236. It did not decitle whether the Federal Tort 
Clain1s Act, with its variot1s proc~dural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal d2fe~dants, 616 F . 2d, at 1237, althcugh _it did ho!d .that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on 
state law," id., at 1236. 
10 See n. 3, supra . Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711 , 79.:...1754, a1~d 80:-12 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on cro,s-claims 
'filed in the District Court. 
I I 
.. 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress paEsed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, §§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), 
( c) , the Amendments created various federal minimum effiu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 St.at. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1411 (a) .19 In addition , it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7) , 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it ma.y affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b) . 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition,. 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts.'0 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
·out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 Th e 
terials, which may b e dumped under a permit issued by the Serretary 
of the Army, id ., § 1413. 
,o The Court ,,! Appe:1 b did ,;late that the :;avings clau:;e in § 505 (el 
of the FWPCA " provides an independent. remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F . 2d, at 
1227. But ,he conrt did not conclude that thP savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suit s. Instead, it held that the 
,,avings cbt1$e acted to presen ·e any existing right to enforce the act , 
in addition to the explicit , citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b) . The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis befo re ~oncluding 
that a private stiit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
l"r rved by th e savings clause. 
"ln rece nt year~. the que:;tion has a ri,;eu with incr;,n ,;ed freqm·n cy. 
See Cannon v Univer::n ty of Chicago , HL l1 . S. 677, 7-H-7 42 (1!:!79} 
,(Pnwell , .J ., di~~euting). 
7~i- li'll. 7\1-17.">4. 79--1760, & 80-12--0PINION 
'\'llDDI. ESF:X CTY. 8EWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 11 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas \ 
Industries, Inc. \'. Rad:J;lifj Materials, Inc ., - U. S. --, -
( l!J81); California v. ik_rra Club, _ __:_ U. S. - , -- (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. --, -
( 1\)81); Tran~~america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
-P. S. 11, 15 ( 1979); To·uche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first. of course, to the statu-
tory language, pHrticularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congre~sional in tent. O ~\ '.:» ~·• tr.r'\ 
These Acts contain unusually elab9tate enforcement pro-
visions. conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. ·The FWFCA. for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
~ 309. 33 U. S. C. ~ 1;319_2 2 He may Eeek a civil penalty of 
up to $ 10.000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U.S. C. ~ 1;319 (d). 
and criminal penalties also are available. id., at § 309 ( c). 33 
U S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id. , § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b) (i)_ In addition , under § 509 (b), 33 
F S. C'. § 1350 (b) "any int'.~rested person·· may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator. including establishment 
c,f pflfoent standHds and issuanf'e (Jf permits for discharge of 
poll11ta11ts.'3 .. Where revie,v could have been obtained undt>r 
• 2 The Admini~trntur i;:; a11thorizerl to givt:· the Statn, au oppcrtunity to 
rake artion beforr. doing ~o himself. 33 U. S . C . § 1319 (a) (1). 
·a:< Thi~ reviPw must b :· ~onght within 90 day~ . Thf• n·viPw provisi:.i11s 
0f § 509 are open to "' ra lny person ," S . R ep. No . 92-414 , p 85 (1972), and 
thus provirle an additional -procrdure to ''private attorneys general'' .;eek-
ing to enfurrr the Art, ,;upplernenting the citizen suits authorized in§ 505, 
'3,-,, W. Tiodgrr:;., Environnwnt,1] Law 87- F;8 (1977). 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged ·in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. 
Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C . . § 1365 (a), arid § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. · These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first m~st comply with specified procedures-which respond-
eil.ts here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
· notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize ·by 
implica.tion additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
· suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in ·Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
' of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." · i144.1J. S. , at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at ·571-574. · In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that .Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the ·FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit ·provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act.· It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a) , criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id ., .§ 1415 (f) . 
25 Under the FvVPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, 1;1lso, 
' may be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 u. s. C. § 1365 (a) . 
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~ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured membeT[s] of the public"' 
~uing to promote the gen-eral welfaTe rather than to Tedress 
~n injury to their own welfare. '61'6 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
'~A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 3'3 U. S. C. § 1365 
(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) . 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "sha.11 restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.26 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause, 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added) . 
See ;also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) 
'19- 1711 , 79-1754, 79-17ts0, & 80--12-OPINION 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain~ 
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by ·Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972) . This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly vovided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
(the citizen-suit prov1s1on does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argu·ed that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the ·FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, . or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under· ,the common law· 
' of -nuisance. · · 
19--1711, 79-1754, 79- 1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b). See pp. 15-16, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
eBies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U.S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner ·n which rivate citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
11 Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (l!:)75 _ ::t:W"Court iden-
tifieJ several ~ factors that .._w-fiJefre evant to the ques-
iv.flie& 
f" i i1Jt 
-- tior~ida@i :o intent, These include e eg1s at1ve his-
I 1 ury. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla-
"e. ""~ct.,ts . 
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny orie ?"). This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed, the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
~ view that Congress intended the limitations imposed on 
citizen suits tu apply t.o a11 private suits under these acts."7 
27 The Sen:,te Heporls or: Loth A.et:; plated particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suit,; b eing authorized. S. Hep. No . !)2-451, 
P. 23 (1971) ; S. Hep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) . In addition, the cit izen-
;:uit pr01·i"sion of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act. 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. R ep . No . 92-414, 
p . 79 (1971) . And the legisla tive his tory of the latter act contains ex-
plir1t indications that private enforcement su its were intended to be 
limited to the injunctil·e relief expressly provided for. Senator H a rt, fo-r 
ex11mplt~, sta ted : 
" It has been argued. howen~r, that conferring additional rights on thf' 
r·itizen may burden the courts unduly . f would argue that the citizen 
cl.lit provision of S 43.58 ha~ been carefully draftPd to prp1·ent thi~ ,-nn-
R._ 
1\...u,,, tk, 
s tv- u. c:h,, < e 
t\cts o.. v..rJ. ftt e i r 
\ e~ islo.t,ve \,.~~to<y 
\,,o& _ (~ ~~ to 
lt)v\a lv--de ~o:t 
~~res~ i ~J 
't¼i" ~r~--r1e 
re t.l ~i e? ( \i\ 
().. Jd. ,- -t,'()"Yt. ft> ~ 
~<f>'(6~,~ f<-,";dd 
45~{ol Lwi- ~ 
1 ~ l,eJ. 
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sequence from ansmg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
µiakes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provjdes 
po incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of .those 
~ing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than .the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, · in 
response to concerns expressed by other Sen~_tors, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate hill, S. 3201, that would haYe 
authorized private suits fo.r damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 pro~ides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under t_he act, and expressly excludes ·damage actions." · 116 Corig. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
~f damages "would encourage. frivolous or harassing suits against i1idus-
tries and government ·agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train , 519 F. 2d 681, 690-69 l (CA7 1975) , cert. deni Pd, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976) . 
~• St>e generally City of Evrcnsville v. K entucky Liquid Rec ycliny, Inc. , 
50'1 F. 2d 1008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) . 
! 
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'Where, as here , Congress has made clear thati a i'olfHII:Qtl!l ~ri 
uat,p retned)' is 11rnecoo0a13 01 andesitable-, the courts are not 





Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a I 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot , 448 U. S. - (1980). the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the munici,-
palities and sewerage boards aniong the petitioners "0 under 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this rntting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or ·below. ·This case began long 
before that decision . Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether ·congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
· The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of ~ 1983 to statutory viola tio11s. In Penrihurst 
.State School and Hospital v. Halderman, -- U. S. 
um rne 1ac t tIHIT an unpue 
n ·nw<!~· \ ' ' ca11se of ac t1011. traditionally relegated to slat 
law .' · 4:2'.2 U.S., ti ik-in view c,;ellt pervasive federal regulat im1 
t1f waler poll11tion. 1311t thi~ , ingle factor c:1 rne,; · ' ·CJ" 11 .in the far 
a I eon1ra rY 1 n, · e11islat' ,, intent. l>V\l\. t C.,4$1 b-Y, 
"" These petiliDner,; ,q1pta r to fall within tlw caft:>gory of municipal 
governmental enti ties stiable ,1s "persons" unde r our decision in Monell v. 
DPpurtment of Social Services. 436 U. S. 658 ( 1978). 
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(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and . (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § i983. Id., at ~. In the present case, -be-
cause we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under 
these Acts, · we need not reach 
1
ihe--second qtlestion , whether 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude_ the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, / who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in_ Chapman v_. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
( 1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state offic;ial is alleged 
to have violated a federal statute . which proyides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." ai As discussed above, the FWPCA 
and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
visions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecti11g a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chair-
rna11 of a State \\Tater Board, with reasoni11g based on the 
cornprehe11sive11ess of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist- I 
e11ce of these express remeuiesQ.ot on::!25 dernonstrate~ that 
31 S t-l' al~o Me )fP.rsun v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., at -, -
F. Supp. - , - (Ariz . Feb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of 
~ 1983 cannot be us~ to r:ircumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve--
;nue Sharing Act."). · · 
• I 
i "'--k. ~cJ..e.tt 
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r e-w.. t,J ~ 
~'-'.<le>c ~ 
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~ D+~v--wi~ ~el ~ <A-vr,.;lo.ldle 
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III 
The remammg two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. · The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v . .Milwaukee, 406 -u. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge 'of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
· action may be brought under federal common law by a pi-i-
vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
po1Iution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA. which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in · Illinois v . .Milwaukee. See -.Milwailkee 
v. Illinois, - · U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of rcsporidents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA. arid 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for · different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. · The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less compreheusive, with re-
spect to ocean durnping, than are analogo us provisions of the 
FWPC:A. 32 
3 2 IndePd, as ;rnti:d snµra . a t n . 1-1 , the ul'Pa ll dumping of :;ewage ~Judge 
mu~t end a ltogether by Dec-ember 81, 1981. To the ext ent that Congress 
a llowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sen~e to allow entities like 
petitioners to adju~t to the coming change. 
I 
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We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
! t is so ordered. 
,, 
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JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
,I 
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or on the provisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 1J. S. C. § 1251 
'et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfi~h ~ff the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other wa.ste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudson 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a res1ilt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
·and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Col)Servation; Ogden R. -Reid, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that .rDepartment ; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District ; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities ; the City of Long 
Beach; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin , individually and as Commis-
sioner of that ·Department ; the ·Bergen County Sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
·Commissioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority ; the Linden. 
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental ·Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
Corps of Engineers; . and Martin . R. Hoffman, individually and as Sec;re~ 
• tary of the Army. 
., 
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said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
n,ges. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. 8. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
-if 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA ; federal com-
mon law; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq .; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion; 46 U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law claim3 
was without prejudice, 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of th~ 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) ( 1) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relie'f, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and .any alleged violator. Ibid.9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: 
" (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action oh his own behalf-
" (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
''The distr_i-ct courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in· controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and· to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced- · 
"(1) under subsection (a) (1) of this section- · 
"(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or · · 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United Sta.tes any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. · · · 
"(2) under. subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administr(ltor, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the 
lase of an action under this section respecting a violation of section$ 
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llOt give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
eitizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S. C. §' 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' cl'aims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33' 
lJ. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection sh~ll be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.';, 
§'505 (a), (b), 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2), 
33 U.S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 27, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United· States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 (e), which 
states: 
' 1N othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(includi.ilg relief against the Administrator or a State agency).'' 33' 
U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g) ( 1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United· States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged·to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced_:_ 
' 1(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of' 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
u (B) if the Attorney General h11s coµun~nced and is diligently prosecut--
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claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicit}y and because they had failed to 
comply with the p~ocedural requirements of the federal , and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common la~ of nuisance, aud maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b) (1) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific '1citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e) , pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator ·has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsectio!) (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection ( f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and 'is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g)(l), (2). 
The United Sta~es may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (3) (B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency)." Id. , at§ 1415 (g)(5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq .; N. Y. Gen . Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i; N. J. S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
· to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within 
the scope of the questions on whi.ch review was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that ''Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. ·2d, at 1230--1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding aga:in that the District Court had erred in dis• 
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advuiors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Canrwn v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can ·be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
·This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages· 
relief. An additional indication •is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal ·bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed' 
\i)_wn ~ti! "198Q. Unclei: tn..~ M.fRSA, ·33. U. S. C. § 1412a (a) , the EPA. 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims1 
the Court of Appeals rejected the Distri~t Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. 'It also held, 
applying comn1on law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual ·<la.mag~ to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially p,ublic nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought ·by 
state plainti:ff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in .New Jerrny (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and M_ayor of New York (No. '79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit ('No. 80-12) .16 
We granted these petitions, ' limiting review to three ques-
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legisla-
tive scheme conta.ined in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 
damages under the federal common law of nuisance. We 
hold that there is no implied right of action under these stat-
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December · 31, 
1981. 
1 5 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F . 2d, at 1236. I t did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act , with its various procedural requirements,· 28 U. S. C. §§·1346 
(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal defendants, 616 F. 2d, at 1237, although it ·did hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based; on 
state law," id., at · 1236. 
1 a See n. 3, supra. Petit ioners in Nos. 79- 1711, - 79~1754, and 80-12' 
also named the remaining petition_ers as respondents; based on cro1;s-claims 
"filed in the. District Court. 
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ut-es and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.17 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
:in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
Californi,a ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration a.nd enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, §§ 402 (b), (c) , 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b), 
{c), the Amendments created various federal minimum efHu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301__:307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an 'American vessel or aircraft. ·33 ·u. S. ·C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 ·In addition,· it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon -law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for -damages- by 
a private party. 
18 The Act -applies to -discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362.(7), 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other -than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (19.71). 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmentar 
l'rqtection A~ency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of _dr~dged ,ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the· United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." -Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
·: gories. The main contention is that the' EPA and the·Army 
' Corps of Engineers have permitted the New· Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in 
I 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. · In addition, 
they seem to allege that the' New York and New· Jersey ·de-
fendants have vfolated the terms of their permits. · The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of- these claims in a 'private suit for injunctive and monetary 
· relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 20 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 ·The 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Arll).y, id., § 1413. 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 (e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F: 2d, •at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
t hat a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
21 In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency. 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
) 
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key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas 
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., - U. S. -, -
(1981); Californw v. Sierra Club,-· V. S. -, - (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. -, -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11 , 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U.S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement an<l relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional intent. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for-
exa.mple, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.22 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d) , 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 ( c) , 33 
lJ. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim- . 
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7). In addition , under § 509 (b) , 33 . 
U. S. C. § 1369 (b) "any interested person" may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator, including establishment . 
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge or 
pollutants.1i3 Where review could have been obtained under 
22 The Administrator is a,1thorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
23 This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions 
of§ 509 are open to "[a] ny person," S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 85 (1972), and 
thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seek-
ing to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505, 
See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 87'.-88 (1977). 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged ·in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.-
Id. , at§ 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisi~ns in § 505 (a) of the FWFCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9,· il, supra. · These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
:first must comply with specifie·d procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that · Congress · intended to authorize ·by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in -Trans-
amerjca Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." '444 U.S., at 19. See also ·Touche 
Ross & Co. v. · Redington, supra, ·442 U. S., at 571-574. ·In 
the absence of strong inaicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that ·Congress provided 
precisely the remedies · it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
. ence. Discussing the · FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in ·§ ·505 (a) does not rule out 'im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
· at this conclusion ·by asserting that Congress intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. §1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b), suits 
for injunctive relief'by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id ., § 1415 (f) . 
25 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, also 
may be ordered by the court. '§ 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torn~ys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
·on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all r1ghts to e"nforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. ·Cou-
pled with the general federal question · jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) ( emphasis added). 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
·cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It 111erely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or· limitation or to seek 
any other relief." · It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which ·this statement was 
contained.2 6 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA~ 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain~ 
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings 'clauses. · In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
'<llaim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
~ction of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an ·in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92--1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons· like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries · because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly p::-ovided by Con-
, gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
· (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential lit-igant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effiuent standard or limitation" 
_ in § 505 (e) necessfrily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. · We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effiuent 
limitations" imposed as a, result of court decrees under. the common law-
of nuisance. 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b). See pp. 11-12, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975) , the Court iden- ) 
tified several factors that are relevant to the question of 
implied private remedies. These include the legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one?" ) . This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed, the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
for the view that Congress intended the limitations imposed 
on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.27 
2 7 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P. 23 (1971 ); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) . In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications t hat p rivate enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Har t, for-
example, stated : 
" It ·has been argued, however, that ronferring addit ional rights on the 
ci\izen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
$.tut r rovision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
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Thus, the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 
both lead us to conclude tha.t Congress intended that private 
remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not 
be implied.28 Where, as here, Congress has made clear that 
implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. · Last Term, in Maine 
v. 'Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the munici-
sequence from ar1smg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for d!}mages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It ·will be-the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, ' who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 ( 1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie,- in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for· damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary· damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] · abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." · 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975) , cert. denied, 424 
U. S. 927 (1976) . 
25 See generally City of Evansville v. K entucky Liquid R ecycling, Inc,, 
604 F. 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). OMt!,S,o~ 
~ • 
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palities and sewerage boards among the petitioners 29 under 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended· to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, a.nd (ii) ·whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind1 that created enforceable 
'-'rights" under § 1983. Id.,_ at --1. In the present case, be-
cause we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under 
these Acts, we need not reach the second question whether 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. Z 
(1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
29 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v._ 
!>epartrnent of Social S.ervices, 436 U, S. 658 (1978). 
• 
79-1711, '19-1154, '1!}-17W, & 80-1'.Z-OPINION 
18 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
to have violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing sl)it 
directly under § 1983." 30 As discussed above, the FWPCA 
and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
visions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chair-
man of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist-
ence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that 
Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but 
also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise 
would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 
u. s. 14, 23 (1980). 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State .of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. · In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
30 See also M eyerson v. Arizona, Civ. No. 80-715, slip op., at - , -
F. Supp. - , - (Ariz. Feb. 12, 1981) ("[T]he remedial provision of 
§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve-
nue Sharing Act."). 
_., 
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vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon ·1aw claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
·pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.31 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We remand the case 
for further proceedings corisistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
31 Indeed, as nofod supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
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JUSTICE Pow'ELL 'delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
. -
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or on the provisions of two Acts---the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U . S. C. § 1251 
·et seq., and the Marine Protection, · Research, and Sanctuaries 
. . 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
nsh and shellfil!!h 9ff the coast of New York and New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. In 1971, 
they brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey against petitioners---various govern-
, mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewa.ge "sludge/' and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hud!oon 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint aUeged that, as a res1ilt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was ·becoming polluted, 
·and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New Yoi:k defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Co~ervation; Ogden ·R. ·Reid, individually and a<l Commie• 
sioner of that ./Department ; the City of New York ; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District ; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities ; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the ·city of Glen Cove . 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of ·En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Commis• 
sioner of that ·Department; the ·Bergen County ·sewer Authority; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties ; the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
·Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority ; the Linden• 
Roselle Sewerage Authority ; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
8 The federal defendants were the Environmental · Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
Corps of Engineers ;. and Martin. R. Hoffman, individually and as Sec,e-
. tary of the Army. 
f 
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~a,id to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
n,ges. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
tlischarges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
"lf 35, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or OJ.'Ygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor. This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
8 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq .; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes ; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion ; 46 U. S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1345 
(b), 2671 et seq. ; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law clai~ 
was without prejudice. 
.  
' 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of th~ 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A) . This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relie"f, and the citi-
zen plai:r;itiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and .any alleged violator. lbid.9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: 
" {a) Except as provided in subsection {b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action oh his own behalf-
" {l) against any person {including {i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of {A) an effiuent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
1'The distijct courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effiuent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and· to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
"(1) under subsection {a)(l) of this section- · 
"{A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrato_r, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or . . · · 
"{B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. · · · · 
"(2) under. subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Ad~inistr;itor, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the 
i ase of an action under this section respecting a violation of sectionf! 
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~ot give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
eitizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in 28 U. S'. C. §' 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions, 33' 
lJ. S, C, § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shllll be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.''' 
§' 505 (a), (b), 33· U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c) (2). 
See n. 27, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWFCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United· States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 ( e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any· effluent standard or liinitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33' 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
-person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United· States and· any other governmental instrumentality 
or· agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution) , who is alleged· to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
t ion, criterion, or permit established or issued · by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
''(2) No action may be commenced.;... 
' 1(A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of · 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit ; or 
H(B) if the Attorney Gene.ral h11s copunenceq and is diligently prosecut:.. 
79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
6 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explici~ly and because they had failed to 
comply with the P!Ocedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common la~ of nuisance, and maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to con:,.ply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific ''citi-
zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 (e) , 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e) , pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator ·has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and 'is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g)(l), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (3)(B) . 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency) ." Id., at § 1415 (g)(5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b) , 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i; N. J . S. A. 59 :1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
· to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, wit4in 
the scope of the questions on whi,ch revi~w was granted. 
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serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce .. 
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that ''Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured ·by pollution in violation of its terms.'' 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis .. 
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con,-
-cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979) ; 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979) ; Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated : 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has ·been waived fa all suits by plain-
t iffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can ·be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F. 2d, at 
1231 ( footnote omitted-). 
·This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages-
relief. An additional indication •is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal ·bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed" 
~wn tgitil '198Q. Und,.et ·t~ M.l?'R..SA,. 33., U._ S. C. § 1412a (a) , the EPA. 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims1 
the Court of Appeals rejected the Distri~t Court's conclusion 
that private parties may,not bring such claims. 'It also held, 
applying common' law principles, that respon'dents "alleged 
sufficient individual ·dama.ge to permit them to recover dam-
,ages for this essentially p_ublic nuisl(l,nce." 616 F ." 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought ·by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for \a _writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in . this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-i711)," by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in ' New Jerrny (No. 79-1754), by 
the City and .M,ayor of New York (No. ' 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants namea in this suit ('No. 8~12) .10 
We granted these petitions, ' limiting review to three ques--
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private 
right of action independent of ·their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legisla-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
(iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 
· damages under the federal common law of nuisance. ·We 
hold that there is no implied right of action under these stat-
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December · 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that · respondents · had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F . 2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
'Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, ·28 U. S. C. §§· 1346 
(b), 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal defendants, 616 F. 2d, at 1237, although it ·did· hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies· based; on 
state law;" id., at· 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711 , -79~1754, and 80-12' 
also named the remaining petition_ers as respondents; based on cro~s-claim~ 
•filed in the. District Court. · · ·· 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA ·v. 
-California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.18 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, § § 402 (b), ( c), 33 U. S. C. § § 1342 (b), 
{ c), the Amendments created various federal minimum effiu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301...:307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section '101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transportetl from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. -33 U. S. -C. 
§ 1411 (a).10 ' In addition; it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act -applies to · discharges of pollutants . from any source into 
·navigable waters, including ·the "territorial seas,"· 33 U. S. C. ~§ 1362,(7) , 
(12), and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9), (10), (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (Ul71) . 
19 These permits are issued by the Administrator of the Environmentat 
frqtecti_on Agency, 33 U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ,ma-
. . • ' • ' . I 
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ing of material transported from outside the· United States 
into the territorial seas , or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the· United States." -Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two cate-
·; gories. The main contention is that the' EPA and the·Army 
'Corps of Engineers have permitted the New-Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants · in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. · In additi6n, 
they seem to allege that the' New York and New· Jersey ·de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. · The 
question before us is whether' respondents may raise e1ther 
of-these claims in a 'private suit for injunctive and monetary 
· relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts. 20 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 · ·The 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, id., § 1413. 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 ( e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b) ." 616 F: 2d, ,at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that ·the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce ·the ac;t, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The ceuTt 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
t hat a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
21 In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency, 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979) 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
79- 1711, 79-1754, 79~1760, & 80-12-0l>INION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 11 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas 
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., - U. S. - , -
(1981); California v. Sierra Club,-· U.S.-, - (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. - , -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11 , 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement anrl relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional intent. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for-
exa:rnple, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act w.ith compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.22 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d) , 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d ), 
and criminal penalties also a.re available, id., at § 309 ( c) , 33 
lJ. S. C. § 1319 ( c) . States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim- . 
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b) (7). In addition, under § 509 (b), 33 . 
U. S. C. § 1369 (b) "any interested person" may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular act ions by the Administrator, including establishment . 
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of' 
pollutants.23 Where review could have been obtained under 
22 The Administrator is a ,1thorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a) (1). 
. 23 This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions 
of§ 509 are open to ." [a] ny person," S. Rep. No. 92- 414, p. 85 (1972), and 
thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seek-
ing to enforce the Act, .supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505. 
See W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 87'.--88 (1977) . 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged ·in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.· 
Id., at§ 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented · by the 
express citizen-suit provisi~ns in · § 505 (a) of · the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a) , and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g) . See nn. 9,'i l , supra. - These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specifie'd procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 'days' prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-. 
not be assumed that · Congress · intended to authorize ·by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated. in -Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." ·444 U. S., at ·19. See also ·Touche 
Ross & Co. · v. Redington, supra, ·442 U. S., at 5-71-574. In 
the absence of strong in'dicia of a contra.ry congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that ·Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate . 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
.. ence. Discussing the ·· FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in ·§ ·505 (a) does ·not rule out 1.m-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
· at this conclusion ·by assert1ng that Congress "intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment. of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief .by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
fluspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f). 
25 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, also 
may be ordered by the court. '§ 505 (a}, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
1 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
·on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 136·5 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rl.ghts to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. ·Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties~" 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) ( emphasis added). 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
·cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It ~erely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or· limitation or to seek 
any other relief." · It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which "this statement was 
contained.26 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA• 
~ 
"' 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured'' plainti_ffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain~ 
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the -Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings 'clauses. · In fact, it is clear -that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
·claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
~ction of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an · in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g), 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). · This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessa.rily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons· like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic · injuries· because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly provided by Con-
. gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
· (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant -in any other statu_te 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
. in § 505 (e) · necessfrily is a reference to the terms of the· FWPCA. · We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed .as a result of court decrees under. the common law-
of nuisance. 
r 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA aetions within 
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b). See pp. 11-12, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to ·the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded · that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expres.sly authorized 
citizens suits. · The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
-33 U.S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expresslYliniit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we a.re not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expreesly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. } 
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court iden-
tified several factors that are relevant to the question of 
implied private remedies. These include t~e legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one?"). This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed, the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
for the view that Congress intended the limitations imposed 
on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.21 
27 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92--451, 
P . 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971). In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p . 79 (1971) . And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Ha-rt, fot 
example, stated : 
"It ·has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I would argue that the citizen 
~ult :provisicm of S. 4358 h~ been carefully drafted to prevent this con-
r 
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Thus, the structure of the Acts and their legisla.tive history 
both lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private 
remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not 
be implied.28 Where, as here, Congress has made clear that 
implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. · Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the munici-
sequence from ansmg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It ·will be-the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, ·who, with no hope of-financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under thjs 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 ' (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for· damages : 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fin es 
and restitution, and other monetari damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] · abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." · 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id. , at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train, 519 F . 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
u. s. 927 (1976). 
28 See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 
604 F. 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
~ 
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palities and sewerage boards among the petitioners 29 unqter 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of act1~on 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicabi~ty 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began I g 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argum~nt 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended·- to authorize private suits to enforce these particuiar 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably rJns 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it invol*es 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute Has 
been violated under color of st~te law, causing_ an injuty. 
'The Court, however, has recogmzed two exceptions to t~e 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhur 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. · 
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determinati n 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement lof 
that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether tr,e 
statute at issue there was the kint that created enforcea;le 
'-'rights" under § 1983. Id., at ' In the present case, e-. \ 
cause we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy un~er 
these Acts, we need not reach the second question whetrr 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with t e 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in . a particular 8ft 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demop-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of su!s 
under § 1983, As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined t e 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Ho s-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2' 
(1979) (dissenting opinion) , when "a state official is alleg d 
29 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of munici~at 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell Iv .. 
l)epartrnent of Social ,Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
,.r 
19-1711, '19-1154, 1~17M, & 80-lz-<':>PINION 
ll8 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
to have violated a. federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing StJit 
directly under § 1983." 30 As discussed above, the FWPCA 
and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
visions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chair-
man of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist-
ence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that 
Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but 
also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise 
would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 
u. s. 14, 23 (1980). 
llI 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State .of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
30 See also Meyerson\ , Arizona~@ic . !fo. 2!6 MO, slip op ., at , 
i't Iii pp. ; ~"ffll1 Jieb , li, IOlil.)« (" [T]he remedial provision of 
'§ 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the remedial provisions of the Reve-, 
nue Sharing Act.") . 
~1 f. 
~~f· ~o1 
'6~4 (A-r-i'Z . 
'q~o 
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vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon ·1aw claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
·pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.81 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law -claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because resQQ_ndents lack 
right of action under those statutes. We(MMII &he &Aili' 
·or forthe1 ""f)tacecdiLgs eo-m~h tais-o~ 
31 Indeed, a:; not~d s·upra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repr~ 
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like 
petitioners to adjust to the coming change. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused -by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
·waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity 10f a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the pi:ovisions of two Acts-the Federal Water Pollu: 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S .. C. § 125l 
·et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sa~ctuarie~ 
• L . 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. . \ . 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
'fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey; 
and one infiividua.l _ member of that organization. Jn 197?i 
they brought SlJ.it in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jer~ey against petitioners-various govern-
mental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey 2 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
River by some of the respondents. In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a result of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Department of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, indiYidually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester Department of Environmental Facilities; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The .. New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection; David J. Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner _ of . that Department; the Bergen County Sewer Authority; the 
:Joint .Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Pa,::s:iic Valley Sewei:age 
Commissioners ; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Linden-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Authority. 
1 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E. Train, individually and as EPA Administrator ; the Army 
Corps .~fl Engineers ; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as Secre-
tary of the Army. 
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~aid to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this-pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, se-e 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
4 The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
,r 35, App. 25a . Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint ,r 39, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA ; the MPRSA ; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environm~ntal Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourt€enth Amendments, to the United Stat€S Constitu-
tion ; 46 U. S. C. § 740; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law c)ain\$ 
was without prejudice. 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b) (1) 
(A) . This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, arid the citi-
zen plaintiffs first 'must giye notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. lbid.9 Because respondents did 
9 Section 505 provides, in part: 
" (a) Except as provided in subsecti9n (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
" (I) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent :standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action may be commenced-
" (I) under subsection (a)(l) of this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, or 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that -such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the 
t:ase of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 
e 
79-1711, 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-OPlNION 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. A UTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS a 
not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional 
grant in ~8 U. S. C. § 1331.1° The court applied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 3·3 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.'' 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b) . 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 21, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 {e) , which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief' 
{including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).'' 33 
U. S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"{g) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subcha~ 
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been given 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(8) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently pro~c»~ 
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'Claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort claims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). ·with respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
zen suits~' authorized in § 505. ·rt based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 ( e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition; limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if ·the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, bas initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection (f) of this section; or 
"(D) i(foe United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g) (1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U.S. C. § 1415 (3) (B). 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency) ." Id. , at§ 1415 (g) (5) . 
12 See "28 U. S. C. '§§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50-e, 50-i ; N. J . S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The -petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the app11cability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort -suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, within 
the scope of the questions on which review was granted. 
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eerving "any right which any person ( or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1223; seen. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis~ 
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparent1y con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.H 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 2S 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers . Whether 
damages can be recovered from the federal government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F . 2d; at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the 'Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not ·handed 
down iuntU 1980. Under tbe MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1412a (a), the El'A 
7'9-1711 , 79-1754, 79-1760, & 80-12-0PINION 
8 MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWER. AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS 
With respect to the federal common law nuisance claim!!, 
the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F . 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state plaintiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in New Jen:ey (No. 79-1754) , by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal ·defenclan ts named in this suit (No. 80- 12) .10 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a - private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nui:rnnce actions con-
. cerning ocean pollution now sre pre-empted by the legisla-
tive scheme conta.ined in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
· (iii ) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 
damages under the federal common law of n"isance. · We 
hold that there is no implied right of action under these stat-
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December ·31, 
1981. • 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations suffici!mt 
to make out a claim of maritime tort , cognizab!e under admiralty juris-
diction.· · 616 F. 2d, at 1236. · It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its va rious procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal d:.-fendants, 616 F . 2d, at 1237, although it did hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on 
state law ,n id., at 1236. 
10 See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79- 1711 , 79-1754, and 80-12 
·also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on croEs -claims 
nled in the District Court. 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.17 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pa~sed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id., at 205.1 8 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, § § 402 (b), ( c), 33 U. S. C. § § 1342 (b), 
( c), the Amendments created various federal minimum efflu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301-307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972. Pub. L. 92- 532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping irtto ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. 'C. 
§ 1411 (a).19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
17 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7), 
(12), and applies as we11 to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9) , (10), (12). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971). 
1 9 These -permits are iosned by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 33 U. 'S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but the claims appea.r to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants ;n 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
fendants have violated the terms of their permits. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
of these Acts.2° 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
·out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 The 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, id., § 1413. . 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 ( e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section 505 (b)." 616 F . 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in -addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in § 505 (b). The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis before concluding 
that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
21 In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency. 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979) 
(Powell, J ., dissenting). 
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key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas 
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., - U. S. -, -
(1981); California v. Sierra Club,-· U. S. --, - (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. - , -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11 , 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U. S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional intent. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferring authority to sue for this ·purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.22 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d) , 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 ( c), 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
p~rmit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7). In addition, under § 509 (b) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1369 (b) "any interested person" may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator, including establishment 
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of 
pollutants.23 Where review could have been obtained undel' 
22 The Administrator is a,1thorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U.S. C. § 1319 (a)(l) . 
23 This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions 
of§ 509 are open to "[a] ny person ," S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 85 (1972), and 
thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seek-
ing to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505, 
See W. R odgers, Environmental Law 87-88 (1977). 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged i,n 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. 
Id., at § 1369 (b)(2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens 
suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra., 442 U. S., at ·571-574. · In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
ence. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in 
24 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalties by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a), criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d), and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f) . 
2 5 Under the FWPCA, civil penalties, payable to the government, also-
may be ordered by the court. '§ 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of a.ction for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate 
basis for suit under section 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
( e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal question jurisdiction it 
permits this suit to be brought by these parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at lea.st three problems with this rea.soning. 
First, the language of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under· 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any per-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
contained.26 • 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted; · however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance-· 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added). 
See also S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp .. 23-24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA) · 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue 'of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under. 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 ( g) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 9~1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly p=-ovided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person" 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law"). 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law 
of nuisance. 
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-to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within-
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b ). See pp. 11-12, 
.supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court iden-
tified several factors that are relevant to the question of 
implied private remedies. These include the legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one?"). This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed, the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
for tlie view that Congress intended the limitations imposed 
on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.21 
27 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P . 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971). In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA. was express]~, modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clear Air Act , 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for-
example, stated: 
" It has been argued. however, that conferring additional rights on the-
citizen may burden the courts unduly. I wou1d argue that the citi 7 en-
suit provision of S. 4358 has been carefully drafted to preyent thi~ ron-· 
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Thus, the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 
both lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private 
remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not 
be implied. 28 Where, as here, Congress has ma,de clear that 
implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - ( 1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the munici-
sequence from ansmg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 (1970). 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clear Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
·response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of a separate bill, S. 3201, that would have 
authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3210 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution , and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 (1970) . 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highland 
Park v. Train , 519 F. 2d 681, 690-691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
u. s. 927 (1976) . 
28 See generally City of Evansville v. K entucky Liquid R ecycling, Inc ., 
'604 F. 2d 1008 (CA7 1979) , cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1025 (1980) . 
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palities and sewerage boards among the petitioners 29 under 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
(1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id.,_ at-. In the present case, be-
cause we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under 
these Acts, we need not reach the second question whether 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JUSTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton, Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) ( dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
29 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipat 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
D epartment of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
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to have violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." :Jo As discussed above, the FWPCA 
and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
visions. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chair-
man of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist-
ence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that 
Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but 
also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise 
would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, ,446 
u. s. 14, 23 (1980). 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is fllinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raisecf 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. The Court has now held 
30 See also Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (Ariz. 1981) \ 
("[T]he remedial provision of § 1983 cannot be used to circumvent the 
remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act."). 
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that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of wate11 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
FWPCA.31 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a I 
right of action under those statutes. We vacate the judgment 
below with respect to these two claims, and remand for fur-
ther proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
n Indeed, as noted supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage s!udge· 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities like· 
petitioners to adjust to the comin? change. 
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In this case, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds 
caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other 
waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availabil-
ity of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law 
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or on the provisions of two Acts--the Federal Water Pollu. 
tion Control Act (FWPCA), as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 
'et seq., and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. 
I 
Respondents are an organization whose members harvest 
fish and shellfish off the coast of New York an:d New Jersey, 
and one individual member of that organization. · In 1977, 
they brought suit in the United States· District Court for the 
District of New · Jersey against petitioners-various govern• 
mental entities and officials from New York,1 · New Jersey: 
and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that 
sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were 
being discharged into· New York Harbor and the Hudrnn 
River by some of the respondents. · In addition it complained 
of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from 
maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a resnlt of 
these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, 
and it made special reference to a massive · growth of · algae 
1 The New York defendants were the New York Dep~rtment of En-
vironmental Conservation; Ogden R. Reid, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the City of New York; Abraham Beame, 
Mayor of New York ; the West Long Beach Sewer District; the County 
of Westchester Department of Envi-ronmental Facilities; the City of Long 
Beach ; and the City of Glen Cove. 
2 The New Jersey defendants were the New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection ; David J . Bardin, individually and as Commis-
sioner of that Department ; the Bergen County Sewer Authority ; the 
Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties; the Pass::ric Valley Sewerage-
Commissioners; the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority; the Lirn;len-
Roselle Sewerage Authority; and the Middletown Sewerage Autho.rity. 
3 The federal defendants were the Environmental Protection Agency; 
Russell E . Train, individually and as· EPA · Administrator; the Army 
Corps of Engineers; and Martin R. Hoffman, individually and as S~cre-
tary of the Army. 
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said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that 
this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clam-
ming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of 
the Atlantic Ocean." 5 
Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents 
sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in 
compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive dam-
ages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
petitioners 7 on all counts of the complaint.8 
In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected re-
spondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 ( 1972), on the ground 
that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. 
• The complaint alleged that this growth of algae was caused by the 
discharges of sewage and "covered an area of the Atlantic Ocean ranging 
from approximately the southwest portion of Long Island, New York to 
a point approximately due east of Cape May, New Jersey, and extending· 
from a few miles offshore to more than 20 miles out to sea," Complaint 
135, App. 25a. Respondents' Brief in this Court states that when 
"this massive algal bloom died, its residuals settled on the ocean floor, 
creating a condition of anoxia, or oxygen deficiency, in and about the 
water near the ocean's floor . This condition resulted in the death and 
destruction of an enormous amount of marine life, particularly with 
respect to the shellfish and other ocean-bottom dwellers and other marine 
life unable to escape the blighted area." Brief for Respondents 4. 
5 Complaint 139, App. 26a. 
6 Respondents based claims on the FWPCA; the MPRSA; federal com-
mon law ; § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 407 ; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 4321 et seq.; New York and New Jersey environmental statutes ; the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to the United States Constitu-
tion ; 46 U. S. C. § 740 ; the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq.; and state tort law. 
7 The court previously had dismissed claims against the New York and 
New Jersey environmental protection agencies and their directors. These 
defendants are not among the petitioners in this Court. 
8 The court's judgment with respect to the pendent state-law claims, 
was without prejudice. 
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With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the 
FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to 
comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen 
suit" provision in § 505 of the Act, 33 U.S. 'C. § 1365 (b)(l) 
(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private 
citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citi-
zen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, 
and any alleged violator. 1bid.9 Because respondents did 
• Section 505 provides, in part: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen 
may commence a civil action on · his own behalf-
" (1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any 
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by 
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or 
(B) an order issued 'by the Administrator or a State with respect to such 
a standard or limitation, or 
"(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not 
discretionary with the Administrator. 
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount 
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent 
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator 
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appro-
priate civil penalties under section 1319 (d) of this title. 
"(b) No action · may be commenced-
" ( l) under subsection (a) (1) of this section-
" (A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice , of the 
alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the 
alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, 
limitation, or order, · or 
"(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently 
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United State:s, 
or a State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or , order, 
but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may 
intervene as a matter of right. 
"(2) under subsection (a) (2) of this section prior to sixty days after 
the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except 
that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the 
·case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 
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not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them 
to proceed with a ciaim under the Act independent of the 
citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictionai 
grant in 28 U. S. C. § 1331.10 The court ~pplied the same 
analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, whfoh 
contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. · 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible 
1316 and 1317 (a) of this title. Notice under this subsection shall be 
given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulatio~:" 
§ 505 (a), (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), (b). 
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen suit. Id., § 505 (c) (2), 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (c)(2). 
See n. 27, infra (legislative history emphasizing the limited forms of 
relief available under the Act). 
In this opinion we refer to sections of the original FWPCA, added in 
the 1972 Amendments, with parallel citations to the United States Code. 
10 In so holding the court rejected an argument that the notice require-
ment is inapplicable because of the "savings clause" in § 505 (e), which 
states: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person ( or class 
of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 
U.S. C. § 1365 (e). 
11 The citizen-suit provision in the MPRSA provides in part: 
"(g)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any 
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf to enjoin any person, 
including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality 
or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any prohibition, limita-
tion, criterion, or permit established or issued by or under this subchap-
ter. The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the 
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such 
prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit, as the case may be. 
"(2) No action may be commenced-
" (A) prior to sixty days after notice of the violation has been give?\ 
to the Administrator or to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of 
the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(B) if the Attorney General has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
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I 
claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed 
to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and 
state tort cla.ims acts.12 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, 
the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. 616 
F. 2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court 
held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision 
in § 505 (b)(l)(A), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A), does not 
preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citi-
. zen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on 
the savings clause in § 505 ( e), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 ( e), pre-
ing a civil action in a court of the United States to require compliance 
with the prohibition, limitation, criterion, or permit; or 
"(C) if the Administrator has commenced action to impose a penalty 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the 
Secretary, has initiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings under 
subsection ( f) of this section; or 
"(D) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting 
a criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress a 
violation of this subchapter." 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g)(1), (2). 
The United States may intervene in any citizen suit brought under the 
Act. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g) (3) (B) . 
Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which 
states: 
"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any 
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Sec-
retary, or a State agency)." Id., at §1415 (g)(5). 
12 See 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq.; N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law 
§§ 50--e, 50--i; N. J. S. A. 59:1-1 et seq. The District Court noted that 
respondents had given timely notice to one defendant-New York City. 
The petitions for certiorari in this Court raised questions concerning 
the applicability of state tort claims acts and the Eleventh Amendment 
to tort suits in federal court. These questions are not, however, witbi!l 
the scope of the questions on which review was granted. 
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'Serving "any right which any person (or class of persons) 
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce.:. 
ment of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any 
other relief." 616 F. 2d, at 1226-1228; see n. 10, supra. The 
Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in 
the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and con-
cluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts 
to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms 
of the [FWPCAJ, preserved by the savings clause of the Act, 
on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have 
been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 
616 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. 
The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, 
concluding again that the District Court had erred in dis-
missing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the 
court was not explicit on this question, it apparently con-
cluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, 
could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14 
13 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 (1979); 
Touche Ross & Co. v. R edington, 442 U. S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 442 U. S. 66 
(1975). 
14 After holding that there is an implied right of action under the 
FWPCA, the court stated: 
"Having so held, we reject the federal government defendants' sover-
eign immunity argument. The 1976 amendments to section 1331 of title 28 
make clear that sovereign immunity has been waived in all suits by plain-
tiffs seeking injunctive relief against federal agencies or officers. Whether 
damages can be recovered from the fede:-al government is a separate 
question to which the Federal Tort Claims Act speaks." 616 F . 2d, at 
1231 (footnote omitted). 
This passage suggests that, as a general matter, the court had concluded 
that the statutory rights of action it was recognizing included damages 
relief. An additional indication is the fact that, by the time of the Court 
of Appeals decision, any relief other than damages could not have been 
too important to respondents. The algal bloom about which respondents 
complain died in 1976. The Court of Appeals decision was not handed 
down t1ntil l980. Under the MPRSA, 33 U.S. C. § 1412a (a), the EPA 
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With respect to the federal common law nuisance claims, 
the Court of Appeals rej~cted the District Court's conclusion 
that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, 
applying common law principles, that respondents "alleged 
'sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover dam-
ages for this essentially public nuisance." 616 F. 2d, at 1234. 
It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
supra, which involved purely prospective relief sought by 
state pla.intiff.15 
Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of argu-
ments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey 
sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711) , by the Joint Meeting of 
Essex and Union Counties in -New JerEey (No. ·79-1754), by 
the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by 
all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. S0.-:12).10 
We granted these petitions, limiting review to three ques-
tions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA implra private 
right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, 
(ii) whether all federal common law nuisance actions con-
cerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legisla-
tive scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and 
( iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for 
damages under the federal common law of nuisance. We 
hold that there is no implied right of action under these stat-
is required to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge by December 31, 
1981. 
15 The court also held that respondents had offered allegations sufficient 
to make out a claim of maritime tort, cognizable under admiralty juris-
diction. 616 F . 2d, at 1236. It did not decide whether the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, with its various procedural requirements, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 
(b) , 2671 et seq., applies to any of respondents' federal-law claims against 
federal d2fendants, 616 F. 2d, at 1237, although it did hold that the Act 
precluded a "money damage recovery against federal agencies based on 
state Jaw," id., at 1236. 
16 See n. 3, supra. Petitioners in Nos. 79-1711, 79-1754, and 80-12 
also named the remaining petitioners as respondents, based on croEs-claims 
filed in the District Court. 
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utes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been 
fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.11 
II 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted 
in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized 
state enforcement of water quality standards. When this 
legislation proved ineffective, Congress pa~sed the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-500, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted 
the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. 
California ex rel. State Water Resource Control Board, 426 
U. S. 200, 204 (1976) , and made it "unlawful for any person 
to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and com-
plying with its terms," id. , at 205.1 8 While still allowing for 
state administration and enforcement under federally ap-
proved state plans, §'§ 402 (b), (c), 33 U. S. C. §§ 1342 (b) , 
(c) , the Amendments created various federal minimum efflu-
ent standards, id., §§ 301- 307, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311-1317. 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create compre-
hensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into 
ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101 
of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean 
waters, when the material is transported from the United 
States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U. S. C. 
§' 1411 (a).19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dump-
1 7 We therefore need not discuss the question whether the federal com-
mon law of nuisance could ever be the basis of a suit for damages by 
a private party. 
18 The Act applies to discharges of pollutants from any source into 
navigable waters, including the "territorial seas," 33 U. S. C. §§ 1362 (7) , 
(12) , and applies as well to discharges from sources "other than a vessel 
or other floating craft" into the "contiguous zone" and the high seas, 
id., §§ 1362 (9) , (10) , (12) . See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 75 (1971) . 
1 9 These permits are iEsued by the Administrator of the Environmental 
PrQiecHon Agency, 33, U. S. C. § 1412, except in the case of dredged ma-
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ing of material transported from outside the United States 
into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles 
from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the 
territorial sea or the territory of the United States." Id., 
§ 1411 (b). 
The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two 
Acts is not clear, but th~ claims appear to fall into two cate-
gories. The main contention is that the 'EPA and the Army 
'corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New 
York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants ,in 
amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, 
they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey de-
'fendants have violated the terms of their permits. The 
question before us is whether respondents may raise either 
of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary 
-relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either 
· of these Acts. 20 
A 
It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set 
out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action 
under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 The 
terials, which may be dumped under a permit issued by the Secretary 
of the Army, id., § 1413. 
20 The Court of Appeals did state that the savings clause in § 505 ( e) 
of the FWPCA "provides an independent remedy for injured parties · un-
burdened by the notice requirements of section -505 (b)." 616 F . 2d, at 
1227. But the court did not conclude that the savings clause is itself an 
express authorization of private damages suits. · Instead, it held that the 
savings clause acted to preserve any existing right to enforce the act, 
in addition to the explicit, citizen-suit remedy in '§ 505 {b) . The court 
went on to apply an implied-right-of-action analysis · before concluding 
that a private suit for damages is among the pre-existing remedies pre-
served by the savings clause. 
21 In recent years, the question has arisen with increased frequency. 
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 741-742 (1979), 
, (Powell, J ., .dissenting). 
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key to the inquiry is the intent of the legislature. Texas 
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., - U.S.-, -
(1981); Californ-ia v. Sierra Club,-· U. S. -, - (1981); 
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, - U. S. -, -
(1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 
U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U.S. 560, 568 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statu-
tory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for 
enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative his-
tory and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to 
determine congressional intent. 
These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement pro-
visions, conferri11g authority to sue for this purpose both on 
government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for 
example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to 
violations of the Act with compliance orders a.nd civil suits. 
§ 309, 33 U. S. C. § 1319.22 He may seek a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 per day, id., § 309 (d), 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (d), 
and criminal penalties also are available, id., at § 309 ( c) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1319 (c). States desiring to administer their own 
permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess 
adequate authority to abate violations through civil or crim-
inal penalties or other means of enforcement. Id., § 402, 33 
U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7). In addition, under § 509 (b), 33 
U. S. C. § 1369 (b) "any interested person" may seek judicial 
review in the United States Courts of Appeals of various par-
ticular actions by the Administrator, including establishment 
of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of 
pollutants. 23 Where review could have been obtained under 
22 The Administrator is a•1thorized to give the States an opportunity to 
take action before doing so himself. 33 U. S. C. § 1319 (a)(l). 
23 This review must be sought within 90 days. The review provisions 
of§ 509 are open to "[a]ny person," S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 85 (1972), and 
thus provide an additional procedure to "private attorneys general" seek-
ing to enforce the Act, supplementing the citizen suits authorized in § 505. 
S~ W. l{.odger~, Ep.vironmental Law 87-88 (1977). 
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this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged in 
any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. 
Id. , at § 1369 (b) (2). 
These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their 
counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the 
express citizen-suit provisions in § 505 (a) of the FWPCA, 
33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a), and § 105 (g) of the MPRSA, 33 
U. S. C. § 1415 (g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit 
provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to 
enforce these statutes.2 fi Plaintiffs invoking these provisions 
'first must comply with specified procedures-which respond-
ents here ignored-including in most cases 60 days' prior 
· notice to potential defendants. 
In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it can-
not be assumed that Congress intended to authorize · by 
implication additional · judicial remedies for private citizens 
· suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. ·As we stated in · Trans-
. america Mortgage Advisers, supra, "it is an elemental canon 
· of statutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-
vides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary 
· of reading others into it." 444 U. S., at 19. See also Touche 
Ross & Co. V • . Redington, supra, 442 u. s., at 571-574. In 
the absence of strong iridicia of a contrary congressional in-
tent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided 
precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this infer-
. ence. Discussing ·the · FWPCA, it held that the existence 
of a citizen-suit provision in § 505 (a) does not rule out im-
plied forms of private enforcement of the Act. · It arrived 
at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended -in 
z4 The MPRSA provides for assessment of civil penalt ies by the Admin-
istrator, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (a) , criminal penalties, id., § 1415 (b) , suits 
for injunctive relief by the Attorney General, id., § 1415 (d) , and permit 
suspensions or revocations, id., § 1415 (f) . 
25 Under t he FWPCA, civil penalt ies, payable to the government, als.o, 
may be ordered by the court. § 505 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (a). 
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§ 505 (a) to create a limited cause of action for "private at-
torneys general"-"non-injured member[s] of the public" 
suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress 
· an injury to their own welfare. 616 F. 2d, at 1227. It went 
'•·on to conclude: 
"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, 
as these plaintiffs allege ~hey were,, has an altern~te 
basis for suit under section 505 (e) , 33 U. S. C. § 1365 
(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the 
Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505 
( e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce 
the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Cou-
pled with the general federal queistion jurisdiction .. it 
permits this suit to be brought by the.se parties." 616 
F. 2d, at 1227 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
There are at least three problems with this reasoning. 
First, the langua,ge of the savings clause on which the Court 
of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous con-
cerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under 
the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citi-
zen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any p~r-
son ... may have under any statute or common law to seek 
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek 
·any other relief." It is doubtful that the . phrase "any stat-
ute" includes the very statute in which this statement was 
· contained.26 
26 In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated 
with respect to the savings clause: 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically pre-
serve any rights or remedies . under any other law. Thus, .if damages 
could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance 
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (em-
phasis added) . 
1$~~ also S. Rel). No .. 9~51, pp. 23_:_24 (1971) (report on the MPRSA~ 
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Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals 
relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction 
between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits 
to enfor'ce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plain-
tiffs in this case who claim a right to sue under the Acts, 
not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under 
the language of the savings clauses. In fact, it is clear that 
the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can 
claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason 
to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "in-
jured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit 
section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505 (g) , 33 
U. S. C. § 1316 (g). · It is clear from the Senate Conference 
Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow 
suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's 
decision in Sierra Club v. -Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See 
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad cate-
gory of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs 
seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, 
whose injuries are "non-economic" and probably noncom-
pensable, and persons like respondents who as.sert that · they 
have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory 
violations. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the 
rest of the enforcement scheme expressly p:-ovided by Con-
gress-including the opportunity for "any interested person'~ 
(the citizen-suit provision does not restrict of supersede "any other right 
to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute 
or the common law") . 
It might be argued that the phrase "any effluent standard or limitation" 
in § 505 (e) necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, 
however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. 
The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to "effluent 
limitations" imposed as a result of cqµrt qecrees under the common law-
of nuisance. 
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to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 
90 days, § 509 (b), 33 U. S. C. § 1369 (b). See pp. 11-12, 
supra. 
The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the 
MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress 
evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private rem-
edies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized 
citizens suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are 
in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 
33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g). Although they do not expressly limit 
citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a 
violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone 
that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence 
of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the 
manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations. 
In Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), the Court iden-
tified several factors that are relevant to the question of 
implied private remedies. These include the legislative his-
tory. See ibid. ("Second is there any indication of legisla,. 
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one?"). This history does not lead to a contrary 
conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. 
Indeed, the reports and debates provide affirmative support 
for the view that Congress intended the limitations imposed 
on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these acts.21 
27 The Senate Reports on both Acts placed particular emphasis on the 
limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. S. Rep. No. 92-451, 
P. 23 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971). In addition, the citizen-
suit provision of the FWPCA was expressly modeled on the parallel pro-
vision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604. See S. Rep. No. 92-414, 
p. 79 (1971). And the legislative history of the latter act contains ex-
plicit indications that private enforcement suits were · intended to · be 
limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Senator Hart, for-
example, stated: 
"It has been argued, however, that conferring additional rights on the 
citizen may burden the courts uriduly. I would argue that the citizen 
suit :provision of S. '4358 has been carefully drafted to prevent this co:n-
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'Thus, the structure of the Acts and their legislative history 
both lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private 
remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not 
be implied.28 Where, as here, Congress has made clear that 
implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are 
not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment. 
B 
Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a 
possible alternative source of express congressional authoriza-
tion of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. - (1980), the Court construed 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by 
state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accord-
ingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the munici-
sequence from ansmg. First of all, it should be noted that the bill 
makes no provision for damages to the individual. It therefore provides 
no incentives to suit other than to protect the health and welfare of those 
suing and others similarly situated. It will be the rare, rather than the 
ordinary, person, I suspect, who, with no hope of financial gain and the 
very real prospect of financial loss, will initiate court action under this 
bill." 116 Cong. Rec. 33104 ( 1970) . 
Similarly, during the debates on the Clean Air Act, Senator Muskie, in 
response to concerns expressed by other Senators, contrasted the citizen-
suit provision with the terms of S. 3201, a consumer protection bill that 
would have authorized private suits for damages: 
"Senate bill 3201 provides damages and a remedy for recovery of fines 
and restitution, and other monetary damages. The pending bill is limited 
to seek [sic] abatement of violation of standards established administra-
tively under the act, and expressly excludes damage actions." 116 Cong. 
Rec. 33102 ( 1970). 
He placed in the record a staff memorandum stating that the availability 
of damages "would encourage frivolous or harassing suits against indus-
tries and government agencies." Id., at 33103. See also City of Highlana 
Park v. Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690--691 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 424 
u. s. 927 (1976) . 
28 See generally City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid R ecycling, Inc ., 
604 F. 2d 1'008 (CA7 1979), cert. denied; 444 U. S~ l02S (1980), . 
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palities and sewerage boards among the petitioners 29 under 
the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action 
created by § 1983. 
It is appropriate to reach the questi<m of the applicability 
of Maine v. Thiboutot to this rntting, despite the failure of 
respondents to raise it here or below. This case began long 
before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument 
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress in-
tended to authorize private suits to enforce these particular 
federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls 
within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves 
a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has 
been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. 
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the 
application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman, - U. S. -
( 1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination 
(i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the 
statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable 
"rights" under § 1983. Id., at -. In the present case, be-
cause we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under 
these Acts, we need not reach the second question whether 
these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" with the 
meaning of § 1983. 
When the remedial devices provided in a particular act 
are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits 
under § 1983. As JusTICE STEWART, who later joined the 
majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 673, n. 2 
(1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged 
29 These petitioners appear to fall within the category of municipal 
governmental entities suable as "persons" under our decision in Monell v. 
Department of Social & rvices, 436 U. S. 658 (1978). 
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to have violated a federal statute which provides its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that 
enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit 
directly under § 1983." 80 As discussed above, the FWPCA 
and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to 
preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many 
specific statutory remedies including the two citizen-suit pro-
'fisions.31 See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State 
30 See nlso Meyerson v. Arizona, 507 F. Supp. 859, 864 (Ariz . 1981) 
("[T]he remedial provision of § 1983 cnnnot be used to circumvent the 
remedial provisions of the Revenue Sharing Act."). 
31 JUSTICE STEVENS in dissent finds contrary indications of congressional 
intent in the snvings clnuses-§ 505 (e) of the FWPCA, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1365 (e) and § 105 (g) (5) of the MPRSA, 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g) (5). 
The language of these clauses, see 1111. 10, 11 , supra, does not, however, 
support the view thnt Congress expressly preserved § 1983 remedies for 
violations of these statutes. As noted, supra, at 13, there is little reason 
to believe that Congress intended to do this when it made reference in 
§ 505 (e) to "any right which any person ... may have under any 
statute or common law or to seek any other relief." The legislative 
history makes clear Congress' intent to allow further enforcement of anti-
pollution standards arising under other statutes or state common law. 
See n. 26, supra. A suit for damages asserting a substantive violation of 
the FWPCA or the ::\1:PRSA is far different, even if the remedy asserted 
is based on the sepnrate right-of-action created in § 1983. We are con-
vinced that the savings clauses do no refer at all to a suit for redress 
of a violation of these statutes-regardless of the source of the right-of-
action asserted. 
Even if this were not the correct interpretation of the savings clauses, 
we recently held that the savings clause in the FWPCA relates only to the 
effect of the accompanying citizen-suit provision. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 
- U. S. - , - (1981) (the section "means only that the provision of 
[a citizen] suit does not revoke other remedies"). The parallel provision 
of the MPRSA is equally limited. 33 U. S. C. § 1415 (g) (5) ("The 
injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right 
which any person ... may have under any statute or common law") ( em-
phasis added). We therefore are not persuaded that the savings clauses 
limit the effect of the overall remedial schemes provided expressly in the 
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Water Control Board, 501 F. Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (re-
jecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chair~ 
man of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the 
comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federal-
ism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the exist-
ence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that 
Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but 
also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise 
would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 
u. s. 14, 23 (1980). 
III 
The remaining two issues on which we granted certiorari 
relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal 
common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which 
these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider the federal common law issues raised 
by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against 
various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage com-
missons, involving the discharge of sewage into ·Lake Michi-
gan. In this case, we need not decide whether a cause of 
action may be brought under federal common law by a pri-
vate plaintiffs, seeking damages. · The Court has now held 
that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water 
pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive 
scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon 
after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee 
v. Illinois, - U. S. - (1981). 
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal com-
Acts. In sum, we think it clea r that t hose express remedies preclude 
suits for damages under § 1983, and that the savings clauses do not 
require a contrary conclusion. 
In so holding, we also note that, contra ry to J uS'rrc E STEVENS' a rgu-
ment, post, at - , n . 11, we do not suggest that the burden is on a 
plaint iff to demonstrate congressional intent to p reserve § 1983 remedies. 
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'mon law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution 
of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this case 
involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and 
regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different 
treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory 
scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with re-
spect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the 
'FWPCA.32 
We therefore must dismiss the federal common law claims 
because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by 
statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under 
the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a 
right of action under those statutes. We vacate the judgment 
below with respect to these two claims, and remand for fur-
ther proceedings. 
It is so ordered, 
32 Indeed, as noted supra, at n. 14, the ocean dumping of sewage sludge 
must end altogether by December 31, 1981. To the extent that Congress 
allowed some continued dumping of sludge prior to that date, this repre-
sents a considered judgment that it made sense to allow entities• like" 
petitioners to adjust to the coming change. 
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Respondents (an organizat,ion whose members harvest fish and shellfish 
off the coast of New York and New Jersey and one individual member) 
brought suit in Federal District Court against petitioners ( various 
governmental entities and officials from New York, New jersey, and 
the Federal Government), alleging damage to fishing grounds caused by 
discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste. Invoking a 
number of legal theories, respondents sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief and compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for petitioners. It rejected respondents1 
federal common-law nuisance claims on the ground that such a cause of 
action is not available to private parties. And as to claims based on 
alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
(MPRSA), the court refused to allow respondents to proceed with such 
claims independently of the provisions of the Acts, which authorize 
private citizens (defined as "persons having an interest which is or may 
be adversely affected") to sue for injunctions to enforce the Acts, 
because respondents had failed to give the notice to the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the States, and any alleged violators required for 
such citizen suits. The Court of Appeals reversed. With respect to 
the FWPCA and MPRSA, the court held that failure to comply with 
i!-Together with No. 79-1754, Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties 
v. National, Sea Clammers Association et al.; No. 79'--1760, City of New 
York et al. v. National Sea Clammers Association et al; and No. 80-12, 
Environmental Protection Agency et al. v. National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 
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the notice provisions did not preclude suits under the Acts in addit ion 
to the authorized citizen suits. The court construed the citizen-suit 
provisions as intended to create a limited cause of action for "private 
attorneys general" ("non-injured" plaintiffs), as opposed to "injured" 
plaintiffs such as respondents, who have an alternative basis for suit 
under the savings clauses in the Acts preserving any right which any 
person may have under "any statute or common law" to enforce any 
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. The court then 
concluded that respondents had an implied statutory right of action. 
With respect to the federal common-law nuisance claims, the court 
rejected the District Court's conclusion that private parties may not 
bring such claims. 
Held: 
1. There is no implied right of action under the FWPCA and MPRSA. 
Pp. 9-18. 
(a) In view of the elaborate provisions in both Acts authorizing 
enforcement suits by government ofF. cials and private citizens, it cannot 
be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication addi-
tional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under the Acts. In 
the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, it 
must be concluded that Congress provided precisely the remedies it con-
sidered appropriate. Pp. 11-14. 
(b) The savings clauses are ambiguous as to Congress' intent to 
"preserve" remedies under the Acts. It is doubtful that the phrase 
"any statute" in those clauses includes the very statute in which the 
phrase is contained. Since it is clear that the citizen-suit provisions 
apply only to persons who can claim some sort of injury, there is PO 
reason to infer the exist ence of a separate cause of action for "in.iurerl ." 
as opposed to "non-injured" plaintiffs, as the Court of Appeals did. 
Pp. 12-14. 
(c) The legislative history of the Acts does not lead to contrary 
conclusions with respect to implied remedies under either Act. Rather 
such history provides affirmative support for the view that Congress 
intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits to apply to all private 
suits under the Acts. P . 15. 
( d) The existence of the express remedies in both Acts demon-
strates that Congress intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise 
might be available to respondents under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., 
Supp. III) for violation of the Acts by any municipalities and sewerage 
boards among petitioners. Pp. 16-18. 
2. The Federal common law of nuisance has been fully pre-empted in 
the area of water pollution by the FWPCA, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 
MIDDLESEX CTY. SEWERAGE AUTH. v. SEA CLAMMERS m 
Syllabus 
U. S. -, and, to the extent ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA 
are involved, by the MPRSA. Pp. 18-19. 
616 F. 2d 1222, vacated and remanded. 
